t***h
发帖数: 5601 | 1 原帖已于2015-07-08下午一点多被同主题删除，以下是根据归档和网页快照恢复的部分
内容。
发信人: wahrheit (), 信区: Picture
标 题: Re: 英国卫报:一个股市泡沫中国政府就慌了,来了真正的危机咋办
发信站: 水木社区 (Tue Jul 7 23:46:00 2015), 站内
你有病啊? 谁说“下跌150%”了? 就你自己在说而已.
告诉你, 从5000多点降到现在的3700多点, 其实就是下跌25%, 还不到30%.
至于说2000点是被低估, 3500点以上才符合价值, 这应该让市场自己去发现和判断. 如
果中国的股市有投资价值, 那政府就可以放心了, 更没必要“救市”了.
。从3500点以上才算是超过本来价值。你只看涨跌，有意义么？再者，不控制的话，这
周就可以回到2000点以下了。
%，切，你只不过拿这个数字来进行曲解，糊弄谁呢？是个人都知道看绝对点数，而是
幅度。你能不能算算下跌150%是多少点，太没文化了。
发信人: sambob126 (喜欢逛), 信区: Picture
标 题: Re: 英国卫报:一个股市泡沫中国政府就慌了,来了真正的危机咋办
发信站: 水木社区 (Tue Jul 7 08:22:26 2015), 站内
这报纸胡说八道，就是欺骗围观群众罢了。你看看英国股市暴跌30%，政府救不救。反
正当年美国是救了，还出现过直接宣布当天交易无效。
如果不理解，这么举个例子：如果银行出现全国性挤兑了，你觉得政府该不该出手？如
果粮食已经出过全国性疯狂挤兑了，你觉得政府该不该出手？如果大米涨价到100000块
一斤了，你觉得政府该不该出手？还是放任市场自由波动？
凡是认为市场万能的，都是无知的。这个世界上已经没有任何一个政府相信市场万能论
了，自1929年以来。
to the point where they are cheap.
发信人: shysky (2.5), 信区: Picture
标 题: Re: 英国卫报:一个股市泡沫中国政府就慌了,来了真正的危机咋办
发信站: 水木社区 (Tue Jul 7 08:35:14 2015), 站内
在中国，一个公司只要上市了，融资问题基本解决，就很难死掉了。养1万个很难死掉
的公司，时间久了，慢慢沉淀，可能涌现出一批优质的公司。
归根到底，经济这东西，就是一个数字游戏。其实中国的制造力很强，但是不是你生产
出多少钢材才是经济好，要把这个游戏玩的好，资本市场是最重要的。
说个简单的，如果股市一直牛市，起码金融产业会快速膨胀，给经济发展注入重大动力
。金融服务业也是国家希望大力发展的。
问题
发信人: wahrheit (), 信区: Picture
标 题: Re: 英国卫报:一个股市泡沫中国政府就慌了,来了真正的危机咋办
发信站: 水木社区 (Tue Jul 7 2015), 站内
(1) 2008年美国出台的是一个暂时性的禁止做空金融股票令, 期限不超过30天.
(2) 此禁令仅限于金融类企业的股票, 而其它大多数股票的做空均不受限制.
(3) 这个禁令是针对金融股票做空的, 与股指期货没有任何关系.
反正当年美国是救了，还出现过直接宣布当天交易无效。
如果粮食已经出过全国性疯狂挤兑了，你觉得政府该不该出手？如果大米涨价到100000
块一斤了，你觉得政府该不该出手？还是放任市场自由波动？
发信人: wahrheit (), 信区: Picture
标 题: Re: 英国卫报:一个股市泡沫中国政府就慌了,来了真正的危机咋办
发信站: 水木社区 (Tue Jul 7 2015), 站内
你少在这里胡说八道了.
中国的哪家银行出现挤兑了? 中国哪个地方的粮食涨到100000块一斤了?
中国的经济基本面良好, 根本没有发生金融危机. 股市跌30%又怎么了? 从去年2000点
到今年5000多点, 股市大幅上涨150%, 你看不见吗?
反正当年美国是救了，还出现过直接宣布当天交易无效。
如果粮食已经出过全国性疯狂挤兑了，你觉得政府该不该出手？如果大米涨价到100000
块一斤了，你觉得政府该不该出手？还是放任市场自由波动？
发信人: sambob126 (喜欢逛), 信区: Picture
标 题: Re: 英国卫报:一个股市泡沫中国政府就慌了,来了真正的危机咋办
发信站: 水木社区 (Tue Jul 7 10:14:11 2015), 站内
这人连数都不会算，你还和他较真。
他还真以为上涨150%就要下跌150%，都傻成啥样，连个上涨150%，下跌只要60%都不知
道。网上还真有一堆人相信英国那个报道，仅仅就去看150%、30%。这也就是偏偏英国
人罢了，毕竟他们全国人都不会数学。
发信人: maple0 (我思故我不在，我未思故我在), 信区: Picture
标 题: Re: 英国卫报:一个股市泡沫中国政府就慌了,来了真正的危机咋办
发信站: 水木社区 (Wed Jul 8 09:00:23 2015), 站内
普遍认为此次救市主要原因是国家队没跑出来，因此国家慌乱也完全可以理解---亏钱了
有人贴出证据之一是交通银行还有几家银行股票在5000点时股价与3700点股价一致
http://quote.eastmoney.com/flash/flash.html?c=601328&n=%e4%ba%a
话说回来，08年股市直奔1500点，也没见国家有啥救市行为，此次跌了上回的20%不到
就慌了，这里明显是有问题的
发信人: wahrheit (), 信区: Picture
标 题: Re: 英国卫报:一个股市泡沫中国政府就慌了,来了真正的危机咋办
发信站: 水木社区 (Wed Jul 8 12:15:00 2015), 站内
股市当然会影响实体经济, 但问题在于有多大影响?
