w********9
发帖数: 8613 | |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 3 10几个小时前的情况
俄军车跑入kharkiv 城里 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 5 这很可能是
俄国在不到2天前从北边（白俄罗斯？）向基辅方向继续增兵
军车比例非常高
涂的标志基本都是V了
https://twitter.com/RT_com/status/1497647653882052611?t=
3FWtEJlX23WNuh5LFfz2yA&s=19 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 6 Siverskyi Donets River是顿河的大支流
从kharkiv到俄罗斯境内顿河有一大盆地
这个河的2岸应该给2个独立区提供了些自然保护地带
luhansk独立区有不小的山
因此过去多年被乌军犯扰的基本都是这donetsk的独立区
那里很多被遗弃的楼房成了分离分子们搞巷战的阵地
3天前俄军在某处渡河 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 8 俄军（把独立区的军事人员也算上，因为独立区现在实际上完全与俄罗斯一体了）穿过
了乌军的某检查哨位
哨位周边的一些小建筑被多年遗弃 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 9 乌克兰说要设立国际兵团
英国说会支持（“back”）本国人自愿参战
俄罗斯说我国会亮出核武器
俄和乌都有（了）更多的底气？？？？？？？？
谈判在白俄罗斯，基本合了普金的意愿
2天前我说会“打打谈谈”
双方都付出很大，都需要调整
普金要求是去军事化，那相当于乌军投降，让俄罗斯掌管乌克兰今后的国防
乌克兰的底线会是不与西方结军事同盟，但很难保证它不接受大量的北约援助，那对俄
罗斯来讲是噩梦，今后仍然不可预料，本质是回到战前情况
从现在的战场情况看，也谈不出什么东西
因此继续打下去几乎没有疑问
俄国作为进攻方非常需要调整，尤其是在进攻策略上
应该参考一种发生过的战地形式。小山地作战，不清除所有的地堡，继续攻击全面的目
标，过一段时间回头解决。。。绕过可以被孤立的大城市，先巩固南边和东部其它地方。
乌军会继续以城市为依靠，打巷战，也在某些地方重点打击出击的俄国军队 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 10 第涅河水
在多年被阻隔后
被
跑向克里米亚人民的土里或肚里 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | |
A*******r
发帖数: 1 | 12 普金和演员两个凯克蜜柚走狗搁这演双簧 果蝇两脚羊看得津津有味 要不是千老不给力
疫苗杀不死人 还需要演这一出？ |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | |
A*******r
发帖数: 1 | |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 16 俄国应该开始感受到了拿下一个大城市的紧迫感
（自己弹药有限，而外援会继续送往乌军---应该主要是给了最西部）
俄军向基辅大量增兵
似乎俄军仍然想攻坚基辅而扬威 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 17 如果攻城，巷战升级，
俄军为了尽快拿下，为了减小军力损失和损耗，
就会不再顾及民用设施了
那时候媒体的报道就会特别着重于civilian casualties了
是一种“老剧本”内容了了
还有另外一个版本，偶尔由官方谈到collateral damages |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 18 乌军在基辅地区的火力还能撑多久？
城中人口（尤其平民）的粮食能够撑多久？
。。。
很多问题啊
俄方也会对大量平民的生活问题肯定也有顾虑
平民能跑的应该赶紧跑路
如果俄军下了死心要拿下基辅，难免它会拿下
如何是欧美打民众区，剧本里会说对方是把老百姓当作human shields了 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 19 从另外一个角度看
头一天
突击基辅那个机场的
数十直升机的
空中无阻飞行
太突然了 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 20 俄国军方应该也看了不少此类视频
昨天
kharkiv |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 21 说俄军在南部的进展是个大关键，会给乌军造成整体上的大麻烦
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-ukraine-warning-update-
russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27
The Russian military has likely recognized that its initial expectations
that limited Russian attacks would cause the collapse of Ukrainian
resistance have failed and is recalibrating accordingly. The Russian
military is moving additional combat resources toward Ukraine and
establishing more reliable and effective logistics arrangements to support
what is likely a larger, harder, and more protracted conflict than it had
originally prepared for. The tide of the war could change rapidly in Russia
’s favor if the Russian military has correctly identified its failings and
addresses them promptly, given the overwhelming advantage in net combat
power Moscow enjoys. Ukrainian morale and combat effectiveness remain
extremely high, however, and Russian forces confront the challenge of likely
intense urban warfare in the coming days.
Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on February 26-27 but
will likely resume offensive operations and begin using greater air and
artillery support in the coming days. Russian airborne and special forces
troops are engaged in urban warfare in northwestern Kyiv, but Russian
mechanized forces are not yet in the capital. Russian forces conducted
limited attacks on the direct approaches to Kyiv on both banks of the Dnipro
River, but largely paused offensive operations in northeastern Ukraine.
Russian forces likely paused to recalibrate their – to date largely
unsuccessful – approach to offensive operations in northern Ukraine and
deploy additional reinforcements and air assets to the front lines.
Russian forces from Crimea slowly pushed north toward Zaporizhie and the
southeastern bend of the Dnipro River and east along the Azov Sea coast
toward Mariupol on February 27. Russian forces advancing east from Crimea
began initial assaults against Mariupol the morning of February 27. These
advances risk cutting off the large concentrations of Ukrainian forces still
defending the former line of contact between unoccupied Ukraine and
occupied Donbas.
Ukrainian resistance remains remarkably effective and Russian operations
especially on the Kyiv axis have been poorly coordinated and executed,
leading to significant Russian failures on that axis and at Kharkiv. Russian
forces remain much larger and more capable than Ukraine’s conventional
military, however, and Russian advances in southern Ukraine may threaten to
unhinge the defense of Kyiv and northeastern Ukraine if they continue
unchecked. |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 22 接上
KTs
Russian forces likely conducted an operational pause on the Kyiv axis on
February 26-27 to deploy additional supplies and forces forward. Russian
forces will likely resume offensive operations against Kyiv in the next 24
hours. Russian troops have not yet committed heavy armor and artillery
forces to fighting in Kyiv and will likely need to do so to take the city.
Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on their current broad
front of advance between Chernihiv and Kharkiv. Ukrainian forces continue
to delay and inflict losses on the Russian advance but will likely not be
able to halt further advances if the Kremlin commits additional reserves.
Russian forces entered the city of Kharkiv for the first time on February 27
but remain unlikely to take the city without the use of heavier firepower.
Russian forces have encircled Mariupol from the west and began initial
assaults on the city. Russian forces have not made any major territorial
gains from the east in Donbas after four days of fighting. Russian forces
likely intend to pin Ukrainian forces in place on the line of contact to
enable Russian forces breaking out of Crimea to isolate them.
Russian forces continued to advance north towards Zaprozhia and, in
conjunction with Russian advances on Mariupol, threaten to isolate Ukrainian
forces on the line of contact in Donbas if they do not withdraw.
Russian forces failed to seize Kherson after Ukrainian counterattacks
reclaimed it on February 26. An unknown concentration of Russian forces
remains on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River and threatens Mikolayiv,
however.
Russian successes in southern Ukraine are the most dangerous and threaten to
unhinge Ukraine’s successful defenses and rearguard actions to the north
and northeast.
Russian troops are facing growing morale and logistics issues, predictable
consequences of the poor planning, coordination, and execution of attacks
along Ukraine’s northern border.
Russian air and missile strikes targeted a Ukrainian airbase in western
Ukraine to ground the remaining Ukrainian air force the night of February 26
-27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces conducted 5 air and
16 missile strikes across Ukraine from midnight to 1pm local time, February
27.[1] Russian strikes targeted the Ivano-Frankivsk airfield, home to
Ukraine’s 114th Tactical Aviation Brigade.[2] Russian forces continue to
refrain from using the full array of air and missile capabilities available
to them. Russian forces will likely increase their use of fires in coming
days to overcome heavier-than-anticipated Ukrainian resistance, however.
Russian forces in northeast Ukraine continue to face morale and supply
issues, likely due to poor planning and ad hoc command structures, as ISW
previously forecasted.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported
Russian forces are “experiencing an acute shortage of fuel and food“ and
are increasingly using Belarusian rail networks to supply Russian forces in
Ukraine.[4] |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 23 上面说
到第3或第4天，乌克兰空军没了
Russian air and missile strikes targeted a Ukrainian airbase in western
Ukraine to ground the remaining Ukrainian air force the night of February 26
-27.
也多次说
以后俄军会把猛劲加强很多，火力、物力和人力 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 24 俄军似乎在做出
要断掉mariupol和那边更东乌军的后路
的姿态
4) Crimea axis: Russian forces continued to advance north towards Zaprozhia
and threaten to isolate Ukrainian forces on the line of contact in Donbas if
they do not withdraw. Russian forces failed to seize Kherson after
Ukrainian counterattacks reclaimed it on February 26. An unknown
concentration of Russian forces remains on the eastern bank of the Dnipro
River and threatens Mikolayiv, however.
Russian forces from the 20th Motor Rifle Division advanced north towards
Zaprozhia from Melitopol on February 27.[29] These forces likely seek to
take Zaprozhia in the coming days. They may then either continue north to
Dnipro City, or pivot east to isolate Ukrainian forces in Donbas.
Russian forces failed to take Kherson on February 27, but the Ukrainian
General Staff reported Russian forces are regrouping for an offensive
towards Kherson and Mykolayiv.[30] Ukrainian forces repelled a second
Russian attempt to seize Kherson on February 27.[31] ISW cannot confirm the
extent of possible Russian advances into the city. Ukrainian air defenses
remain active in the city, however shooting down an Su-25 and a Mi-24 on
February 26.[32] A Ukrainian TB2 drone additionally struck a Russian column
near the Kherson airport on February 27.[33]
An unknown concentration of Russian forces remains west of the Dnipro River
and entered the outskirts of Mykolayiv on February 27.[34] Russian forces
assaulting Kherson likely seek to support these forces to continue advances
west towards Odesa.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of Russia’s Black Sea
Fleet left port to strike the Ukrainian Navy on February 27.[35] ISW cannot
confirm the extent or focus of Russian naval operations. |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 25 2000航海步兵也加入围/攻mariupol
克里米亚去的俄国大兵也往那里逼近
mariupol是个2天内的大目标
3) Donbas axis:Russian forces have encircled Mariupol from the west and
began initial assaults on the city. Russian forces have not made any major
territorial gains from the east in Donbas after four days of fighting.
Russian forces likely intend to pin Ukrainian forces in place on the line of
contact to enable Russian forces breaking out of Crimea to isolate them.
The Russians may be content to leave them there while concentrating on
capturing Kyiv and imposing a new government on Ukraine. They may
alternatively seek to encircle and destroy them or force them to surrender.
Russian forces advancing on Mariupol from the west, through Berdyansk,
likely began initial assaults on the city on February 27.[25] Russian
artillery systems redeployed from Melitopol towards Mariupol the night of
February 26.[26] Russian forces likely seek to pin Ukrainian forces in place
in Mariupol. Russian forces could alternatively attempt to reduce the
Mariupol pocket in the next 48 hours.
US intelligence sources reported 2,000 Russian Naval Infantry conducted a
landing west of Mariupol and began advancing on the city throughout February
27.[27] This operation is likely Russia’s first commitment of its Naval
Infantry to operations in southern Ukraine.
