z***7
发帖数: 555 | 1 Why did IBM's OS/2 project lose to Microsoft, given that IBM had much more
resources than Microsoft at that time?
Great question. I'm the founder of Team OS/2 and IBM's first OS/2 Evangelist
, so I lived through the answer to your question for a decade. There's just
no easy answer - it's like asking what makes any given startup a success or
failure - but I'm happy to share the way I see it.
First a few facts - from memory - you might find relevant that support your
question.
IBM spent more than a billion dollars developing and marketing OS/2.
It was the most advanced operating system of its time - the most secure, the
best architected, and the most powerful - without question (unless perhaps
you were a journalist defending your decision to give the nod to Windows,
perhaps in anticipation of the legendary envelopes of cash that landed
mysteriously on Microsoft-friendly reviewers' desks). One example, it had
pre-emptive multi-tasking (now a staple in multi-core systems and operating
systems) when Windows 3.1 was still running on top of DOS and context-
switching was the norm for any other desktop OS. It would run multiple DOS,
Windows, or OS/2 apps smoothly. It was reliable and almost never crashed -
something DOS and Windows was prone to do regularly. Yet Microsoft slammed
OS/2 in the press (and got the media to echo their whining) because it
needed 4MB (MB! not GB) of RAM - "too much memory" - and could be crashed by
Ballmer at trade shows using specially written code on a diskette.
IBM's Personal Software Products (PSP) - the division I worked for - had
more employees and was better funded than all of Microsoft in the early '90s
. IBM was the dominant force in that relationship, much to Gates chagrin,
but was nonetheless weak-willed in using its power aggressively. I
constantly heard "we should take the high road" in discussions about dealing
with Microsoft. I value ethics as much as anyone, but IBM's Business
Conduct Guidelines assumed perpetual dominant status in the industry and
because they handcuffed executives and employees, they were thus inadequate
to deal with foul play on the part of an underdog business partner. I once
heard from reliable sources that Gates had called executives at IBM to
complain about my violation of IBM's Business Conduct Guidelines, without
specifics. I'm pretty sure what he was talking about was how I got quoted in
PC Week as saying that "Bill Gates's gift to the industry is a win/lose
mentality." Wow, I was so guilty as charged.
So, with those facts established, from my perspective, here are the
following lessons to be learned from IBM's failure to establish OS/2 as the
"operating system of the future" - as Bill Gates once called it:
LESSON ONE. As a company, if you are going to adopt and insist on
compliance with strict Business Conduct Guidelines (as IBM and many other
company's did - similar to Google's 'don't be evil' mantra), be aware of
your strategic vulnerability to a company (such as Microsoft) willing to use
other company's scruples as both shield and weapon in their war against you
. In the words of a wise man, you need to be "wise as a serpent, and
harmless as a dove." IBM had the harmless down pat - but they were unable
to outsmart the serpent.
Gates was brilliant in negotiating deals to take advantage of other
companies' blind spots - including their ignorance of Microsoft's
willingness to bend the ethical constraints honored by other companies. For
example, Novell entered into a contract with Microsoft that allowed MS to
include Novell's networking code in Windows Version 3.1. Ever wonder why
the first version of Windows NT was Version 3.1? Now you know. When Noorda
flew to Redmond to try to work things out with Gates, after making Ray wait
for seemingly forever, Bill's response was "So sue me." No wonder when
later, the media asked Noorda why he didn't just have a heart-to-heart with
Gates, his reply was "To have a heart-to-heart, you have to have two hearts."
Everyone also knows that Microsoft encouraged other vendors to develop first
for OS/2 and then for Windows. Some have called this the "head fake" that
destroyed the ISVs (Independent Software Vendors - Lotus, WordPerfect, et al
) and allowed Microsoft and their Windows apps to take the lead. What is
forgotten is that Microsoft also developed for OS/2. What is not well-known
is that Microsoft again sabotaged whatever they shipped for OS/2. So running
Word or Excel on OS/2 was a miserable experience, especially compared to
running Word or Excel on Windows. I know - I used and tested all apps for
Windows and OS/2 available at that time rather extensively. There's no
question in my mind that Microsoft's OS/2-app crappiness was deliberate on
their part.
And not all of the evidence of Microsoft's lack of scruples came out during
their trial for violation of anti-trust laws. There was little or nothing,
for example, on their online character assassination campaigns or
manipulation of the media. As the target of one of their campaigns, I can
tell you that they didn't play nice. Strangely, they were recruiting me at
the same time they were trashing my reputation online and it wasn't a case
of the right hand not knowing what the left hand was doing. 'nuff said, I
hope.
