a********r
发帖数: 597 | 1 摘要：2001年方舟子在《南方周末》发表《科学地解决道德难题？》一文，本文详细回
顾方舟子文章与对应的《科学》杂志原文，对比直译或者甚小改动的复述内容，及明确
的复述内容。在此基础上，确定方舟子几乎没有原创内容。进一步针对其原创内容检验
，发现少到可以忽略不计的原创内容错误成堆。揭露方舟子抱着谴责他的《科学》编辑
部来信当着支持他的证据，出了国际洋相还说洋人维护他。最后我以方舟子的判定抄袭
剽窃的标准，论证方舟子该文属于剽窃。
全文：
由于本文在最后一节结论时要用到方舟子语录，学习方舟子语录转到相应章节。
一、方舟子文章与原文对比
2001年9月14日，《科学》杂志上发表了J. D. Greene等人报告了对人进行道德判断的
研究结果（Science, 293, 2105-2108）。2001年10月4日方舟子在《南方周末》上发表
《科学地解决道德难题？》一文。方舟子编译英文冒充原创在下面以逐段列表的方式进
行对比，如果是原文翻译或者稍微改动地复述原作者内容，则标记为红色；如果是依据
原文写作，明确判定为复述，则标记为橙色；如果属于原创，则为黑色。为方便评论，
各段加入序列号。如果一段话来自多个源，则用带圈数字排序。
http://www.sciencenet.cn/m/user_content.aspx?id=348444
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Plagiarism 在美国有明确的界定，我仔细把方的文章和原文读了一遍，很明显
plagiarism,这种人还有脸一天举着正义的旗帜到处打假。丢尽了生物千老的脸了。 | a********r
发帖数: 597 | 2 Science 的原文：
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An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment.Authors:
Greene, Joshua D.
Sommerville, R. Brian
Nystrom, Leigh E.
Darley, John M.
Cohen, Jonathan D.Source:Science; 9/14/2001, Vol. 293 Issue 5537, p2105, 4p,
1 Diagram, 1 GraphDocument Type:ArticleSubject Terms:JUDGMENT (Ethics)
EMOTIONS
REASONING (Psychology)Abstract:Explores the emotional engagement in moral
judgement using two functional magnetic resonance imaging. Efficacy of
cognitive science methods in the study of moral judgment; Role of reason and
emotion in moral judgement; Employment of moral dilemmas as probes.Full
Text Word Count:4316ISSN:00368075Accession Number:5260664Database: Health
Source: Nursing/Academic Edition
Section: Reports
The long-standing rationalist tradition in moral psychology emphasizes the
role of reason in moral judgment. A more recent trend places increased
emphasis on emotion. Although both reason and emotion are likely to play
important roles in moral judgment, relatively little is known about their
neural correlates, the nature of their interaction, and the factors that
modulate their respective behavioral influences in the context of moral
judgment. In two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using
moral dilemmas as probes, we apply the methods of cognitive neuroscience to
the study of moral judgment. We argue that moral dilemmas vary
systematically in the extent to which they engage emotional processing and
that these variations in emotional engagement influence moral judgment.
These results may shed light on some puzzling patterns in moral judgment
observed by contemporary philosophers.
The present study was inspired by a family of ethical dilemmas familiar to
contemporary moral philosophers ( 1). One such dilemma is the trolley
dilemma: A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if
it proceeds on its present course. The only way to save them is to hit a
switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it
will kill one person instead of five. Ought you to turn the trolley in order
to save five people at the expense of one? Most people say yes. Now
consider a similar problem, the footbridge dilemma. As before, a trolley
threatens to kill five people. You are standing next to a large stranger on
a footbridge that spans the tracks, in between the oncoming trolley and the
five people. In this scenario, the only way to save the five people is to
push this stranger off the bridge, onto the tracks below. He will die if you
do this, but his body will stop the trolley from reaching the others. Ought
you to save the five others by pushing this stranger to his death? Most
people say no.
Taken together, these two dilemmas create a puzzle for moral philosophers:
What makes it morally acceptable to sacrifice one life to save five in the
trolley dilemma but not in the footbridge dilemma? Many answers have been
proposed. For example, one might suggest, in a Kantian vein, that the
difference between these two cases lies in the fact that in the footbridge
dilemma one literally uses a fellow human being as a means to some
independent end, whereas in the trolley dilemma the unfortunate person just
happens to be in the way. This answer, however, runs into trouble with a
variant of the trolley dilemma in which the track leading to the one person
loops around to connect with the track leading to the five people ( 1). Here
we will suppose that without a body on the alternate track, the trolley
would, if turned that way, make its way to the other track and kill the five
people as well. In this variant, as in the footbridge dilemma, you would
use someone's body to stop the trolley from killing the five. Most agree,
nevertheless, that it is still appropriate to turn the trolley in this case
in spite of the fact that here, too, we have a case of "using." These are
just one proposed solution and one counterexample, but together they
illustrate the sort of dialectical difficulties that all proposed solutions
to this problem have encountered. If a solution to this problem exists, it
is not obvious. That is, there is no set of consistent, readily accessible
moral principles that captures people's intuitions concerning what behavior
is or is not appropriate in these and similar cases. This leaves
psychologists with a puzzle of their own: How is it that nearly everyone
manages to conclude that it is acceptable to sacrifice one life for five in
the trolley dilemma but not in the footbridge dilemma, in spite of the fact
that a satisfying justification for distinguishing between these two cases
is remarkably difficult to find ( 2)?