Russian forces did not conduct any major attacks along the line of contact
in Donbas or in Luhansk Oblast on February 27. Ukrainian forces remain
largely in place on the line of contact in Donbas. ISW’s initial assessment
that Russian forces would likely attempt an envelopment through Luhansk
Oblast was incorrect.[28] Russian forces likely seek to achieve a larger
envelopment using forces breaking out from Crimea and currently advancing on
Mariupol from the west. |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 26 俄的东北地区进军变得相当不顺，基本在调整（包括补充）和休整
2) Northeast axis: Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on
their current broad front of advance between Chernihiv and Kharkiv. Russian
forces entered the city of Kharkiv for the first time on February 27 but
remain unlikely to take the city without the use of heavier firepower.
Ukrainian forces continue to delay and inflict losses on the Russian advance
but will likely not be able to halt further advances if the Kremlin commits
additional reserves.
Russian forces did not secure any major advances in northeastern Ukraine on
February 26-27 and likely conducted an operational pause to bring forward
supplies and reinforcements. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian
elements from the Central Military District attacked Ichnya in the direction
of Kyiv on February 27.[15] Ukrainian forces reportedly repelled a Russian
assault near Pryluky by the 2nd and 4th Tank divisions in Sumy Oblast as of
10am local time on February 27.[16] Ukrainian forces claimed to destroy an
entire BTG of the 4th Guards Tank Division near Slobozhanskyi, approximately
80km west of Kharkiv, on February 27.[17] Russian forces in northeast
Ukraine have been halted on a line roughly running down the P67 highway
since roughly 11am local time on February 26.[18]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that 14 Russian BTGs, including but not
entirely drawn from the 41st Combined Arms Army, resumed attacks towards
Kyiv along the east bank of the Dnipro River from the north at 10am local
time on February 27 after an operational pause on February 26.[19] A Russian
attempt to seize the encircled city of Chernihiv failed as of 10am local
time on February 27.[20]
Light Russian forces entered downtown Kharkiv on February 27 but have not
yet secured the city. Ukrainian forces claimed to repel attacks by Russian
motor rifle elements (including the 25th Motor Rifle Brigade, with Ukrainian
forces taking confirmed prisoners) the night of February 27 after heavy
fighting.[21] Russian forces began shelling of residential areas of the city
throughout February on 27.[22] Russian forces are deploying additional
artillery assets including thermobaric artillery to the Kharkiv axis as of
February 27.[23] Russian forces likely seized Kup’yans’k, southeast of
Kharkiv, on February 27.[24] |
x****o
发帖数: 29677 | 27
on
Russian
advance
commits
on
俄军打巷战不行，有个视频，俄军进入哈尔科夫，还是坦克走路中间，然后旁边一溜步
兵靠着墙和坦克前进，碰到乌克兰藏匿的火力，打几下，损失太大就后撤
【在 w********9 的大作中提到】
: 俄的东北地区进军变得相当不顺，基本在调整（包括补充）和休整
: 2) Northeast axis: Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on
: their current broad front of advance between Chernihiv and Kharkiv. Russian
: forces entered the city of Kharkiv for the first time on February 27 but
: remain unlikely to take the city without the use of heavier firepower.
: Ukrainian forces continue to delay and inflict losses on the Russian advance
: but will likely not be able to halt further advances if the Kremlin commits
: additional reserves.
: Russian forces did not secure any major advances in northeastern Ukraine on
: February 26-27 and likely conducted an operational pause to bring forward
|
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 28 在基辅周边
24小时内会加强攻击
至今没有用重装甲重炮部队
乌军在一方出击，相当成功
俄军会空投物资解决（可能）出现的供给困难
1) Kyiv axis:Russian forces likely conducted an operational pause on the
Kyiv axis on February 26-27 to deploy additional supplies and forces forward
. Russian forces will likely resume offensive operations against Kyiv in the
next 24 hours. Russian forces committed additional reserves to fighting
west of Kyiv. Russian troops have not yet committed heavy armor and
artillery forces to fighting in Kyiv and will likely need to do so to take
the city. Ukrainian forces are unlikely to capitulate.
Russian forces continue to assault Kyiv on a narrow front on the western
bank of the Dnipro River. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian
forces remain concentrated in the Pripyet marshes in “northern operational
areas” (likely around Chernihiv and Sumy) at 11am local time on February 27
.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 1pm local time that Ukrainian
forces continue to successfully defend the outskirts of Kyiv. No Russian
forces have entered the central city as of this time. Russian forces have
not yet committed heavy armor and artillery to urban fighting in Kyiv.
Ukrainian forces retain defensive positions in western Kyiv Oblast.
Ukrainian forces reported halting Russian advances in Bucha, west of Kyiv.
Several videos emerged on February 27 of destroyed Russian motor rifle and
VDV (Airborne) elements in the town.[6] Russian forces additionally entered
Borodyanka on February 27.[7] Ukrainian forces conducted a counterattack
against Russian VDV forces in Irpin on February 27.[8]
Russian forces committed reserves from the 36th Combined Arms Army to
fighting along the western flank of Kyiv. The Ukrainian General Staff
reported 36th CAA elements deployed to Bucha, Kapitanivka and Belogorodka,
on the western outskirts of Kyiv.[9] Russian forces are additionally
deploying engineering and bridging units to the western approach to Kyiv.[10
] These elements may enable a wider Russian effort to encircle Kyiy further
west than Russia’s currently narrow axis of advance into the city.