In summary, IBM was foolish to continue to play nice with Microsoft and take
the high road and treat them as a Business Partner under the Business
Conduct Guidelines even after it was clear that Microsoft was out to destroy
OS/2 and IBM's leadership in the PC industry.
LESSON TWO. Strategic brilliance in exploiting the resources you have to
deploy against the resources your competitor has, smart marketing execution,
and cunning media relations all trump engineering genius. Microsoft had
the former. IBM had the latter.
LESSON THREE. If you want to establish a desktop OS as the standard during
the coming of age of the Internet, you had better understand how to get the
media on your side. They established perceptions, and perception became
reality.
Microsoft played many in the media like Itzhak Perlman plays a Stradivarius.
And the media created many of the myths - inconsistent with reality - that
persist to this day and can be seen in many of the answers to this question.
Microsoft succeeded in perpetuating myths like:
"OS/2 was clumsy and IBM's programmers were incompetent while Microsoft's
programmers were geniuses." Totally backwards. OS/2 was a billion-dollar
miracle of software engineering. IBM created rock-solid, reliable, flexible,
elegant, mission-critical operating systems that businesses relied on. OS/2
was in most ATMs for well over a decade. Can you imagine using Windows 3.1
or Windows 95/98 in an ATM? Hahaha. IBM was the company that was #1 in
Forbes for attracting the best and the brightest - especially engineers and
scientists including Nobel Prize winners - back then. Not Microsoft. Case
in point: the web (HTML) is modeled after IBM technology, not Microsoft's.
Yet Microsoft would talk to the media, and IBM was pretty insular. So
Microsoft's twisted version of reality won the day.
"IBM is proprietary but Microsoft is open." How the media bought this lie is
a mystery. Truth: Both were / are proprietary. When it came to enterprise
marketing, Microsoft copied a lot from IBM - just years later. Only in
hindsight is it obvious that the difference (in the consumer tech space at
least) is that Microsoft produced unreliable proprietary crap marketed well,
and IBM produced reliable proprietary quality marketed poorly.
"IBM doesn't care about consumers or the little guy." Again, totally
backwards. IBM supported its products. Microsoft did not and still does not.
IBM did the same thing then that Apple does now - create a solid
infrastructure of well-supported quality and insist that others play by
their well-designed rules. They then supported their products in order to
constantly improve them. On the other hand, Microsoft created an
opportunistic wild, wild west of anything-goes shoddiness that they crammed
down the market's throat using their ruthless disregard for anything but
their own best interests. Explorer anyone? We've just grown accustomed to
believing that software companies don't need to support their products
because that's what Microsoft pioneered.
"IBM couldn't market its way out of a paper bag." IBM didn't get to be the
biggest company in tech throughout the '60s, '70s, and '80s without knowing
how to market. Their marketing prowess in B2B was rightfully legendary.
Where they failed was in media relations and in countering Microsoft's
ruthless perfidy in establishing a monopoly for Windows. Those things had
even more to do with IBM's failure to establish OS/2 than its marketing
decline of the '90s and its poor showing in transitioning from B2B to B2C
marketing for OS/2. In other words, IBM's marketing would have been good
enough if Microsoft had played by the same ethical rules - honoring the law
and their agreements and playing fair - as most other companies of that day.
LESSON FOUR. The genius that worked to get you established and make you
successful in the first place are inadequate to defend your position at the
top. IBM was the Google of the '60s and '70s, but by the '90s was often
rightfully compared to an elephant trying to dance. Proprietary (but
elegantly designed) systems lost to cheaper, better marketed systems. What
made Microsoft and Windows successful is now working against them as Windows
becomes increasingly irrelevant to a new generation.
LESSON FIVE. When creating an infrastructure to support an OS, treat
application developers as if they were kingmakers. Because they are. IBM saw
developers (ISVs) as both business partners AND customers. Microsoft saw
them for what they were - critical partners.
LESSON SIX: Never under-estimate the willingness of the market to support an
underdog and adopt cheap but easy technology. Windows was the cheaper and
easier path for most people. Never mind that it was the low-quality path. A
market is just like water - always flowing downhill following the easiest
path it can find.
