f*****x
发帖数: 545 | 1 benn thinking the interaction of election rule and vote-buying behaviour. |
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 2 I do some social choice theory but not in the context of American Politics
which I know nothing. //blush.
When you say vote-buyiny, is it equal to side payment ?
【在 f*****x 的大作中提到】
: benn thinking the interaction of election rule and vote-buying behaviour.
|
f*****x
发帖数: 545 | 3 yes, i mean what you have to pay to get vote. DO you think if it will make
sense if i consider only median-voter and leave other voters unconsidered?【
在 kzeng (锴锃) 的大作中提到: 】 |
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 4 I'm interested in social choice theory too. Could you be a little more
specific about your ideas? it seems if you're the only one who's buying vote,
then doing the median voter is enough (suppose it's a one-dimential policy
space). But what if you have an opponent who's buying votes as well?
btw, i have the impression that you appear in the econ board a lot. are you an
econ or polisci phd?
behaviour.
【在 f*****x 的大作中提到】
: yes, i mean what you have to pay to get vote. DO you think if it will make
: sense if i consider only median-voter and leave other voters unconsidered?【
: 在 kzeng (锴锃) 的大作中提到: 】
|
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 5 I do not think so. Vote-buying may cause strategic vote which means that
some voters do not vote sincerely in order to get side-payment... how d
o you think of it?
【在 f*****x 的大作中提到】
: yes, i mean what you have to pay to get vote. DO you think if it will make
: sense if i consider only median-voter and leave other voters unconsidered?【
: 在 kzeng (锴锃) 的大作中提到: 】
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 6 but isn't that the whole point of vote-buying: you pay voters to change their votes?
【在 k***g 的大作中提到】
: I do not think so. Vote-buying may cause strategic vote which means that
: some voters do not vote sincerely in order to get side-payment... how d
: o you think of it?
|
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 7 no.... Let's think of a simple example: there are two candidates X and Y. For
a certain voter, say, v, his real preference is X > Y. But when he hears that
the supporters of X will buy votes, he may cheat and say his preference is Y>X
in order to get some money. In this case, he will get a higher payoff. This is
the problem.
their votes?
make
unconsidered?【
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: but isn't that the whole point of vote-buying: you pay voters to change their votes?
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 8 what's the difference between what you said and what i said? i can't see any.
【在 k***g 的大作中提到】
: no.... Let's think of a simple example: there are two candidates X and Y. For
: a certain voter, say, v, his real preference is X > Y. But when he hears that
: the supporters of X will buy votes, he may cheat and say his preference is Y>X
: in order to get some money. In this case, he will get a higher payoff. This is
: the problem.
:
: their votes?
: make
: unconsidered?【
|
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 9 @@....there is a big difference bah?
any.
For
that
Y>X
This is
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: what's the difference between what you said and what i said? i can't see any.
|
f*****x
发帖数: 545 | 10 My idea is that under different election rule, candidate may have different
incentive to buy vote. It is possible that the total expenditure on
vote-buying varies with election rule, or independent of the election rule.
If it is independent of the election rule, then we will have some equivalence
theorem.
If election rule does affect the expenditure, then under which election rule
will the expenditure be smallest?
For
that
Y>X
is
【在 k***g 的大作中提到】
: no.... Let's think of a simple example: there are two candidates X and Y. For
: a certain voter, say, v, his real preference is X > Y. But when he hears that
: the supporters of X will buy votes, he may cheat and say his preference is Y>X
: in order to get some money. In this case, he will get a higher payoff. This is
: the problem.
:
: their votes?