Russian forces assembled additional reserves and combat support elements in
Belarus on February 26-27. The Russian air force deployed ten helicopters of
the 15th Army Aviation Brigade and two An-124 transport aircraft to the
Machulishchi airfield in Minsk on February 27.[11] A large column of Russian
vehicles was observed moving southeast from Minsk through Babruysk on
February 27.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported Russian
forces are “experiencing an acute shortage of fuel and food“ and are
increasingly using Belarusian rail networks to supply Russian forces in
Ukraine.[13] Russia redeployed a tactical aviation group of Su-34 aircraft
from the Moscow region to the Baranovichi airfield in Belarus.[14] These
aircraft will likely increase tactical air support to Russian operations in
Kyiv in the next 24 hours. |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 29 俄军正规的地面直接战斗人力大概是35万（28万陆军是主力）
现在可能有10多万以上在乌克兰境内了
后面会有最大的战出现
普金急需一个大城市
mariupol也可以了 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 30 "谈归谈，我们还会继续干“
”对啊，我们也会继续努力干“
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-10
Russian and Ukrainian delegations agreed on February 27 to negotiate “
without preconditions” on Russia’s war against Ukraine in Gomel, Belarus,
on February 28.[7] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky agreed with
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko that Ukrainian and Russian
delegations would meet on the condition that Belarus will ground all planes,
helicopters, and missiles before the Ukrainian delegation’s arrival in
Gomel.[8] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky stated the parties “
can achieve a constructive result by the end of the day” while Kremlin
Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Moscow does not plan to suspend
Russia’s military operation during the negotiations.[9] Ukrainian Foreign
Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated Ukraine will “hear what Russia has to say”
but will not “give up one inch of Ukrainian territory.”[10] Russian State
Duma Committee on International Affairs Head Leonid Slutsky emphasized on
February 27 that Russia must find a “constructive approach” with the
Ukrainian delegation in Belarus. Slutsky also threatened that Ukraine will
bear responsibility of unspecified "further events" if negotiations fail.[11
] US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda-Thomas Greenfield stated the US
“will look forward“ to the negotiations' outcome on February 27.[12] |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 31 接上
“乌克兰自古以来就是。。。一部分”
各国反应、计划或行动。。。
Russian Activity
Russian President Vladimir Putin put Russia’s nuclear and strategic missile
forces, described as “deterrence forces, on their highest alert status in
response to “aggressive statements in the West” on February 27.[3] Putin’
s announcement followed a meeting with Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and
Chief of Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov wherein Putin cited “
illegitimate sanctions” and aggressive NATO statements against Russia as
motivating factors for his decision.[4] White House Press Secretary Jen
Psaki accused Putin of "manufacturing threats that don’t exist in order to
justify further aggression.”[5] US Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-
Greenfield called the move "totally unacceptable” and accused Putin of
using "whatever tools he can to intimidate Ukrainians and the world.”[6]
Russian and Ukrainian delegations agreed on February 27 to negotiate “
without preconditions” on Russia’s war against Ukraine in Gomel, Belarus,
on February 28.[7] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky agreed with
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko that Ukrainian and Russian
delegations would meet on the condition that Belarus will ground all planes,
helicopters, and missiles before the Ukrainian delegation’s arrival in
Gomel.[8] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky stated the parties “
can achieve a constructive result by the end of the day” while Kremlin
Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Moscow does not plan to suspend
Russia’s military operation during the negotiations.[9] Ukrainian Foreign
Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated Ukraine will “hear what Russia has to say”
but will not “give up one inch of Ukrainian territory.”[10] Russian State
Duma Committee on International Affairs Head Leonid Slutsky emphasized on
February 27 that Russia must find a “constructive approach” with the
Ukrainian delegation in Belarus. Slutsky also threatened that Ukraine will
bear responsibility of unspecified "further events" if negotiations fail.[11
] US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda-Thomas Greenfield stated the US
“will look forward“ to the negotiations' outcome on February 27.[12]
Kremlin-sponsored media claimed Russian President Vladimir Putin has a “
historic responsibility” to reunite Russia and Ukraine on February 26-27.
Russian state news agency RIA Novosti published and retracted an essay on
February 26 claiming “Ukraine has returned to Russia” and resolved the “
national humiliation” that Russia suffered when Ukraine left the Soviet
Union.[13] The essay claimed that Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus jointly
operate in a new world order, where the Russian bloc challenges the West.
RIA Novosti retracted the essay one minute after publishing, indicating it
was likely prewritten ahead of an anticipated swift Russian victory and was
published accidentally.[14] Russian television amplified the possibility of
“NATO-Russia war” in reports about Putin putting nuclear and strategic
missile forces on alert.[15] Prominent Russian Propagandist Dmitry Kiseyov
said that thousands of Russian nuclear missiles can completely wipe out the
US and NATO because “no one needs the world without Russia in it.”[16]
Russian media is justifying the Kremlin’s failure to gain control over
Ukraine by claiming that Ukrainian ”nationalists” are escalating
aggression against the Russian Armed Forces and civilians, while Ukrainian
military forces massively surrender.
