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发帖数: 1 | 1 http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21083337-china-naval-modernization-implications-for-us-navy-capabilities-background-and-issues-for-congress-oct-7-2021?responsive=1&title=1
Appendix B. U.S. Navy’s Ability to Counter
Chinese ASBMs
This appendix provides additional discussion of the issue of the U.S. Navy’
s ability to counter China’s ASBMs.
Although China’s projected ASBM, as a new type of weapon, might be
considered a “game changer,” that does not mean it cannot be countered.
There are several potential approaches for countering an ASBM that can be
imagined, and these approaches could be used in combination. The ASBM is not
the first “game changer” that the Navy has confronted; the Navy in the
past has developed counters for other new types of weapons, such as ASCMs,
and is likely exploring various approaches for countering ASBMs.
Countering China’s projected ASBMs could involve employing a combination of
active (i.e., “hard-kill”) measures, such as shooting downASBMs with
interceptor missiles, and passive (i.e., “soft-kill”) measures, such as
those for masking the exact location of Navy ships or confusing ASBM reentry
vehicles. Employing a combination of active and passive measures would
attack various points in the ASBM “kill chain”—the sequence of events
that needs to be completed to carry out a successfulASBM attack. This
sequence includes detection, identification, and localization of the target
ship, transmission of that data to the ASBM launcher, firing the ASBM, and
having the ASBM reentry vehicle find the target ship.
Attacking various points in an opponent’s kill chain is an established
method for countering an opponent’s military capability. A September 30,
2011, press report, for example, quotes Lieutenant General Herbert Carlisle,
the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for operations, plans, and
requirements, as stating in regard to Air Force planning that “We’ve taken
[China’s] kill chains apart to the ‘nth’ degree.”127
To attack the ASBM kill chain, Navy surface ships, for example, could
operate in ways (such as controlling electromagnetic emissions or using
deception emitters) that make it more difficult for China to detect,
identify, and track those ships.128 The Navy could acquire weapons and
systems for disabling or jamming China’s long-range maritime surveillance
and targeting systems, for attacking ASBM launchers, for destroying ASBMs in
various stages of flight, and for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they
approach their intended targets. Options for destroying ASBMs in flight
include the SM-3 midcourse BMD interceptor missile (including the new Block
IIA
127 David A. Fulghum, “USAF: Slash And Burn Defense Cuts Will Cost Missions
, Capabilities,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, September 30, 2011: 6.
128 Forajournalarticlediscussing actionsbytheNavyduringtheperiod1956-
1972toconcealtheexactlocationsof Navyships, see Robert G. Angevine, “
HidinginPlainSight, TheU.S. NavyandDispersed OperationsUnderEMCON, 1956-1972
,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2011: 79-95. See also Jonathan F.
Sullivan, Defending the Fleet From China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile:
Naval Deception’sRoles in Sea-Based Missile Defense, A Thesissubmitted to
the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown
University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Security Studies, April 15, 2011, accessed August 10, 2011
, at
h t t p : / / g r a d wo r k s . u m i . c o m / 1 4 9 1 5 4 8 . p d f ; J o
n So l o m o n , “ D e c e p t i o n a n d t h e B a c k f i r e B o m b e
r : R e e x a m i n i n g t h e L a t e Cold War Struggle Between Soviet
Maritime Reconnaissance and U.S. Navy Countertargeting,” Information
D i s s e m i n a t i o n ( w w w . i n f o r m a t i o n d i s s e m i n a
t i o n . n e t ) , O c t o b e r 2 7 , 2 0 1 4 ; J o h n So l o m o n , “
D e c e p t i o n a n d t h e B a c k f i r e Bomber, Part II,” Information
Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net), October 28, 2014; John
Solomon, “Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part III,” Information
Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net),
O c t o b e r 2 9 , 2 0 1 4 ; J o h n So l o m o n , “ D e c e p t i o n a
n d t h e B a c k f i r e B o m b e r , P a r t I V , ” I n f o r m a t i o
n D i s s e m i n a t i o n (www.informationdissemination.net), October 30,
2014.
Congressional Research Service 50
China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities
version), the SM-6 terminal-defense BMD interceptor missile,129 and
accelerating development and deployment of the hypervelocity projectile (HVP
), electromagnetic rail gun (EMRG), and solid state lasers (SSLs).130
Options for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended
targets include equipping ships with systems, such as electronic warfare
systems or systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds or radar-opaque
carbon-fiber clouds, that could confuse an ASBM’s terminal-guidance radar.
131
An October 4, 2016, press report states the following:
Several times in the past, [Chief of Naval Operations John] Richardson has
stressed that long range weapons developments from adversarial nations like
Russia and China aren't theend-all,be-allofnavalconflicts.
