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Military版 - 胡锦涛的遗产 (转载)
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【 以下文字转载自 ChinaNews 讨论区 】
发信人: communipig2 (豬2), 信区: ChinaNews
标 题: 胡锦涛的遗产
发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Fri Jan 13 14:47:44 2012, 美东)
【看中国记者魏锦华编译】本文译自江学勤(Jiang Xueqin)1月12日发表在《外交学
者》上的文章。
上周,超级博主David Cohen讨论了胡锦涛的文章论述中国和西方开始了文化战。胡锦
涛在文中所用的语言和修辞“我们必须清楚地看到,国际敌对势力正在加紧西化和分裂
中国的战略图谋,思想和文化领域,是其长期渗透的重点”—这让西方观察家感到震惊
,并让人想起了红卫兵挥舞着红宝书的场景。
在胡锦涛任职期间,他表现出了最自律,最不露痕迹的技术官僚形象。所以他的此次言
论是非常少见的值得一评的事件。我想对他的文章及其对中国2012年产生的影响发表看
法。
首先,我同意David Cohen的说法,胡锦涛的文章是讲给体制内的党员听的。明年10月
交接权力之前,胡锦涛有两个直接的担忧:他要留下政治遗产,同时为共产党未来规划
战略。
第二,胡锦涛文章最有意思的地方,不是他讲了什么,而是他没讲什么:即,他选择了
强调一个没多少人会认为是问题的一个问题,而留下了他10年前从江泽民那里继承的至
今尚未解决的问题——不断加大的贫富差距,党内腐败,中国道德沦丧。
在整个任职期间,胡锦涛在他严厉而又空洞的讲话中强调过那三个问题,最近一次是在
纪念中共成立90周年的讲话中。而这些问题只是变得更严重。
利用排外心里散布恐怖是转移真正紧迫问题的政治技巧,“流氓的最后一招”暗示了中
共已经变得多么绝望。
第三,胡锦涛的文章暗示了中国道德的败坏——以去年郭美美和小悦悦事件为象征性事
件—表明了中国文化作品对中国人心灵影响的失败,而这不是中国经济增长模式的副产
品。
没错,军队激发农民参加共产主义革命,但是今天的中国不再是为反对地主压迫和洋鬼
子而战斗,而是对付自己的民众,更具体点,自诩为北京共识的政治安排,即如果中国
的中产阶级政治上保持缄默,党可以保证“繁荣稳定”。
北京共识可以为党带来短期的政治合法性,但长期却是以中国经济发展和社会结构为代
价的。
为什么?想想安然和华尔街,这两件事都是以其员工的贪婪而闻名。有一段时间,他们
的利润高到令人目眩,但最终安然因为谎言和欺诈破产,而华尔街如果不是政府干预的
话也会步其后尘。
中国的经济,因为其资不抵债的银行和惊人的地方政府债务,可能会成为最大的危机。
Daniel Pink在他的书“亡命驾驶”(Drive)中谈到刺激人们的功利本能,会导致人们
不快乐,缺乏创造性,不道德,成为只是为了挣尽可能多钱而上瘾的短视者。这在今天
中国很多中产阶级中是非常显而易见的,中国中产阶级痴迷地积攒路易威登皮包,既对
中国经济没好处,也不利于他们的灵魂。
第四,即最后,胡惊涛文章的措辞、语气和精神,都与温家宝呼吁中国发展“民主”和
“创造力”的讲话形成了鲜明的对比。
温家宝呼吁表明了对新的现实--互联网、全球化和自由市场--的了解,释放民众的创造
力和让他们发表政治观点是一回事。如果政府拒绝这么做,不仅会妨碍经济增长,也可
能失去政治上的合法性和权威性 -- 现在的共产党越来越是这样的情况。
不幸的是,中共之所以如此,是因为它缺乏政治想象力,也因为它对维持权力的痴迷使
得它看不见新的现实。所以,在2012年,我们会看到更可怕的措辞和审查,尤其是在中
国的社交网站上。
作者介绍:江学勤是北大附中国际部主任和副校长。从2008年到2010年,江学勤创建并
管理深圳中学海外学习计划。他曾经当过记者,纪录片制造商,和联合国新闻官。
http://the-diplomat.com/china-power/2012/01/12/hu-jintao%E2%80%
Hu Jintao’s Legacy
By Jiang Xueqin
January 12, 2012
Last week, fellow China Power blogger David Cohen discussed Chinese
President Hu Jintao’s essay remarking that China and the West are locked in
a cultural war. The language and rhetoric used in the essay – “We must
clearly see that international hostile forces are intensifying the strategic
plot of Westernizing and dividing China, and ideological and cultural
fields are the focal areas of their long-term infiltration” – alarmed
Western observers, and brought to mind images of Red Book-waving Red Guards.