Russian oligarchs openly called on the Kremlin to end Russia’s war in
Ukraine for the first time on February 27 as Russian protests continued to
grow despite intensifying crackdowns. Russian Alfa-Bank co-owner Mikhail
Fridman and Russian industrialist Oleg Deripaska became the first two
Russian oligarchs to openly call on the Kremlin to end the war in Ukraine on
February 27.[17] Thousands of Russian citizens continued holding
countrywide protests against Russia’s war in Ukraine, with Russian
authorities detaining over 2,000 Russian protesters from 48 different
demonstrations across Russia on February 27 alone.[18] The Kremlin will
likely intensify crackdowns against anti-war protesters. Russia’s
Prosecutor General threatened high treason charges against any Russians who
provide “assistance to a foreign state" during the Russia’s "special
operation" in Ukraine on February 27.[19]
Belarusian Activity
The Belarusian government is setting information conditions to justify a
Belarusian offensive against Ukraine and the imminent deployment of Russian
nuclear weapons in Belarus as of February 27. Belarusian President Alexander
Lukashenko said on February 27 that he would ask Russian President Vladimir
Putin to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus if the United States or NATO
deployed nuclear missiles to Poland and Lithuania.[20] Lukashenko‘s
official press pool claimed Lukashenko and Putin agreed to deploy "weapons
that neither the Poles nor the Lithuanians would want to fight” - likely
implying nuclear weapons - to Belarus on February 27.[21] Lukashenko
slandered Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as “little Napoleon” and
implied current Russian operations in Ukraine is just the first phase of
Russian aggression.[22] Lukashenko accused Ukrainians of planning terrorist
attacks against Belarus and threatened a “special operation” in Ukraine
but claimed there are no Belarusian soldiers, armor, or vehicles in Ukraine
as of February 27.[23] Lukashenko said that Belarus will not betray Russia
by “allowing attacks” by western states against Belarus.[24] Lukashenko
admitted that Russian soldiers in Belarusian territory fired two or three
rockets at Chernobyl around 23:00 on February 23, but claimed that he did
not give the order to fire and that the strikes were a response to alleged
Ukrainian provocations.[25] Lukashenko claimed that Belarusian troops along
the southern border with Ukraine are protecting against Ukrainian sabotage
and reconnaissance group penetrations.[26] Meanwhile, a Belarusian Commander
of the Brest Air Assault Brigade, Valery Sakhashchik, called on Belarusian
servicemembers sitting in the woods near Ukrainian border to refuse to fight
in Ukraine.[27] Sakhaschchik stated that Belarus will lose its dignity for
generations to come fighting in a war against a country that has never
harmed Belarusian sovereignty.
Belarus adopted a new constitution on February 27, likely granting Russia
more direct military control over
。。。
。。。 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 32 会门好技术就可以狠拽
version 2.0
原始版本 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 33 offensive of the DPR army on Mariupol and Volnovakha. |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 34 Tanks and firefight - Mariupol, Shevchenko boulevard 28.02.22 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 35 02/28/2022 fight in Kyiv |
b**e
发帖数: 3199 | 36 迄今为止 俄军表现的十分克制
不排除今天谈判破裂后
俄军战斗民族本性暴露出来
基辅变成阿勒颇第二 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 37 Mariupol. Panic. Marauders. 02/27/2022 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 38 车臣的穆斯林胡兵
也用V而不是Z
Uncompromising and versatile fighters from the Chechen Republic. |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 39 Mariupol. 28.02.2022 7.15 am |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 40 Attack on Mariupol 28.02.2022 |
w********9
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w********9
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w********9
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w********9
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w********9
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w********9
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w********9
发帖数: 8613 | |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | |
w********9
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w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 50 俄国在河东的南部、东南部甚至靠中部的进军路线上没有受到什么阻挡
不少小镇的官员也配合/“配合”
在尽量维稳，不影响普通人的生活
在上述区，现在差不多是俄军控制农村/小镇开始合围较大城市（mariupol和kharkiv）
的状态
从趋势看，俄军拿下河东被列宁分给乌克兰的地区不会特别难
很有可能的是，几天之内，独立区周边会脱离战争，会安全了
此战争前，独立区被死亡1万4千多人，其中包括数千平民，几百万儿童
独立区的请求/“请求支援”是普定出兵最大最合理的借口/理由
俄军在若干天后掌控mariupol掌控应该没有任何悬念
尽量减小平民伤亡对它极为重要，因为那会是俄国特别想掌控/影响的的城市，也是周
边的代表 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 51 Mariupol today Purchase of products. 02/28/22 there is bread! |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 52 鸟弹打机楼和其它大件还算公平
只打几个单车就太可过了
真准
3公里距离以外都小意思 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 53 第2.5.2b.250.3支武装力量被遭遇
“人海，茫茫啊”----justin3, catcharles, miaimidi(?)数个同胞兄弟的新声 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | |
f********1
发帖数: 1601 | 55 器人？
顿顿顿顿顿顿
: 第2.5.2b.250.3支武装力量被遭遇
: “人海，茫茫啊”----justin3, catcharles, miaimidi(?)数个同胞兄弟的新声
: vhttps://www.youtube.com/v/DfF2r243Mto
【在 w********9 的大作中提到】
: kherson
: 第涅河最南的2桥地区
|
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 56 2015年左右乌军对独立区所在区的城市作战
现在是俄乌位置反过来了
搞不好，俄军在某城市也会造成很多平民的损失甚至伤亡 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 57 有了更新
先看图
与前一天比，只有在基辅有小小小的变化
在mariupol，对乌军向北退的大通道还是大开着
似乎俄军想让乌军退出那个城市，而让让它免遭较大的战斗
也许最后通过谈判，最靠近俄国的边境地区都会被乌军让出来而免遭战火。。。
往上看，还有2个类似的大通道口子
maiupol能被差不多和平“交接”吗？
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-
assessment-february-28-2022 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 58 接上
开始对kharkiv使用面性（非点性）攻击武器，因此对平民和非军用设施（有些很难区
分吧？）大大增加了伤亡或损失。
也可能用了（我之前提到的）令人恐怖的久燃火炮（有人用温压武器---太温和了吧？
）。从我看到的几个视频看，对基辅外缘的那个军事基地和Kharkiv某地肯定是用了。
一通至少发24炮过去。火光冲天，老远就可以看到。
开始用这些类型武器后，配合人员增强，kharkiv被拿下是迟早的事情。
围城显然是最糟糕的一招。乌军一个最大的优势就是依赖城市。至今，俄国人也没准备
把它完全围住的样子。应该还是想把乌军‘请“出来吧？
The Russian military has begun using area-attack weapons in the city of
Kharkiv, dramatically increasing the damage to civilian infrastructure and
the number of civilian casualties it is causing. It is using tube- and
rocket artillery against Kharkiv, and unconfirmed reports indicate that it
is also using thermobaric weapons, which can have devastating effects,
especially on civilian targets. Ukrainian resistance in and around Kharkiv
remains determined, but it is unclear how long Ukrainian defenders can hold
if Russia sustains or increases attacks of this variety coupled with ground
attacks supported by arriving Russian reinforcements. |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 59 我觉得乌军没法救mariupol
做大的调兵太难了，没有空军后，在野外会被俄军大大地敲打
那可是俄军最希望有的战斗类型
乌军集中部分兵力比较大规模敲打俄军的能力可能都比较有限了
会更容易顾此失彼
但现在乌军做较小/不大不小规模的攻击/反击的能力还是有。出奇不意、攻其不备。。
。蒙古人碰到大股敌人打了小胜就跑的情况也有不少，保存实力是首要。。。
俄军如果不注意也会在某处吃大苦头
The next major phase of Russian offensive operations will likely begin
within the next 24 hours and play out over the ensuing 48-72 hours.