Just because China’s “carrier-killer” missile has a greater range than
the planes aboard a US aircraft carrier doesn't mean the US would shy away
from deploying a carrier within thatrange,
Richardsonhasstatedondifferentoccasions.
Again, Richardson challenged the notion that a so-called A2/AD zone was “an
impenetrable keep out zone that forces can only enter at extreme peril to
their existence, let alonetheirmission.”
Richardsontookparticularissuewiththe“denial”aspectofA2/AD,
repeatinghisassertion that this denial is an “aspiration” not a “fait
accompli.” The maps so common in
representingthesethreatsoftenmarkoffthelimits ofdifferentsystem’srangeswith
“red arcs that extend off coastlines,” with the implication that military
forces crossing these lines face “certain destruction.”
But this is all speculation accordingto Richardson:“The reality is far more
complex, it’s actually really hard to achieve a hit. It requires the
completion of a really complexchain of events.... these arcs represent
danger for sure... but the threats they are based on are not insurmountable,
andcanbemanaged,willbemanaged.”
“Wecanfightfromwithinthesedefendedareas,andwewill... thisisnothingnewandhas
been done before,” said Richardson.
So while Russia and China can develop missiles and radars and declare their
ranges on paper, things get a lot trickier in the real world, where the US
has the most and best experience in operating.
“Potential adversaries actually have different geographic features like
choke points, islands, ocean currents, mountains,” said Richardson, who
urged against oversimplifying complicated,andalwaysuniquecircumstancesinso-
calledA2/ADzones.
“Have no doubt, the US navy is prepared to go wherever it needs to go, at
any time, and stay there for as long as necessary in response to our
leadership’s call to project our strategic influence,” Richardson
concluded.
129 For more on the SM-3, including the Block IIA version, and the SM-6, see
CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
130 For more on HVP , EMRG, and SSLs, see CRS Report R44175, Navy Lasers,
Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided Projectile: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
131 Regardingelectronicwarfare,see,forexample,BrettTingley,“TheNavy’
sSecretiveAndRevolutionaryProgram T o Project False Fleets From Drone Swarms
,” The Drive, November 7, 2019. Regarding the option of systems for
generatingradar-opaquesmokeclouds, ThomasJ.Culora,“
TheStrategicImplicationsofObscurants,”NavalWar CollegeReview,Summer 2010:73
-84;ScottTait,“MakeSmoke!”U.S.NavalInstituteProceedings,June2011:58-63.
Regarding radar-opaquecarbon-fiberclouds, see“
7thFleetTestsInnovativeMissileDefenseSystem,”NavyNews Services, June26,2014
;KevinMcCaney,“Navy’sCarbon-FiberClouds CouldMakeIncomingMissiles
MissTheir Targets,”DefenseSystemshttp://defensesystems.com),June27,2014.SeealsoSydney J.FreedbergJr.,“Cyber,EW Are Secret Missile Defense W eapons T oo Secret T o Use,” Breaking Defense, December 4, 2015.
Congressional Research Service 51
China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities
Similarly, an August 29, 2016, press report states the following:
The United States Navy is absolutely confident in the ability of its
aircraft carriers and c a r r i e r a i r w i n g s t o f l y a n d f i g h
t w i t h i n z o n e s d e f e n d e d b y s o - c a l l e d a n t i - a c
c e s s / a r e a d e n ia l (A2/AD) weapons....
In the view of the U.S. Navy leadership, A2/AD—as it is now called—has
existed since the dawn of warfare when primitive man was fighting with rocks
and spears. Overtime, A2/AD techniques have evolved as technology has
improved with ever-greater range and lethality. Rocks and spears eventually
gave way to bows and arrows, muskets and cannons. Thus, the advent of long-
range anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles is simply another
technological evolution of A2/AD.
“This is the next play in that,” Adm. John Richardson, chief of naval
operations, told The National Interest on Aug. 25 during an interview in his
office in the Pentagon. “This A2/AD, well, it’s certainly a goal for some
of our competitors, but achieving that goal is much different and much more
complicated.”
Indeed, as many U.S. Navy commanders including Richardson and Rear Adm. (
Upper Half) DeWolfe Miller, the service’s director of air warfare, have
pointed out, anti-access bubbles defended by Chinese DF-21D or DF-26 anti-
ship ballistic missile systems or Russian Bastion-P supersonic anti-ship
missile systems are not impenetrable ‘Iron Domes.’ Nor do formidable
Russian and Chinese air defense systems such as the S-400 or HQ-9
necessarilyrendertheairspacetheyprotectintono-gozonesforthecarrierairwing.
