k***g 发帖数: 7244 | 1 考虑一个简单的Rubinstein Bargainning Model: John和Mary分一块饼,两人交替提出瓜
分方案。假设他们的discount factor 相同,都等于 d. 如果John是第一个提出瓜分方案
的(first proposer),那么最后我们可以算出 (1/(1+d),d/(1+d))是一个唯一的subgame
perfect equlibrium outcome的payoff。
但是如果我们把这个bargaining
model稍微改一下,假设如果John提出一个proposal,Mary可以选择接受或是拒绝,如果Ma
ry拒绝,那么仍然由John继续提出新的proposal,Mary再次选择接受和拒绝,如此下去,
我们仍然假定两人的discount factor相同,都是d,那么在这种情况下,存不存在subgame
perfect equilibrium?如果存在,那么相关的payoff是多少?
多谢,多谢//bow | f*****x 发帖数: 545 | 2 yes, note that every subgame is exactly same as the orginal game. Or this is a
repated one period take-it-or-leave-it offer game. If the equilibrium in one
period is unique, then the repetion of the unique equi. is the equi. of the
game. Otherwise, this game has multi equi.
Perhaps u can restrict the model further, say the pie will become smaller or
bigger at rate r. Finite or infinite period is also important.
瓜
案
(1/(1+d),d/(1+d))是一个唯一的subgame
Ma
,
factor相同,都是d,那么在这种情况下,存不存在subgame
【在 k***g 的大作中提到】 : 考虑一个简单的Rubinstein Bargainning Model: John和Mary分一块饼,两人交替提出瓜 : 分方案。假设他们的discount factor 相同,都等于 d. 如果John是第一个提出瓜分方案 : 的(first proposer),那么最后我们可以算出 (1/(1+d),d/(1+d))是一个唯一的subgame : perfect equlibrium outcome的payoff。 : 但是如果我们把这个bargaining : model稍微改一下,假设如果John提出一个proposal,Mary可以选择接受或是拒绝,如果Ma : ry拒绝,那么仍然由John继续提出新的proposal,Mary再次选择接受和拒绝,如此下去, : 我们仍然假定两人的discount factor相同,都是d,那么在这种情况下,存不存在subgame : perfect equilibrium?如果存在,那么相关的payoff是多少? : 多谢,多谢//bow
| c********y 发帖数: 98 | 3 good point.
【在 f*****x 的大作中提到】 : yes, note that every subgame is exactly same as the orginal game. Or this is a : repated one period take-it-or-leave-it offer game. If the equilibrium in one : period is unique, then the repetion of the unique equi. is the equi. of the : game. Otherwise, this game has multi equi. : Perhaps u can restrict the model further, say the pie will become smaller or : bigger at rate r. Finite or infinite period is also important. : : 瓜 : 案 : (1/(1+d),d/(1+d))是一个唯一的subgame
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