Ukrainian resistance remains remarkably effective and Russian operations,
especially on the Kyiv axis, have been poorly coordinated and executed,
leading to significant Russian failures on that axis and at Kharkiv. Russian
forces remain much larger and more capable than Ukraine’s conventional
military, however, and Russian advances in southern Ukraine threaten to
unhinge the defense of Kyiv and northeastern Ukraine if they continue
unchecked. |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 60 基辅大战降临
白俄罗斯军来也
Key Takeaways
Russia deployed additional heavy forces and artillery that it has so far
failed to employ in assaults on Kyiv to the city’s western approach on
February 27-28. Russian forces will likely launch a renewed assault on
western Kyiv on March 1.
Russian forces began using heavy artillery against central Kharkiv on
February 28, indicating a dangerous inflection in Russian operations as the
Kremlin chooses to use air and artillery assets it has held in reserve to
date.
Russian forces resumed limited advances in northeastern Ukraine on February
28 after an operational pause on February 26-27.
Russian and proxy forces resumed assaults on Ukrainian forces defending
Mariupol from the east and deployed additional artillery and anti-tank
guided missile (ATGM) assets to the Mariupol front line on February 28.
Russian forces may attempt a renewed assault on Mariupol in the coming days.
Russian forces increasingly targeted Ukrainian airfields and logistics
centers on February 28, particularly in western Ukraine. Russia likely seeks
to ground the Ukrainian air force and interdict the ability of Western
states to resupply the Ukrainian military.
Russian and proxy forces resumed assaults on Ukrainian forces defending
Mariupol from the east and deployed additional artillery and anti-tank
guided missile (ATGM) assets to the Mariupol front line on February 28.
Russian forces may attempt a renewed assault on Mariupol in the coming days.
Russian and Belarusian forces may be preparing for an additional line of
advance from Belarus into western Ukraine.
Russian successes in southern Ukraine are the most dangerous and threaten to
unhinge Ukraine’s successful defenses and rearguard actions to the north
and northeast.
Russian troops are facing growing morale and logistics issues, predictable
consequences of the poor planning, coordination, and execution of attacks
along Ukraine’s northern border. |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 61 现在又说俄空军没有制空了
如果算上无人机，那倒是没得说了
俄国也有大量的无人机，也在用。虽然不如土耳其的那个出名，但也是在多个大战场上
起过很大作用的。
其实在第一天空军设施就被打得差不多了（俄军打了830个重要目标），因此俄军大量
军车冲出
克里米亚很快就到了第涅河附近，大量机械化部队在几小时内一路开到了基辅的那个机
场。。。
从显示的图片看，最开始打击的主要是机场的油库。。。也许当时误认为会很快拿下一
些较大的地方
现在很可能是
俄军不想让乌军有任何机会有较大的恢复，因为西方在想办法让乌空军起死回生并快速
提供其它援助。。。
为那，俄军开始（更多）动用白俄罗斯的空军设施，以打击最西乌地区
在乌各处已经毁坏了不少民用机场的设施
24小时内发射了380颗导弹（主要都是短程弹道导弹）敲击机场、放空设施和指挥设施
俄军，在我看来，更是在做“preemptive strikes”，以有效阻碍可能的多种西援（包
括“志愿”人力）
Russian forces increasingly targeted Ukrainian airfields and logistics
centers on February 28, particularly in western Ukraine. Russia likely seeks
to ground the Ukrainian air force and interdict the ability of Western
states to resupply the Ukrainian military. The Ukrainian General staff
reported that Russian airstrikes increasingly concentrated on military and
civilian airfields and air-defense assets on February 28.[1] Russian forces
conducted thirty missile strikes and four airstrikes from 11:00 am local
time February 27 to 11:00 am February 28.[2] US intelligence officials
reported that Russia has fired 380 missiles, predominantly short-range
ballistic missiles, since February 24.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff
reported Russian air assets are increasingly targeting Ukraine from
Belarusian airspace, though no Belarusian assets have launched operations as
of now.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense falsely claimed to have secured
air supremacy over Ukraine on February 28.[5] Russian forces have still not
secured air superiority five days into the invasion but likely seek to do so
in coming days through increased strikes on Ukrainian air assets.[6]
Western military aid to the Ukrainian air force, including EU plans
announced on February 27 to send fighter jets to Ukraine, will be crucial in
preventing Russian forces from achieving air superiority.[7] Russian forces
likely seek to interdict US and European aid shipments through western
Ukraine. |
R**********6
发帖数: 4 | 62 俄乌战事， 西方不仅摇旗呐喊， 还提供军火， 情报， 人员， 连个劝和的都没有，
反而鼓动要大打， 全民动员， 让俄罗斯葬身于人民战争的汪洋大海里，
这剧本真是绝了。 到底是什么人在背后出谋划策？ |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 63 说那昨天从白俄罗斯进军基辅的车队有11英里长
我觉得是搞错了
每100米3辆车/坦克，也有500多了
一下子增加的坦克和装甲都有200以上了吧？
那是去打城市+50%以成分的野外集团军战了吧？
灵活/临时性增援不行吗？
1) Kyiv axis: Russia deployed additional heavy forces and artillery it
has so far failed to employ in assaults on the city to the western approach
to Kyiv on February 27-28. Russian forces will likely launch a renewed
assault on western Kyiv on March 1. Attacks by Russian light forces on the
outskirts of the city failed to make progress on February 28. Ukrainian
forces are unlikely to capitulate.