Asked directly if he was confident in the ability of the aircraft carrier
and its air wing to fight inside an A2/AD zone protected by anti-ship cruise
and ballistic missiles as well as advanced air defenses, Richardson was
unequivocal in his answer. “Yes,” Richardson said—
buthewouldnotsayhowexactlyhowduetotheneedforoperationalsecurity.“It’s
really a suiteofcapabilities,butIactuallythinkwe’
retalkingtoomuchintheopenabout someofthethingswe’redoing,
soIwanttobethoughtfulabouthowwetalkaboutthings sowedon’
tgiveanyofourcompetitorsanadvantage.”...
Miller saidthattherehavebeenthreatstothecarriersincethedawnofnavalaviation.
In many ways,the threatto the carrierwas arguablymuch greaterduring the Cold
Warwhen the Soviet Union massed entire regiments of Tupolev Tu-22M3
Backfires and deployed massivecruisemissile-armedOscar-
classSSGNsubmarinestohuntdownanddestroythe Navy’s flattops. The service
developed ways to defeat the Soviet threat—and the carrier will adapt to
fight in the current environment.
“W e could have had this interview twenty-years-ago and there would have
been a threat,” Miller said. “The nature of war and A2/AD is not new—that
’s my point. I don’t want to downplay it, but our improvements in
information warfare, electronic warfare, payloads, t h e w e a p o n s s y s
t e m s t h a t w e ’ v e p r e v i o u s l y t a l k e d a b o u t — p l
u s o u r a b i l i t y t o t r a in t o t h o s e capabilitiesthatwehave—
wewillcreatesanctuaries,we’llfightin thosesanctuariesand we’re a maneuver
force.”132
An October 18, 2017, blog post states the following:
Assuming the DF-21D is ready for battle, can America defend against China’s
mighty mis s ile ?
132 Dave Majumdar, “Chief of Naval Operations Richardson: US Aircraft
Carriers Can Fight Inside A2/AD Zon es,” National Interest, August 29, 2016
. See also Ryan Pickrell, “Navy Admirals Brush Aside Biggest Worry Of
Modern Naval Combat,” Daily Caller, August 31, 2016; Dave Majumdar, “Here
Is Why the US Military Is Not In Panic Mode Over China’s Carrier-Killer
Missiles,” National Interest, June 20, 2016.
Congressional Research Service 52
China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities
Whileopinionsareclearlymixed—
inspeakingtomanysourcesoverthelastseveralyears on this topic—it seems clear
there is great nervousness in U.S. defense circles. However, as time has
passed,initialfears haveturnedtowardsamoreoptimisticassessment....
Intheend,theweaponmightnotbethegreat“game-changer”thatmanypointitouttobe,
but a great complicator.133
A January 28, 2021, press report states:
TheU.S. Navy'
stopintelligenceofficerhassaidtheserviceiswatchingcloselyasChina expands its
anti-ship missile capabilities, particularly in and around the disputed
South China Sea, to include the ongoing development of long-range anti-ship
ballistic missiles. At the same time, he said he “hopes”that China's
People's Liberation Army will continue to invest significant resources into
these efforts, hinting that the U.S. Navy already has
extensivemeasurestocounterthesethreatsalreadyinusenoworindevelopment.
NavyViceAdmiralJeffreyTrussler,theDeputyChiefofNavalOperationsforInformation
Warfare,madehisremarks aboutChina'santi-
shipmissilearsenalduringanonlineevent putonbythenon-
profitIntelligenceandNationalSecurityAllianceonJan.27,2021....
... not only did Vice Admiral Trussler seem less concerned about PLA anti-
ship missile capabilities than one would expect, he made clear he was happy
with them continuing to pourtimeandresourcesintothoseefforts.
“I hope they just keep pouring money into that type of thing,” he said. “
That may not be how we win the next war.”
The clear indication here is that Trussler is aware of countermeasures,
whether they be certain systems or tactics, techniques, and procedures, that
are either available now or in development.TheViceAdmiraldid
notofferanyspecificdetailsaboutwhattheNavyis doingtogoalongwiththeseremarks.
...
W e a l s o k n o w t h a t , b y 2 0 1 9 , w a r s h i p s a s s i g n e d
t o t h e N a v y ' s 7 t h F l e e t , w h i c h i s b a s e d in Japan,
were fitted with the AN/SLQ-59 Transportable Electronic Warfare Modules ( T
E W M ) . T E W M i s d e s c r i b e d a s a “ c o u n t e r - t e r m i n
a l t h r e a t d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m , ” i n d i c a t in g that
it is designed to help defeat incoming anti-ship missiles, or other threats,
such as swarms of small drones, in the final phase of their attack on a
ship. Based on the information available, The War Zone previously assessed
that the AN/SLQ-59 was most likely acquired in response to growing cruise
missile threats, and Chinese developments, in particular,given its fielding
first on ships forward-deployedin Japan.