Throughout his tenure, Hu has presented himself as the most disciplined and
faceless of technocrats, so this is one of those rare moments when he’s
actually said something worth commenting on. I’d like to offer some
thoughts on Hu’s essay, and what it means for China in 2012.
First, I agree with David Cohen that Hu’s essay, like everything uttered by
any Chinese leader, is meant for internal Communist Party consumption. In
the lead-up to the October 2012 transfer of power, Hu has two immediate
concerns: creating his legacy, while mapping out the Communist Party’s
future strategy.
Second, what’s most interesting about Hu’s essay is not what he says, but
what he doesn’t say: namely, that he chooses to focus on a problem that
few in China think is actually a problem, while leaving out the still
unresolved issues that he inherited ten years earlier from Jiang Zemin –
the growing gap between the haves and have-nots, internal Party corruption,
and China’s moral bankruptcy.
Throughout his tenure, Hu emphasized these three issues in dour empty
speeches, most recently in his speech commemorating the 90th anniversary of
the founding of China’s Communist Party in July 2011. Meanwhile, these
problems have only worsened.
It’s always politically clever to use xenophobic fear-mongering to distract
from real pressing issues, and this “last resort of scoundrels” hints at
how desperate the Party has become.
Third, Hu’s essay implies that China’s moral decay – as symbolized by
last year’s Guo Meimei and Wang Yue cases – represents a failure of China
’s cultural producers to influence the hearts and minds of Chinese, and not
a by-product of China’s economic growth model.
Yes, the People’s Liberation Army with song and dance did inspire peasants
to join the Communist Revolution, but China today is no longer fighting
against oppressive landlords and foreign devils, but rather itself;
specifically, the much vaunted Beijing Consensus, a political arrangement in
which the Party promises “prosperity and stability” if China’s middle
class shuts its political mouth.
The Beijing Consensus has given the Party short-term political legitimacy at
the long-term cost of China’s economic development and social fabric.
To understand how, consider Enron and Wall Street, both of which seemed to
take pride in appealing to their employees’ greed. For a while their
profits reached dizzying heights, but eventually Enron went bankrupt under
the weight of its own lies and scams, while Wall Street would have gone
under as well if Washington hadn’t intervened. And China’s economy, with
its insolvent banks and staggering local government debt, may be the biggest
house of cards yet.
Daniel Pink in his book Drive argues that appealing to people’s utilitarian
instincts leads to people being unhappy, uncreative, and unethical short-
term thinkers addicted to making as much money as possible. This is evident
in many of China’s middle class today, and the Chinese middle class
obsession with accumulating Louis Vuitton bags is neither good for China’s
economy, nor for its soul.
Fourth and finally, in rhetoric, tone and spirit, Hu’s essay is a
remarkable contrast to Premier Wen Jiabao’s speeches calling for China to
develop “democracy” and “creativity.”
Such calls represent an understanding that, in the new reality of the
Internet, globalization, and the free market, unleashing the citizenry’s
creativity and letting them open their political mouths are one and the same
. If governments refuse to do so, not only will that hamper economic growth
, but they could also lose political legitimacy and authority – as is
increasingly the case with the Communist Party today.
Unfortunately, China’s Communist Party is so because it lacks political
imagination and because its obsession with maintaining power makes it blind
to new realities. So expect more scary rhetoric and censorship, especially
in China’s social media, in 2012.
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