Russia deployed substantial additional forces to its offensive along the
western bank of the Dnipro River on February 27-28. Maxar Technologies
satellite imagery (see Appendix A below) captured an 11-mile-long Russian
convoy approaching Antonov airport, about 17 miles from downtown Kyiv, at 11
:00 am local time on February 28. Social media users observed additional
Russian forces moving through southern Belarus on February 28.[8] Russian
logistics columns were additionally spotted in southeastern Belarus, likely
to support Russian attacks on eastern Kyiv.[9] Russian forces will likely
attempt a renewed assault on western Kyiv with supporting artillery on March
1.
Russian light forces continued unsuccessful attacks on Kyiv the night of
February 27-28.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Ukrainian forces
have established a “dense and multilevel system of defense of the capital
” on February 28.[11] Ukrainian forces likely successfully took advantage
of the time granted by Russia’s operational pause February 26-27 to
reinforce defenses in the city.
Russian forces are likely continuing attempts to infiltrate the city.
Ukrainian forces reported Russian troops attempted to use three captured
ambulances to infiltrate Ukrainian lines in Kyiv on February 27.[12] UK
media outlet the Times reported on February 28 that more than 400 Russian
mercenaries are currently operating in Kyiv under orders to kill Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky, prompting Ukrainian forces to implement a
strict curfew on February 26.[13] ISW cannot confirm this report, though it
would track with Russia’s likely efforts to decapitate the Ukrainian
government.
Ukrainian forces continue to successfully defend against Russian efforts to
encircle Kyiv west of the city, repulsing an attack on Irpin the night of
February 27 and possibly temporarily recapturing Hostomel airport from
Russian forces.[14] |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 64 这个报告的不严谨点比过去有点多了
过去提立个傀儡政府
而现在进一步提（别人传的）要杀总统的说法是没必要的
杀了他，反倒会让他被颂，让不少人的抵抗意志变得更强
抓到他，抓到一些前军人领导人和前政府官员，审判他们对亲俄民众，尤其是东乌克兰
独立区平民的大量死亡，才会让俄军入侵的某些合理性得到宣扬 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 65 在东北，俄军大大加强了对某些城区的重火力攻击
给人的印象是：可能会在那个方向上继续升级，而造成越来越严重的民众或民用设施伤
亡或损失
俄军明显加强了空地力量的配合
2) Northeast axis: Russian forces began using heavy artillery against
central Kharkiv on February 28, indicating a dangerous inflection in Russian
operations as the Kremlin chooses to use fire assets it has held in reserve
to date. Russian forces additionally resumed limited advances in
northeastern Ukraine on February 28 after an operational pause on February
26-27. Ukrainian forces continue to delay and inflict losses on the Russian
advance but will likely not be able to halt further advances if the Kremlin
commits additional reserves.
Russian forces used close air support and heavy artillery, including
unconfirmed reports of thermobaric artillery, in assaults on Kharkiv on
February 28. Russian Su-34 fighter bombers conducted strikes in Kharkiv on
February 28, and Russian forces will likely increase their use of close air
support in the coming days.[15] Russian Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)
and traditional tube artillery began striking central Kharkiv on February
27-28, inflicting numerous civilian casualties.[16]
The Russian use of heavy artillery against urban areas indicates a dangerous
new phase in Russian operations. ISW previously warned that Russian forces
would likely need to increase their use of air and artillery assets to
overcome heavier-than-expected Ukrainian resistance but that Russia
refrained from doing so to limit the informational and diplomatic effects of
causing heavy Ukrainian civilian casualties and to avoid creating rubble
and other obstacles-to-movement into and through Ukrainian cities. Russian
forces will likely be able to overcome Ukrainian defenses in Kharkiv (and in
Kyiv, if they choose to apply similar firepower there) while inflicting
heavy civilian casualties and doing massive property damage.
Russian forces resumed offensive operations in northeastern Ukraine, between
Chernihiv and Sumy, on February 28.[17] Ukrainian forces claimed to halt
attacks by Russian forces out of Khomutovka (in Kursk Oblast, Russia)
towards Hlukhiv and Baturyn, west of Sumy.[18] Russian forces have not
previously attacked this sector of northeastern Ukraine and likely seek
alternate routes through to-date strong Ukrainian defenses. Elements of
Russia’s 14th Army Corps of the Northern Fleet and 47th Tank Division of
the 1st Guards Tank Army are operating along this axis.[19]
Ukrainian forces also repulsed attacks on eastern Kyiv in Baturyn, from the
direction of Chernihiv, on February 28.[20] |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 66 说
在大东南地区增强了支持人力和火力（包括重火力）
其中就也有吓死我的久燃火炮
也许阻击/伏击手和摩托化军队也到来了
打巷战更有用？
还不清楚哪天开始大攻击mariupol
也可能把它包围而让那里的乌军投降
3) Donbas axis: Russian and proxy forces resumed assaults on Ukrainian
forces defending Mariupol from the east and deployed additional artillery
and anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) assets to the Mariupol front line on
February 28. Russian forces may attempt a renewed assault on Mariupol in the
coming days. Russian forces likely intend to pin Ukrainian forces in place
on the line of contact to enable Russian forces breaking out of Crimea to
isolate them. The Russians may be content to leave them there while
concentrating on capturing Kyiv and imposing a new government on Ukraine.