The Navy has also been hard at work developing an entire networked
electronic warfare “ecosystem,” as part of its shadowy Netted Emulation of
Multi-Element Signature against Integrated Sensors program, or NEMESIS. The
goal here has been to craft a ‘system of systems’ comprising of various
manned and unmanned ships, as well as submarines and aircraft, equipped with
electronic warfare systems that can work together cooperatively.
Oneofthekeyusesofthesecapabilities
wouldbetogeneratesignalsthatmimicrealfleets of ships and aircraft to
distract and confuse opponents, making it difficult for them to
effectivelyspotandtargetrealNavyassets.
Thesenetworkedelectronicwarfareplatforms could also employ other kinds of
electronic warfare tactics across a broad area to protect against various
kinds of threats. You can read more about NEMSIS in detail in this past
WarZonefeature.134
133 Harry J. Kazianis, “Could China’s Aircraft Carrier Killer Missiles ‘
Sink’ the U.S. Navy?” National Interest, October 1 8 , 2 0 1 7 . Se e a l
s o D i c k M o s i e r , “ B r e a k i n g t h e A n t i - Sh i p M i s s
i l e K i l l C h a i n , ” C e n t e r f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l M a
r i t i m e Security, February 26,2018;RichardA. Bitzinger, “TheMythofthe
‘Game-Changer’Weapon,”AsiaTimes,April26, 2018.
134 ThearticlelinkedatthispointisBrettTingley,“TheNavy’
sSecretiveAndRevolutionaryProgramToProjectFalse Fleets From Drone Swarms,”
The Drive, November 7, 2019.
Congressional Research Service 53
China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities
A highly adaptive anddeeply networkedelectronic warfareecosystemcould be
particularly usefulagainstlong-rangeanti-shipmissilestrikes,
especiallyusingballisticmissiles,which would require targeting information
from offboard platforms and the ability to send
updatedinformationtotheweaponduringthemid-coursestageofflight....
The Navy does have Arleigh Burke class destroyers outfitted specifically for
ballistic missile defense, including the ability to launch the SM-3 Block
IIA interceptor, which is designed to knock down ballistic missiles during
the mid-course portion of their flight.
Thoseshipsarealsoslatedtogetinterceptorsdesignedtobringdownhypersonicweapons
in thefutureas partoftheRegionalGlidePhaseWeaponSystem(RGPWS)program....
The Navy, which has been looking to stop deploying Arleigh Burkes on
dedicated missile defensemissions,couldseektomake more widespreaduseoftheSM-
3BlockIIA in the f u t u r e . T h o s e d e s t r o y e r s a n d o t h e r
s h i p s c o u l d g a i n a d d i t i o n a l m i s s i l e d e f e n s e
c a p a b i l i t ie s as the improved Block IB variant of the SM-6 missile
begins to enter service. Existing B l o c k I a n d I A v e r s i o n s o f
t h e S M - 6 a l r e a d y h a v e t h e a b i l i t y t o i n t e r c e p
t b a l l i s t i c m i s s ile s during the terminal phase of their flight
, as well as engage various other aerial and s urface threats. The SM-6, in
particular, potentially provides a potent defense against anti-ship
ballistic missiles, especially those that break through mid-course
traditional ballistic missile defenses,ifmid-
courseballisticmissiledefenseassetsareavailableatall.
There’s the possibility that Vice Admiral Trussler is aware of other
developments in the classified realm that could further mitigate some or all
of these threats, as well. Beyond that, there’s no discounting that his
public comments, which are certain to be scrutinized by the PLA itself, are
a form of misinformation designed to prompt concerns within the Chinese
military that its priorities may be, in some way, seriously off base.
Whatever the case, the threat posed by China’s anti-ship missile arsenal,
which continues togrowincapability,includingwiththedevelopmentofnewanti-
shipballisticmissiles,is real. At the same time, while the Navy obviously
knows this, the service seems to be strongly hinting that it feels it making
very good progress on getting around these challenges,
oratleastwantstomaketheChinesethinkso.135
Regarding the above-reported remarks by Vice Admiral Trussler, a January 29,
2021, press report stated:
That confident [U.S. Navy] posture caught the attention of the Chinese
military e s t a b l i s h m e n t . “ W h a t T r u s s l e r i s s a y i
n g i s t h a t t h e U . S . h a s s u f f i c i e n t p o w e r t o h a n
d le t h e anti-ship missile threat from China,” former People’s
Liberation Army instructor Song Zhongping told the South China Morning Post
on Friday [January 29]. “The U.S. is emphasizingthatthreatanditwill
furtherboostits defensesagainstChinesemissiles.”136 | z*****n
发帖数: 36 | 2 看到potential approaches 就笑了，看到imagined在大笑 | Y********g
发帖数: 1 | | V*******n
发帖数: 1 | 4 霉菌看起来很无奈，居然想用宽带干扰，这对光学和红外探测器基本没有屁用。 |
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