g****t
发帖数: 31659 | 1 https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/
名校名师，解决过世界级的数学题。父亲是搞定四色问题的人。
信誉没问题吧？
这位大师以前研究过这个课题。主页上有一系列文章。最新的是：
https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/elj.2019.0619
Ballot-Marking Devices Cannot Ensure the Will of the Voter
现在有人在转之前他一个video,拿了个螺丝刀弄投票机，LoL。
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Ballot-Marking Devices Cannot Ensure the Will of the Voter
The complexity of U.S. elections usually requires computers to count ballots
—but computers can be hacked, so election integrity requires a voting
system in which paper ballots can be recounted by hand. However, paper
ballots provide no assurance unless they accurately record the votes as
expressed by the voters.
Voters can express their intent by indelibly hand-marking ballots or using
computers called ballot-marking devices (BMDs). Voters can make mistakes in
expressing their intent in either technology, but only BMDs are also subject
to hacking, bugs, and misconfiguration of the software that prints the
marked ballots. Most voters do not review BMD-printed ballots, and those who
do often fail to notice when the printed vote is not what they expressed on
the touchscreen. Furthermore, there is no action a voter can take to
demonstrate to election officials that a BMD altered their expressed votes,
nor is there a corrective action that election officials can take if
notified by voters—there is no way to deter, contain, or correct computer
hacking in BMDs. These are the essential security flaws of BMDs.
Risk-limiting audits can ensure that the votes recorded on paper ballots are
tabulated correctly, but no audit can ensure that the votes on paper are
the ones expressed by the voter on a touchscreen: Elections conducted on
current BMDs cannot be confirmed by audits. We identify two properties of
voting systems, contestability and defensibility, necessary for audits to
confirm election outcomes. No available BMD certified by the Election
Assistance Commission is contestable or defensible. |
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