They may alternatively seek to encircle and destroy them or force them to
surrender.
Russian forces advancing on Mariupol from the west continued assembling in
Berdyansk on February 28 but did not make any major assaults.[21] Russia may
be halting these forces to instead prioritize the other two Russian
advances out of Crimea toward Zaporizhia and Mykolayiv. They may, on the
other hand, be waiting until they have concentrated enough combat power in
this region before launching a full attack. Additionally, several videos of
Ukrainian citizens in Berdyansk interdicting and harassing Russian forces
circulated on Ukrainian social media on February 28.[22]
Russian proxies in the 1st and 2nd Army Corps (the Ukrainian designations
for the Russian-controlled military forces of the Donetsk and Luhansk People
’s Republics, respectively) conducted assaults along the line of contact in
Donbas, supported by Russian artillery.[23] Proxy forces reportedly
captured Hranitne, northeast of Mariupol, on February 28.[24] Ukrainian
forces remain largely in place on the line of contact in Donbas. Russian
forces likely seek to achieve a larger envelopment using forces breaking out
from Crimea and currently advancing on Mariupol from the west.
Ukrainian forces reported capturing a Russian sniper from the 102nd Motor
Rifle Regiment of the 150th Motor Rifle Division in Donbas on February 28.[
25] If confirmed, this indicates at least elements of the previously
uncommitted Russian 8th Combined Arms Army are active in Donbas.
Russian forces additionally deployed additional MLRS, thermobaric artillery,
and ATGM assets toward Mariupol in Donetsk Oblast on February 28.[26]
Russian forces may attempt an assault on Mariupol from the east in the
coming days. |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 67 说
克里米亚出击的俄军昨天到达了向西通往odessa的mykolaiv的外围
搞不清楚是否更侧重向北还是向西
（我前面提到，俄国可能是故意让西边的乌军通道存在而让乌军能够撤离，在mariupol
达到不战而胜的目的。围攻也许是最坏的选择，需要最多的兵力，自己也更容易受伤。
因此可能俄军只是在做一种较灵活的选择。）
4) Crimea axis: Russian forces continued limited advances on two axes
out of Crimea—north toward Zaprozhia and west toward Mykolayiv, reaching
the outskirts of Mykolayiv on February 28. Russia may struggle to fully
supply both axes of advance and may be forced to choose which advance to
prioritize.
Russian forces continued to advance north toward Zaprozhia on February 28
but have not yet entered the city. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed
to capture the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, approximately 50km southwest
of the city, on February 28.[27] Russian forces in Melitopol likely deployed
north to attack Zaporizhia on February 28.[28] ISW cannot confirm the
extent of Russian advances toward Zaporizhia on February 28.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops launched an assault
on Mykolayiv at 11:00 am local time on February 28.[29] ISW cannot confirm
the extent of Russian advances west of the Dnipro River, though Russian
forces have likely encircled Kherson. |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 68 说
俄白联军，包括白空军，可能开辟对最西乌地区的进攻，打击多种西援。
会遭遇之前在其它地方碰到的很大的相似困难。。。
我认为俄国现在没有力量顾那里。把东边基本解决了，西方援助就会有极大的顾虑（也
会担心最后西乌克兰被完全占领的可能吧---那样缴获的武器就是俄军的了）。
只要打击空军恢复就够了。
如果乌克兰基本败掉了，西方的很多承诺会变得无法兑现。
Russian and Belarusian forces may be preparing for an additional line of
advance from Belarus into Western Ukraine. The Belarusian 38th Air Assault
Brigade deployed to Kobryn, near Brest in southwestern Belarus, on February
28.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 28 that there is a
high likelihood of Belarusian forces joining Russian operations.[31] ISW
previously reported a Russian armored column assembling in Stolin, Belarus,
on February 25 to support a possible advance into Rivne Oblast in western
Ukraine.[32] Russian forces have not launched a ground attack as of this
publication. A Russian offensive in western Ukraine would likely seek to cut
Ukraine off from ground shipments of Western aid through Poland, Slovakia,
and Hungary. However, Belarusian airborne forces would likely face similar
difficulties to previous, failed, Russian airborne operations against Kyiv
if they attempted airdrops. |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 69 对乌军很近而紧迫的威胁或危险是
从克里米亚出击的俄军会让东（南）区军力被隔离母体
俄国在居民区加大重火力。。。意味。。。到了危险的新阶段
俄军有足够的传统军力攻克乌军的防卫
其它的就不谈了，因为我不一定都同意。。。lol
Immediate Items to Watch
Russian forces advancing north and east from Crimea threaten to cut off
Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine if Kyiv does not withdraw them in the
coming days.
Russian forces began using artillery against residential areas in Kharkiv on
February 28, likely signaling a dangerous new phase of Russian operations.
Russian forces face growing morale and supply issues but will likely be able
to overcome these handicaps.
Russian forces continue to refrain from using their likely full spectrum of
air and missile capabilities. The Ukrainian air force also remains active.
Russian operations will likely steadily wear down Ukrainian air capabilities
and eventually take the Ukrainian air force out of the fight.
Russia has sufficient conventional military power to reinforce each of its
current axes of advance and overpower the conventional Ukrainian forces
defending them. |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 70 假若战争打太久了，乌克兰较大城市零元购事件会不会快速增多？
第52贴那里有新战士小分队的行为
而这里是无武装无组织的零元购 |
w********9
发帖数: 8613 | 71 2015年
Donbas共和国
得克萨斯去的共产主义武士 |