There is a lot of truth (and some myth) in the other responses as well. In
the end, the history books are written by the conquerors and not the
vanquished, so I appreciate your question and the opportunity it provided me
to share the perspective of one of the vanquished. | z***7
发帖数: 555 | 2 IBM的OS/2项目为什么输给了微软，因为IBM比当时的微软有更多的项目资源？
伟大的问题。我是Team OS/2的创始人和IBM第一个OS / 2传播者，所以我经历了十年的
回答你的问题。只是没有一个简单的答案 - 就像问什么让任何创业公司取得成功或成功
失败 - 但我很高兴分享我看到它的方式。
首先几个事实 - 从记忆 - 你可能会发现相关的支持你的题。IBM花费了10多亿美元开
发和营销OS / 2。这是当时最先进的操作系统 - 最安全的最好的架构，最强大的 - 没
有问题（除非也许
你是一个记者捍卫你的决定点头Windows，也许是因为预期着陆的现金的传奇信封
神秘地在微软友好的审稿人桌上）。例如，它已经先发制人的多任务处理（现在是多核
系统和操作的主要部分）系统）当Windows 3.1仍然运行在DOS之上，切换是任何其他桌
面操作系统的标准。它会运行多个DOS，Windows或OS/2应用程序。这是可靠的，几乎从
来没有坠毁 -
DOS和Windows很容易定期做。然而，微软抨击OS / 2在媒体（并得到媒体回应他们的呜
呜声），因为它需要4MB（MB！非GB）的RAM - “太多的内存” - 可能会被崩溃
鲍尔默在贸易展览会上使用特别写在软盘上的代码。
IBM的个人软件产品（PSP） - 我为之工作的部门 - 有更多的员工，在90年代初比全部
微软的资金更好。 IBM是这种关系中的主要力量，很多盖茨感到懊恼，但仍然意志薄弱
地积极使用其权力。一世在讨论处理中不断听到“我们应该走高端路线”与微软。我尊
重任何人的道德观，但IBM的业务
行为准则在行业中被认为是永久的支配地位因为他们手铐的高管和雇员，他们是不够的
处理劣势商业伙伴的犯规行为。我曾经从可靠的消息来源得知，盖茨曾经打电话给IBM
的高管
抱怨我违反了IBM商业行为准则，没有细节。我很确定他在说什么是我被引用的
PC周刊说，“比尔·盖茨给业界的礼物是双赢的心态。“哇，我是如此负罪感。
所以，从我的角度来看，这些事实确立了以下从IBM未能建立OS/2的经验中吸取教训
“未来的操作系统” - 正如比尔·盖茨曾经所说的那样：
第一课。作为一个公司，如果你要采纳和坚持遵守严格的商业行为指南（如IBM等）
公司的做法 - 类似于Google的“不要做恶”的口头禅），要知道您愿意使用的公司（
如Microsoft）的战略漏洞其他公司的顾忌是对你的战争中的盾牌和武器
。用聪明人的话来说，你需要“像一条蛇一样聪明，作为一只鸽子是无害的。“IBM有
无害的下拍功能 - 但是他们无法完成智取蛇。
盖茨在谈判交易中利用其他方面很出色公司的盲点 - 包括他们对微软的无知
愿意屈从其他公司所尊重的道德约束。对于例如，Novell与微软达成了一项允许MS访问
的合同
在Windows 3.1版中包含Novell的网络代码。有没有想过为什么
Windows NT的第一个版本是版本3.1？现在你知道了。当Noorda
在雷等待之后，飞到雷德蒙德试图和盖茨合作似乎永远，比尔的回答是“所以起诉我”
。难怪何时
后来，媒体向诺达（Noorda）问了他为什么不只是一心一意盖茨的回答是“要有一颗心
，要有两颗心”。
大家也知道，微软鼓励其他厂商先发展为OS/2，然后为Windows。有人称这为“头假”
销毁ISV（独立软件供应商 - Lotus，WordPerfect等），并允许微软和他们的Windows
应用程序带头。什么是忘了微软也是为OS / 2开发的。什么是不为人所知的
是微软再次破坏他们为OS / 2发布的任何东西。所以跑步在OS / 2上的Word或Excel是
一个悲惨的经历，尤其是相比在Windows上运行Word或Excel。我知道 - 我使用并测试
