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发帖数: 1 | 1 http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/Analysis-Pentagon-has-a-Pacific-posture-predicament
Analysis: Pentagon has a Pacific posture predicament
White House and admirals can't agree on how to deter China
(placeholder image)
U.S. Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro speaks to the crew of the USS
Ronald Reagan aboard the aircraft carrier in Yokosuka, Japan on Oct. 26. (
Photo courtesy of the U.S. Navy)
KEN MORIYASU, Nikkei Asia chief desk editorOctober 27, 2021 06:41 JST
NEW YORK -- On Feb. 4, roughly two weeks into office, U.S. President Joe
Biden ordered Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to lead a Global Posture
Review of all American forces deployed overseas.
The aim was to make sure that the military's footprint fit the
administration's foreign policy and national security priorities -- in other
words, China. The review was widely expected to conclude around the summer,
but deep into October, it is still underway inside the walls of the
Pentagon.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense has been reaching out to allies such
as Japan, discussing the plans. But one Japanese official said that he was
mildly surprised by the lack of big decisions that typically accompany a
global-scale posture review. "It doesn't look like Japan will feature much
in the review," the official said.
One reason the review has not concluded could be because the Biden
administration cannot decide on how to deter China.
"There is an ongoing debate," said Bryan McGrath, a retired surface warship
officer and founding managing director of consultancy The FerryBridge Group,
"between those who believe that powerful, numerous, networked naval forces
[deployed] forward act as a deterrent and can lead to security and
prosperity, and those who can't prove that with algorithms and math and so
dismiss it as a wish and a prayer."
(placeholder image) President Joe Biden, joined by Vice President Kamala
Harris, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin
and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, depart after delivering
remarks in the East Room of the White House. Biden's foreign policy team
looks to compartmentalize relations with China, cooperating on the climate
but "jousting" for advantage in the South China Sea. (Photo courtesy of the
White House)
There seem to be multiple tracks of debate. One is an argument between "
deterrence by denial" or "deterrence by punishment."
"Denial" is the more conventional method of deterrence, dissuading China
from taking action through a heavy forward presence in locations such as
Japan, South Korea and Singapore.
People who advocate for "punishment," meanwhile, "tend to be more
enthusiastic about funding programs and capabilities that manifest
themselves after the shooting starts," such as long-range missiles, Air
Force bombers and attack submarines, McGrath said.
Combatant commanders seem to tilt toward denial, or a bigger forward
presence.
"I'm a forward-deployed person. Man, I would have forces all over the place
out there," former Chief of Naval Operations -- the Navy's highest ranking
officer -- Adm. Jonathan Greenert told the Institute for Corean-American
Studies in a webinar on Oct. 19, speaking about naval presence in the Indo-
Pacific.
Pointing to the roughly 20 U.S. warships based in Yokosuka and Sasebo in
Japan, Greenert said: "I'd try to see if we can get that to 30, 35," he said
. "Because we don't have nearly enough forces to respond quickly," to China'
s actions.
(placeholder image) Then-Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert
delivers remarks at Chatham House in London in June 2015. Greenert calls for
increasing the number of warships forward-deployed to the Indo-Pacific to
deter China. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Navy)
The administration of former President Donald Trump made a clear tilt toward
the "denial" camp. One of the chief advocates for that shift was Elbridge
Colby, the former deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and
force development and the principal author of Trump's 2018 National Defense
Strategy.
"We were trying to move to a deterrence by denial model, whose basic logic
is that you're best off if you can convince the other side that they're
going to fail, not that you're going to punish them so much they'll disgorge
whatever they gain," Colby told Nikkei Asia.
Another source of contention in the Pentagon is the new concept of "
integrated deterrence" that has been floated by Austin. It calls for a "
whole-of-government" approach to strengthen competition with China, rather
than focus solely on the military aspect. Diplomacy, cyber tools, economic
incentives and sanctions are all expected to enhance deterrence.
But the concept has been met with suspicion, especially after Biden's fiscal
2022 defense budget request grew less than inflation and called for fewer
new ships than during the Trump years.
"It sure seems like a funny way out of the gate, when we say China is the
biggest challenge in the Pacific, and it's mostly a maritime challenge, and
then go cut the number of warships they are buying. That doesn't make a lot
of sense," said Tom Shugart, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a
New American Security and an expert on the Chinese military threat.
"It's hard to tell if it's competition with domestic priorities, but it's
certainly a head scratcher," he said.
