k**0
发帖数: 1 | | k**0
发帖数: 1 | | k**0
发帖数: 1 | 3 霉爹对台蛙完全没有信心
"Taiwan’s will to resist is vital but unknowable." | k**0
发帖数: 1 | 4 老僵也都认为克林顿轰炸大使馆是故意的？
“From China’s perspective, the bombing and the larger Kosovo conflict were
a major geostrategic event: a US-led coalition acting without UN
authorization, invading a sovereign state and carving off a province of that
state to become independent just because Americans thought it should be.
The rampant unilateralism and disregard of international norms, plus the
specifically anti-China focus of the embassy bombing (which no Chinese I
have ever spoken to believes was a mistake), made the prospect of a near-
term US war over Taiwan look alarmingly real.” | k**0
发帖数: 1 | 5 "Taiwan’s Will and Ability to Resist
There has been a good deal of discussion about whether the Taiwan public and
elites have the political will to endure the horrific punishment China
would rain down on them. Would Taiwan crumble at the first blow, like many
mainland Chinese observers seem to believe? Or would they rise to the
Churchillian moment, fighting on the beaches, on the landing grounds, in the
fields and streets and hills, vowing to never surrender? No one knows. Many
have opinions, but this is essentially unknowable.
Despite this uncertainty, both US and Taiwan operational concepts assume a
vigorous resistance against the PLA landing.16 Indeed, assuming and planning
for such resistance is an important part of making it happen, should push
ever come to shove. But all discussion among both US and Taiwan observers
focuses on defeating the landing. There is no discussion whatsoever of what
happens next, if the PLA doesn’t just go away to lick its wounds as we
think it should.
Unlike Taiwan’s will to resist, its ability to resist a long-term blockade
is something we should know much more about than we do. I am aware of no
study in the United States or Taiwan examining Taiwan’s wartime consumption
rate of critical materials, its peacetime stockpiles, or which stockpiles
would likely be lost to PLA fires. There is no assessment of what must get
through a blockade to keep Taiwan alive, what types of materiel in what
quantities, or what Taiwan’s domestic production of food, water, supplies,
and equipment might be under wartime conditions. And to the best of my
knowledge, no one has considered in detail how to get enough materiel
through a PLA air and maritime blockade, day after day, week after week,
while working to break down the blockade itself."
【在 k**0 的大作中提到】
: 霉爹对台蛙完全没有信心
: "Taiwan’s will to resist is vital but unknowable."
| k**0
发帖数: 1 | 6 "Potential Approaches to Defeat the Blockade
Suppression of Air Defenses. The center of gravity for this entire conflict,
in my judgment, is the PLA air defense network. Over many years of
participating in Taiwan Strait war games and tabletop exercises, I observe
that Taiwan’s air defenses are almost always disabled within the first few
days of the conflict, but China’s integrated air defense system (IADS)
along the Taiwan Strait remains effective for as far into the conflict as
the exercise examines. This in turn limits the United States to long-range
stand-off weapons or precision-strike incursions by stealth platforms. I
assume I am not the only person to have observed this and that US forces are
working on the issue." |
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