c*******v
发帖数: 2599 | 1 从下面的话看来，格林厄姆对股市的波动升降，以及个股的波动升降显然非常熟悉，并
且拥有极其丰富的经验。
总结出来价值投资，看来是因为觉得更profitable。
而不是人家不懂技术分析。
There are two elements of basic importance, I think, that the analyst should
recognize in the behavior of stocks over the last six years. The first is
the principle of continuity, and the other is what I would call the
principle of deceptive selectivity in the stock market.
First, with regard to continuity: The extraordinary thing about the
securities market, if you judge it over a long period of years, is the fact
that it does not go off on tangents permanently, but it remains in
continuous orbit. When I say that it doesn't go off on tangents, I mean the
simple point that after the stock market goes up a great deal it not only
comes down a great deal but it comes down to levels to which we had
previously been accustomed. Thus we have never found the stock market as a
whole going off into new areas and staying there permanently because there
has been a permanent change in the basic conditions. I think you would have
expected such new departures in stock prices. For the last thirty years, the
period of time that I have watched the securities market, we have had two
world wars; we have had a tremendous boom and a tremendous deflation; we now
have the Atomic Age on us. Thus you might well assume that the security
market could really have been permanently transformed at one time or another
, so that the past records might not have been very useful in judging future
values.
These remarks are relevant, of course, to developments since 1940. When the
security market advanced in the last few years to levels which were not
unexampled but which were high in relation to past experience, there was a
general tendency for security analysts to assume that a new level of values
had been established for stock prices which was quite different from those
we had previously been accustomed to. It may very well be that individual
stocks as a whole are worth more than they used to be. But the thing that
doesn't seem to be true is that they are worth so much more than they used
to be that past experience -- i.e., past levels and patterns of behavior --
can be discarded.
One way of expressing the principle of continuity in concrete terms would be
as follows: When you look at the stock market as a whole, you will find
from experience that after it has advanced a good deal it not only goes down
-- that is obvious -- but it goes down to levels substantially below
earlier high levels. Hence it has always been possible to buy stocks at
lower prices than the highest of previous moves, not of the current move.
That means, in short, that the investor who says he does not wish to buy
securities at high levels, because they don't appeal to him on a historical
basis or on an analytical basis, can point to past experience to warrant the
assumption that he will have an opportunity to buy them at lower prices --
not only lower than current high prices, but lower than previous high levels
. In sum, therefore, you can take previous high levels, if you wish, as a
measure of the danger point in the stock market for investors, and I think
you will find that past experience would bear you out using this as a
practical guide. Thus, if you look at this chart of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average, you can see there has never been a time in which the price level
has broken out, in a once-for-all or permanent way, from its past area of
fluctuations. That is the thing I have been trying to point out in the last
few minutes.
Another way of illustrating the principle of continuity is by looking at the
long-term earnings of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. We have figures
here running back to 1915, which is more than thirty years, and it is
extraordinary to see the persistence with which the earnings of the Dow-
Jones Industrial Average return to a figure of about $10 per unit. It is
true that they got away from it repeatedly. In 1917, for example, they got
up to $22 a unit; but in 1921 they earned nothing. And a few years later
they were back to $10. In 1915 the earnings of the unit were $10.59; in 1945
they were practically the same. All of the changes in between appear to
have been merely of fluctuations around the central figure. So much for this
idea of continuity?
The second thing that I want to talk about is selectivity. Here is an idea
that has misled security analysts and advisers to a very great extent. In
the few weeks preceding the recent break in the stock market I noticed that
a great many of the brokerage house advisers were saying that now that the
market has ceased to go up continuously, the thing to do is to exercise
selectivity in your purchases; and in that way you can still derive benefits
from security price changes. Well, it stands to reason that if you define
selectivity as picking out a stock which is going to go up a good deal later
on -- or more than the rest -- you are going to benefit. But that is too
obvious a definition. What the commentators mean, as is evident from their
actual arguments, is that if you buy the securities which apparently have
good earnings prospects, you will then benefit market-wise; whereas if you
buy the others you won't.
History shows this to be a very plausible idea but an extremely misleading
one; that is why I referred to this concept of selectivity as deceptive. One
of the easiest ways to illustrate that is by taking two securities here in
the Dow-Jones Average, National Distillers and United Aircraft. You will
find that National Distillers sold at lower average prices in 1940-1942 than
in 1935-1939. No doubt there was a general feeling that the company's
prospects were not good, primarily because it was thought that war would not
be a very good thing for a luxury type of business such as whiskey is
politely considered to be.
In the same way you will find that the United Aircraft Company through 1940-
1942, was better regarded than the average stock, because it was thought
that here was a company that had especially good prospects of making money;
and so it did. But if you had bought and sold these securities, as most
people seem to have done, on the basis of these obvious differential
prospects, you would have made a complete error. For, as you see, National
Distillers went up from the low of 1940 more than fivefold recently, and is
now selling nearly four times its 1940 price. The buyer of United Aircraft
would have had a very small profit at its best price and would now have a
loss of one third of his money.
This principle of selectivity can be explored in various other ways. | l*****e
发帖数: 3343 | 2 why not mark this???
Exactly what I realized in these three months! |
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