了所有的应用程序
当时可用的Windows和OS/2相当广泛。没有在我心中，微软的操作系统/2应用程序的疯
狂是故意的他们的部分。
在此期间，并不是所有微软缺乏顾忌的证据都出来了他们因违反反垄断法受审。有一点
或没有，
例如，在他们的在线角色暗杀运动或媒体的操纵。作为他们的一个活动的目标，我可以
告诉你他们打得不好。奇怪的是，他们正在招聘我同时他们在网上诋毁我的声誉，这不
是一个案件
右手不知道左手在做什么。 “恩夫说，我希望。
总而言之，IBM继续和微软合作，是愚蠢的把公司视为商业伙伴
即使明确表示微软即将销毁，也要执行指南OS / 2和IBM在PC行业的领导地位。
第二课在开发资源方面具有战略意义针对您的竞争对手拥有的资源进行部署，智能营销
执行，
和狡猾的媒体关系都是王牌工程天才。微软已经前者。 IBM有后者。
第三课如果你想建立一个桌面操作系统作为标准互联网时代的来临，你最好懂得如何获得
媒体在你身边。他们建立了看法，知觉变成了现实。
微软在媒体上扮演了很多人的角色，比如Itzhak Perlman饰演Stradivarius。
媒体创造了许多与现实不符的神话 - 坚持到今天，并可以在这个问题的许多答案中看
到。
微软成功地使神话延续如下：
“OS / 2笨拙，而IBM的程序员在微软的时候是无能为力的程序员是天才。“完全倒退
，OS / 2是十亿美元软件工程的奇迹。 IBM创造出坚如磐石，可靠，灵活，优雅的关键
业务操作系统。 OS / 2
在大多数自动柜员机上十多年。你能想象使用Windows 3.1或在Windows 95/98在ATM？
哈哈哈。 IBM是排名第一的公司福布斯吸引最好的和最聪明的 - 特别是工程师和包括
诺贝尔奖获得者在内的科学家 - 当时。不是微软。案件网站（HTML）是建立在IBM技术
之后的，而不是微软的。
然而，微软会和媒体谈论，而IBM则非常孤立。所以微软扭曲的现实版本赢得了这一天。
“IBM是专有的，但微软公开。”媒体如何买这个谎言是一个谜。事实：两者都是专有
的。谈到企业
微软在几年之后从IBM复制了很多东西。只有在事后看来，这是显而易见的差异（在消
费科技空间
至少）是微软公司生产的不可靠的专有的废话很好，而IBM生产的可靠专有品质销售不
佳。
“IBM不关心消费者或小家伙。”再次，完全向后。 IBM支持其产品。微软并没有，现
在仍然没有。
IBM做了同样的事情，苹果现在做 - 创造一个坚实的质量好的基础设施，坚持别人玩
他们精心设计的规则。他们然后支持他们的产品为了不断改进。另一方面，微软创造了
一个
机会主义的荒野，狂野西部的任何东西，他们塞满了sh sh
用他们无情的无视来贬低市场的喉咙他们自己的最佳利益。资源管理员？我们已经习惯了
相信软件公司不需要支持他们的产品因为这是微软开创的。
“IBM不能从一个纸袋里推销出来。” IBM没有成为那个在60年代，70年代和80年代，
科技领域最大的公司不知道
如何上市。他们在B2B的营销实力是传奇的。
他们失败的地方是媒体关系和对抗微软的
无情的背信弃义地建立了对Windows的垄断。那些东西了甚至更多与IBM未能建立OS / 2
而不是其营销相关90年代的衰退以及从B2B向B2C过渡的糟糕表现营销为OS / 2。换句话
说，IBM的营销本来就不错如果微软按照相同的道德规则来履行法律，这就足够了以及
他们的协议和公平竞争 - 就像当天的其他大多数公司一样。
第四课天才，使你成立和让你首先成功是不足以捍卫你的地位的
最佳。 IBM是60年代和70年代的谷歌，但是到了90年代是经常的
正当地与一头试图跳舞的大象比较。专有（但是优雅的设计）系统失去了更便宜，更好
的销售系统。什么使微软和Windows成功，现在正在对付他们作为Windows
与新一代变得越来越无关。
第五课创建支持操作系统的基础架构时，请注意应用程序开发人员就好像他们是国王。
因为他们是。 IBM看到了开发者（ISV）作为商业伙伴和客户。微软看到他们是他们的
- 重要的合作伙伴。
第六课：永远不要低估市场的支持意愿处于不利地位，采取廉价易用的技术。 Windows
是便宜的
大多数人更容易走路。没关系，这是低质量的路径。一个
市场就像水一样 - 总是顺着最简单的顺流而下它可以找到的路径。
其他答案中也有很多的事实（和一些神话）。在最后，历史书是由征服者写的而不是
战胜了，所以我感谢你提出的问题和机会分享一个被征服者的视角。 |
|