Colby said he is worried about the Biden administration's "lack of sharp
focus" on deterrence. "The way the administration is talking now about this
is more of a hodgepodge. This 'integrated deterrence' idea sounds like 'we'
ll have some denial but then we'll have some economic and diplomatic
pressure and the like.' That sounds nice but won't work if we don't meet the
high denial standard," he said.
McGrath said he saw this coming. "It's obvious. The Deputy Secretary of
Defense Kath Hicks led a long effort when she was in the think tank world
that was called 'Getting to less.' It was a series of defense strategies
that would have a lower footprint, a lower cost, lower continuing costs and
lower lifecycle costs. There's nothing they are doing that they didn't
telegraph they wanted to do," he said.
(placeholder image) Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks sits with
Secretary Lloyd Austin at a roundtable at the Pentagon. Before assuming her
post, Hicks led a project at the think tank Center for Strategic and
International Studies called 'Getting to less,' which explored defense
strategies that would have a lower footprint and a lower cost. (Photo
courtesy of the Department of Defense)
At the heart of the many debates inside the White House and the Pentagon is
how to deter China.
The New York Times reported Oct. 17 that Biden's top aides do not see the
challenges with China as part of a new Cold War. "Instead, they argue that
it should be possible for the two superpowers to compartmentalize,
cooperating on the climate and containing North Korea's arsenal, even while
competing on technology and trade, or jousting for advantage in the South
China Sea and around Taiwan," the report said.
Colby took issue with the word "jousting," that draws from the medieval
sports contest in which two opponents on horseback fought with lances.
"They want to compete and joust in the South China Sea but then cooperate on
climate. That's naive about how much the military dimension is critical and
central," he said.
"Their statement is an aspiration, not a strategy," Colby added, warning
that despite any superficial gains in diplomacy, once the Chinese do have
military capacity, "the politics and the diplomacy will be determined by the
military."
The delay in the Global Posture Review could also have been linked to an
effort by the Biden administration to garner Chinese cooperation toward the
COP26 climate summit that begins at the end of this month. Biden and Chinese
President Xi Jinping have also agreed in principle to hold a virtual summit
by the end of the year, and the White House may have tried to avoid
revealing a new force posture blueprint that is clearly focused on
encircling China.
Brent Sadler, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation and a 26-year Navy
veteran, said the Global Posture Review is more likely to be "a bureaucratic
drill" than a new grand strategy. "I had high hopes that it would be a true
posture review, where we're looking at 'where do we have a hard time
maintaining our presence?' And then, 'what kind of basing and what kind of
new access we need looking out 20 years.' It's not that, unfortunately."
One area that Sadler hopes may be included in the Global Posture Review is a
focus on Southeast Asia. "Right now, the weakest place that needs the most
attention is the South China Sea," he said.
"The only way you're really going to get that sustained persistent presence
is that you have to have a dedicated structure, like a task force."
(placeholder image) The Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS
Montgomery sits pierside at Changi Naval Base, Singapore, after arriving for
a rotational deployment in July 2019. The U.S. Navy uses Singaporean ports
on a rotational basis. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Navy)
Such a task force could be in line with the revival of a "First Fleet" that
focuses on the western part of the Indo-Pacific, that was proposed by former
Navy Secretary Kenneth Braithwaite.
Collin Koh, a research fellow at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, said that while Singapore may be reluctant to open a
new U.S. naval base, it is open to increasing access for U.S. ships under
the current framework of cooperation.
"There is an appetite for sustaining and enhancing U.S. presence in the
region," he said.
But Koh added that Southeast Asian countries will also be closely watching
the U.S.-China rivalry, and adjust strategies accordingly.
"Certainly, the sentiments and perceptions that will shift policies in
Southeast Asia are very much shaped by the ongoing China-U.S. rivalry. It
was interesting to see that in the recent times, Southeast Asian countries
are actually intensified engagements with non-U.S. external powers such as
Australia, France, Japan, India," he said.
"I do see those alternative engagements with non-U.S. partners as being a
potential third way for them to pursue." | N**********n
发帖数: 1 | 2 deterrence by denial需要的可不止35艘军舰
Combatant commanders seem to tilt toward denial, or a bigger forward
presence.
"I'm a forward-deployed person. Man, I would have forces all over the place
out there," former Chief of Naval Operations -- the Navy's highest ranking
officer -- Adm. Jonathan Greenert told the Institute for Corean-American
Studies in a webinar on Oct. 19, speaking about naval presence in the Indo-
Pacific.
Pointing to the roughly 20 U.S. warships based in Yokosuka and Sasebo in
Japan, Greenert said: "I'd try to see if we can get that to 30, 35," he said
. "Because we don't have nearly enough forces to respond quickly," to China'
s actions. |
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