2001-2006年, A股从2000点跌到1000多点; 2010-2014年, A股从3000点跌到2000点; 这
都是长达四五年的熊市. 当时的中国GDP增长率都在两位数左右, 并未受到股市下跌的
影响.
至于说股权抵押贷款, 股价下跌正好是释放风险, 按照正常程序补充抵押品就行了. 银
行对此早有准备, 而且此类贷款数量也不多. 而对于企业, 如果其经营依赖于股权抵押
贷款, 那只能说明这家企业很成问题.
过快下跌，已经触及银行强制平仓的底线。如果真的发生，首先由于不足额抵押银行必
定积累大量坏账；对于企业，会造成公司财务嫉妒恶化，极端会出现现金流中断，正常
经营受到影响，不要说和这些上市公司关联的公司。你去看看现在半数上市公司停牌的
现象，就能验证这点。
发信人: wahrheit (), 信区: StockAnalysis
标 题: Re: 英国卫报:一个股市泡沫中国政府就慌了,来了真正的危机咋办
发信站: 水木社区 (Wed Jul 8 12:34:00 2015), 站内
现在中国GDP增长率在7.0%左右, 这是经济规律产生的新常态. 你如果不信统计局, 那
是另外一回事, 但与股市无关.
事实上, 目前中国的GDP增长率仍然是G20经济体中最高的之一. 但中国作为世界第二大
经济体, 不可能永远高速增长.
中国经济的新常态与股市并无直接联系. 股市出现泡沫, 市场自行调整, 这是合理正常
的现象. | t***h
发帖数: 5601 | 2 http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/05/china-panicking
Sunday 5 July 2015 08.59 BST
As with many things in China, the numbers are staggering. The two main
indices - the Shanghai Composite and the Shenzhen Composite - had risen
about 150% in the 12 months to mid-June. In terms of market value, that was
a gain of about $6.5tn. Since then, the market has tumbled almost 30% - call
it a $2tn plunge.
What's the big deal? Shares never go up in a straight line and anybody who
bought a year ago has still more than doubled their money. But there are
several potential problems, at least to Beijing's apparent way of thinking.
First, there are a lot of latecomers to the share frenzy. In May, just
before prices started to fall, 12 million trading accounts were opened.
Second, some latecomers are novices ill-equipped to take losses. Trading on
margin - using borrowed money - is commonplace in China, raising the
likelihood that losing investors will be forced to get out in a hurry,
creating more selling pressure.
Third, a crash in the share market could hit the real economy. Consumer
confidence could be damaged. More directly, companies could find it hard to
raise capital and the gradual liberalisation of the Chinese economy could
stall as locals and foreigners conclude it is safer to stay away.
Such worries explain why the authorities seem so keen to put a floor under
share prices. Interest rates have been cut and margin requirements have been
relaxed, seemingly to help investors with their backs to the wall. Banks
have been told they can hold less capital with the central bank, freeing up
liquidity in the financial system. So far, nothing has worked.
On Friday, operations took a new direction. The securities regulator said it
would look for "clues of illegal manipulation across markets". In other
words, short-sellers and devious individuals are being blamed - a
traditional excuse for authorities who like there to be a culprit. Maybe
more measures will follow if the market continues to fall. Already, voices
can be heard calling for direct intervention - in other words, the state
buying shares.
The Chinese do things differently, but these measures seem a ridiculous over
-reaction. If the authorities feel compelled to intervene every time the
stock market rises 150% then corrects by 30%, they are creating massive
problems for the future. Investors will believe it really is true that the
share prices are "officially sanctioned". Instead of assessing companies'
prospects intelligently, investors will try to guess the intentions of the
bigwigs in Beijing. You can't liberalize an economy that way; you just
create the risk of an even bigger bubble next time.
Even if one accepted the dubious proposition that emergency measures could
be justified to prevent damage to the wider economy, the authorities acted
far too soon. The interest rate cut came after a 20% fall from the mid-June
highs. That was a mere slip in the context of the market's rise. No wonder
investors were not reassured. Beijing was sending a message that it is
setting interest rates for the stock market rather than the economy. What
happened to famous Chinese long-termism?
The only certain way to deal with a stock market bubble is let prices fall
to the point where they are cheap. At 20 times earnings, the Chinese market
is not an obvious bargain even after these declines. The deeper worry is
this: if the Chinese authorities think a wobble in the stock market is a
threat to financial stability, do they have the ammunition to cope with a
proper crisis in the more important property market? |
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