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发帖数: 20965 | 1 The Mitutoyo Case: Will Japan Learn from Its Mistakes or Repeat Them?
Introduction
In the last few years, a number of Japanese companies have been implicated
in export control violations that have highlighted deficiencies in Tokyo's
ability to control the spread of sensitive dual-use technologies. One of the
most prominent and egregious cases is that of the Mitutoyo Corporation, a
leading precision measuring device manufacturer. The charges in this case
revolved around the illegal transfer of five precision measuring devices to
subsidiary in Malaysia via Singapore between 2001 and 2005. In June 2007,
two important final judgments in the case were handed down: on June 25, a
Japanese court gave four former executives multi-year jail sentences and
fined the company 楼45 million (about $350,000 USD); the next day, the
Japanese government imposed a two-phased export ban on the company with a
total duration of three years.
The investigation in Mitutoyo's export activities began after inspections by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in late 2003 and early 2004
turned up one of the company's precision measuring devices in a facility
that had been a part of Libya's now-defunct nuclear weapons program. Before
Tripoli's change of heart in 2003, it had contracted with Pakistani
scientist A.Q. Khan and his network of nuclear suppliers to provide Libya
with a "turn-key" nuclear weapons program.[1] The Mitutoyo
measuring
equipment, a dual-use item that can be used to assist in the manufacturing
of centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, had been transferred
from Japan to Mitutoyo's subsidiary in Malaysia, which in turn sold it (
along with at least one other measuring device) to associates of Khan.
Although this transfer by Mitutoyo is the most notorious, it was only one of
thousands of devices that the company exported without appropriate licenses
over more than a ten-year period.[2] The steps taken by the company to
circumvent Japanese regulations were unprecedented and part of an overall
business strategy to improve export performance.
Although the criminal proceedings ended with the four executives charged in
the case receiving jail terms, the sentences were suspended and it is
unlikely that any of the men will serve time in jail. As part of the
administrative sanctions placed on the company by the Japanese government,
Mitutoyo has been banned from exporting any products out of Japan for a
period of six months starting on July 3, 2007. At the end of this period, a
second phase of the sanctions bans Mitutoyo from exporting certain precision
measurement devices for two-and-a-half years, although exceptions to the
ban will exempt certain users.[3]
The administrative penalties represent the longest ban Tokyo has applied to
one company - a total of three years, which is also the maximum length that
can be imposed on violators under the current law. With approximately 70
percent of Mitutoyo's business coming from exports, the initial six month
ban will impact the company's profitability in the short-term. However the
lasting impact of the second phase of the ban is debatable, even if it is
directed at one of the company's most popular items - computer numerical
control (CNC) three-dimensional measuring devices. With the promised
exemptions for certain customers, the affects of the sanctions on the
company's bottom-line could be minimal. In allowing Mitutoyo to continue to
trade with "safe" entities, it is unlikely that the administrative
punishments will cause serious disruptions in the company's long-term
success. The exemptions also likely ease industry concerns about the supply
of these devices and suggest that Mitutoyo's customers do not have to
scramble to find a new viable supplier.
Although at first glance both the administrative and criminal penalties that
have resulted in this case appear significant, exemptions and other special
allowances have limited the pain for the company and the executives
involved. This "mercy" for those accused in this case is Tokyo's
way of
balancing justice with economic needs.
The question remains whether other companies could duplicate - or even
improve on - Mitutoyo's system of circumvention. As Japan looks to
strengthen its export controls in order to prevent any unwanted transfers of
dual-use technology, the judgments in this case could impede effective
reform as the consequences for bad behavior are not sufficiently obvious to
serve as a deterrent against similar, profit-motivated behavior.
Export Controls: Stopping Proliferation at the Source
Historically, efforts by states to develop nuclear and missile programs have
benefited greatly from foreign assistance. In most cases, the assistance
was not condoned by the supplier country but instead came about through
illicit transfers of knowledge and equipment. Iraq's pre-1991 efforts to
build a nuclear weapon - and its success in creating chemical weapons and
missiles - were assisted by lax export controls in Western countries. In the
case of Pakistan, the now notorious A.Q. Khan network supplied Islamabad's
nuclear program with much needed materials and technical know-how. Both Iran
and North Korea have established supply networks aimed at illicitly
obtaining sensitive dual-use equipment.
As these cases of proliferation highlight, export controls can be an
important tool for slowing the progress of proliferation internationally.
Ideally, strong export control systems in countries capable of supplying
sensitive materials work within the overall nonproliferation regime to
impede the ability of state and non-state actors to develop WMD programs.
Although most supplier countries recognize the importance of having a viable
export control program, they also recognize the necessity of balancing
nonproliferation regulations with economic and trade policies. Maintaining
this balance has proved a constant challenge for supplier countries.
Japan's export control system is generally considered to be one of the
strongest in the world. However, as with any export control system, Tokyo's
export control efforts are challenged by technological advances and the
sheer volume of trade that flows through its borders. Japan's difficulties
in addressing both these areas played a key role in allowing Mitutoyo to
carry out its strategy of circumvention.
Corporate Culture Fostering Noncompliance
Mitutoyo, founded in 1934 by Yehan Numata, was the first Japanese producer
of precise measuring devices known as micrometers. The company opened its
first foreign subsidiary - the MTI Corporation - in New York City in 1963.[4
] As of early 2006, the company had about 2,400 employees in Japan; it also
had subsidiaries in 26 countries, employing upwards of 4,500 worldwide.[5]
It has become a global leader in the manufacturing of precision measuring
instruments with about 30 percent of the global market.[6]
Despite Mitutoyo's significant growth in the last 70 years, the company
remained a "family business" for most of its history, breading
chronic
nepotism within the leadership. Those who have studied the company and the
violations it committed point to the company's corporate culture as a
contributing factor in the ultimate decision to be noncompliant with Japan's
export control laws. At Mitutoyo, the company president, a title that
remained within the Numata family for six decades, was the preeminent
decision maker within the company; decisions came from above with often
little effort to gain input or consensus from other executives. As a result,
company executives concerned with export compliance would have had little
opportunity to affect decisions with regards to high-tech transfers.[7]
In the 1980's, during a period when licensing laws in Japan were more
relaxed, Mitutoyo began transferring high-tech measuring devices to entities
in Iran. Between 1982 and 1992, the company transferred numerous three-
dimensional measuring equipment and several other precision measuring
devices to entities connected to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the
Ministry of Defense |
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