We maintain that, from a psychological point of view, the crucial difference
between the trolley dilemma and the footbridge dilemma lies in the latter's
tendency to engage people's emotions in a way that the former does not. The
thought of pushing someone to his death is, we propose, more emotionally
salien | a********r
发帖数: 597 | 3 注: 本翻译由自动翻译程序产生，旨在表达原文的内容。 该程序不能保证产生的译文
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Translations powered by Language Weaver Service
Title: An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment. By:
Greene, Joshua D., Sommerville, R. Brian, Nystrom, Leigh E., Darley, John M.
, Cohen, Jonathan D., Science, 00368075, 9/14/2001, Vol. 293, Issue
5537Database: Health Source: Nursing/Academic EditionResult List Refine
Search Result 1 of 1 .
html全文 一个利用调查的情绪参与道德判断
目录
参考资料和说明
第:报告
长期以来在理性传统道德心理的作用,强调,在道德的判断。 更多的趋势更加强调地方
的情绪。 虽然这两个原因和情绪都可能将发挥重要作用的道德判断,相对不太了解其神
经息息相关,其性质的相互作用,和因素,调制各自行为影响的范围内的道德判断。 在两
个功能磁共振成像(利用)研究使用道义困境调查,我们的方法适用的认知神经科学研究
的道德判断。 我们认为,道德困境有系统地在不同的程度进行处理和情绪,这些变化的
情绪影响参与道德的判断。 这些结果可能会使一些令人费解模式遵守道德判断当代哲
学家。
本研究借鉴了一个家庭的道德难题熟悉当代道德哲学家( 1)。 一个两难的小车是两难
境地:一是领导小车失控的5人被杀害的收益,如果其目前的道路。 的唯一途径,节省他
们是打击一切换,将把小车到一个备用的轨道,它将杀死一人而不是五。 你应该把小车
为了节省五人牺牲呢? 大部分的人说是。 现在考虑一个类似的问题,该桥困境。 前,一
架手推车威胁杀害五名。 你是站在一个陌生的天桥,横跨轨道,迎面驶来的小车,五人。
在这种情况下,才可节省五人是推动这个陌生人的桥,路轨如下。 他会死去,如果你这
样做,但他的尸体将停止手推车进入其他人。 你应该为节省其他五个推进这个陌生人,
他的死亡? 大部分人都说没有。
这两个难题困扰创造一个道德哲学家:是什么使它在道义上是可以接受,牺牲一生,节省0
小车的困境,但在天桥矛盾? 很多答案已经提出。 例如,一个暗示,在一个亚方面,它们
之间的差别在于两个案的事实是,在困境的天桥0确实使用了人,一些独立完,而在轨困境
的人只是不幸发生的事。 这个答案,但是,陷入麻烦的变体的小车两难的轨道,导致一人
循环,连接轨道的5人( 1)。 在这里,我们会想,没有一个机构的候补轨道、手推车将,如
果把这种方法,使其对其他轨道和杀害五人。 在这种办法,如在天桥困境,你将使用一个
人的身体的小车,停止杀害五名。 多数同意,然而,它仍然是适当的小车在这种情况下,
尽管在这里,我们也有一个“使用”。这是一个建议的解决办法,一个被,但这就说明这
种辩证困难,所有提出的解决办法,这一问题已经出现。 如果一个解决这一问题的存在,
这并不明显。 这是,没有一定的一致的,可随时道德原则,体现了人民与关于行为或是不
适当的这些和类似的案件。 这使得心理学家与拼图自己:如何,几乎每个人都能得出结
论,这是可以接受牺牲0 0生活困境的小车,但在天桥困境,尽管这一事实,一个满意理由
区分这两个案件是非常难找到( 2)?
我们认为,从心理角度来看,关键的差别的小车之间的矛盾和天桥困境在于后者的倾向,
让人们的情绪,并不前。 想推动有人对他的死,我们建议,更比情绪突出的想法,击中了
一个开关,将造成小车产生同样的后果,而且这种情绪反应,占人民的倾向,把这些情况不
同。 关于这一假设这两个案件提出一个更一般假设关于道德判断:一些道德困境(类似
的恰当的天桥困境)进行处理情绪的程度比其他人(类似的恰当的小车困境),而这些差异
的情绪参与影响人的判决。 目前的调查是企图测试一下,更一般假设。 最近利用工作
的神经相关因素的情绪( 3-5),我们预测,脑部相关领域的情绪会更积极在预期等难题的
天桥困境,而在预期等难题的小车困境。 此外,我们预测行为干预模式类似,在认知工作
自动程序可以影响反应,如斯特鲁普工作的身分的颜色Word可以干扰的能力,与会者姓名
的颜色,它是展示;例如,可以说“绿色”针对“红”写在绿墨)( 6、 7)。 鉴于我们的
建议,人们往往会有一个突出,自动情绪反应的天桥困境,使他们的行动,法官提出不恰当
的,我们希望这些较为罕见)个人不过法官这一行动是适当,对一个反补贴情绪反应,展览
再反应,这种情绪干扰。 更多一般来说,我们预测再反应次审讯,参与者的反应,是不相
宜的情绪反应(例如,“适当”等一个两难困境的天桥)。 我们预计没有这种影响困境的
小车等问题,根据我们的理论,是不太可能引起强烈情绪反应。 | a********r
发帖数: 597 | |
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