: make
: unconsidered?【
|
|
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 11 this is an interesting project. I guess you're considering the 3 candidate
case, and whether plurality or majoritarian electoral rules have different
effects on it, right? (since in the 2 candidate case the rule does not matter
much). Well, it seems that you do need to consider voters other than the
median voter, since in the 3 candidate case the winning platform in the Nash
equilibrium is not going to be the median voter's position, unlike the 2
candidate case. well, it's just my casual thought |
f*****x
发帖数: 545 | 12
matter
I think u r right here. I actually havent started this yet, but have this in
mind for many years, while writing my thesis. I got this idea from my
observation of the gaoxiong concil election 2 years ago. I hope to start it
after submitting my thesis. will share with u more once i start it.
well, it's just my casual thoughts. need to think deep about
different
rule.
rule
Y.
is
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: this is an interesting project. I guess you're considering the 3 candidate
: case, and whether plurality or majoritarian electoral rules have different
: effects on it, right? (since in the 2 candidate case the rule does not matter
: much). Well, it seems that you do need to consider voters other than the
: median voter, since in the 3 candidate case the winning platform in the Nash
: equilibrium is not going to be the median voter's position, unlike the 2
: candidate case. well, it's just my casual thought
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 13 sounds great. Please do keep me posted of the development of your project.
btw, if you don't mind my asking, what's your thesis about?
Nash
hears
preference
【在 f*****x 的大作中提到】
:
: matter
: I think u r right here. I actually havent started this yet, but have this in
: mind for many years, while writing my thesis. I got this idea from my
: observation of the gaoxiong concil election 2 years ago. I hope to start it
: after submitting my thesis. will share with u more once i start it.
: well, it's just my casual thoughts. need to think deep about
: different
: rule.
: rule
|
f*****x
发帖数: 545 | 14 hehe, i am doing auction theory, esp. license auction. basically, most of work
on auction theory models auction as a one short game, no pre or post auction
strategic interaction. However, in the case of license auction, license
winners still have to compete with their rivals in the market even if they win
a license. How the nature of market competition affects firms' bidding in the
licensing stage? How the info revealed in the licensing stage affect firms'
behaviour in the market? These two ques |
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 15 hehe, the professor with whom I currently work also does this research (
he calls it information economics). hehe, it is so coincident that today
we just talked about auction theory, license auction and the famous "w
inner's curse".
It's really an interesting questions:-)
【在 f*****x 的大作中提到】
: hehe, i am doing auction theory, esp. license auction. basically, most of work
: on auction theory models auction as a one short game, no pre or post auction
: strategic interaction. However, in the case of license auction, license
: winners still have to compete with their rivals in the market even if they win
: a license. How the nature of market competition affects firms' bidding in the
: licensing stage? How the info revealed in the licensing stage affect firms'
: behaviour in the market? These two ques
|
f*****x
发帖数: 545 | 16 hehe, it is my convinction that there is a bridge between auction and voting
theory and it can be filled someday.
the license auction question is indeed an interesting question, hehe,
actually, there are two papers published in 2003, one in JET, one in
international journal of industrial org. Both focus on the signalling role of
bids.【 在 kzeng (锴锃) 的大作中提到: 】
work
auction
win
the
firms'
project. |
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 17 what class is that? I remember the first time I read about the winner's curse
was in an intro decision analysis and game theory class.
work
auction
win
the
firms'
project.
【在 k***g 的大作中提到】
: hehe, the professor with whom I currently work also does this research (
: he calls it information economics). hehe, it is so coincident that today
: we just talked about auction theory, license auction and the famous "w
: inner's curse".
: It's really an interesting questions:-)
|
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 18 呵呵，一篇非常古老的paper,"Competitive bidding in high risk situations":-)
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: what class is that? I remember the first time I read about the winner's curse
: was in an intro decision analysis and game theory class.
:
: work
: auction
: win
: the
: firms'
: project.
|
x****x
发帖数: 87 | 19 haha, 是arrow 的social choice么，我读过的。好像挺数学化的，政治学真好玩啊，现
在经济系里面这样的东西倒是少了
【在 k***g 的大作中提到】
: I do some social choice theory but not in the context of American Politics
: which I know nothing. //blush.
: When you say vote-buyiny, is it equal to side payment ?
|
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 20 呵呵，Arrow的理论是voting theory 的基石之一，最根本的还是 Hotelling 的那个 S
picial Model，一般的voting theory都是从这里开始的。
现
【在 x****x 的大作中提到】
: haha, 是arrow 的social choice么，我读过的。好像挺数学化的，政治学真好玩啊，现
: 在经济系里面这样的东西倒是少了
|
