s******2
发帖数: 1 | 1 The Diplomat文章：中共在南沙渚碧礁建立的軍用機場可能為豆腐渣工程，無法起降和
維護戰鬥機。
https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/why-doesnt-china-deploy-fighter-jets-to-the-
spratly-islands/
Why Doesn’t China Deploy Fighter Jets to the Spratly Islands?
Is Beijing merely trying to avoid provocation, or is there a more serious
problem with its artificial island bases in the South China Sea?
By Ian Storey
August 14, 2020
Why Doesn’t China Deploy Fighter Jets to the Spratly Islands?
In this Friday, April 21, 2017, file photo, an airstrip, structures, and
buildings on China’s man-made Subi Reef in the Spratly chain of islands in
the South China Sea are seen from a Philippine Air Force C-130 transport
plane.
Credit: AP Photo/Bullit Marquez
On August 4, China’s Global Times reported that SU-30MKK Flanker fighter
jets belonging to the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) had
conducted a 10-hour patrol over the South China Sea, breaking the air force
’s previous record of 8.5 hours.
Although the report suggested only one SU-30 had made the 10-hour flight, an
online video showed five to six fighter jets had been involved in the
mission.
The fighter aircraft departed from an air base in southern China and were
refueled twice by Ilyushin-78 aerial refueling tankers. The Global Times
described the operation as “technically and mentally” challenging for the
pilots, noting that they had “consumed rations to keep their energy levels
up.”
The mission came at a time of heightened tensions between the United States
and China over the maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Over the past
few months, both countries have increased the tempo of naval exercises and
air patrols in the South China Sea. On July 13, U.S. Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo declared China’s jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea to be
unlawful and accused Beijing of bullying the Southeast Asian claimants.
While the video was designed to demonstrate China’s growing power
projection capabilities, one expert noted that it may have inadvertently
revealed the PLAAF’s weaknesses. The Flankers were either lightly armed or
unarmed, and the use of two Il-78s would have consumed two-thirds of the air
force’s heavy tanker fleet. It suggests that in a conflict over the South
China Sea the PLAAF would not be able to send large numbers of aircraft into
the battle space and sustain them.
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month.
While the Global Times would only say that the fighter jets had been
dispatched to the “most remote islands and reefs” in the South China Sea,
the video clearly showed the aircraft flying over Subi Reef in the Spratly
Islands.
Subi Reef is one of China’s seven artificial islands in the Spratlys and
hosts a 3,300 meter-long runway. Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef also
support long runways.
The mission begs an important question: Why didn’t the SU-30s land and
refuel on Subi Reef? Surely one of the main purposes of the artificial
islands is to enable China to project air power into the South China Sea to
assert its territorial and jurisdictional claims, including the possibility
of establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Spratlys?
In the past, China has deployed fighter jets to Woody Island in the Paracels
(including eight aircraft in July). In January 2016, two commercial
aircraft landed on Fiery Cross Reef soon after the runway had become
operational. And over the past two years, the PLA has flown transport planes
and maritime patrol aircraft to the artificial islands, including most
recently in April. PLA Navy (PLAN) warships, China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels
, and Chinese-flagged survey ships are also frequent visitors to the man-
made islands.
Yet, as far as we know, no PLAAF fighter aircraft has ever landed on
Mischief, Subi, or Fiery Cross Reefs. Given the United States’ interest in
publicizing China’s military activities in the South China Sea — both
countries have accused each other of militarizing the dispute — it seems
implausible that the Pentagon has evidence of fighter jet deployments to the
Spratlys but hasn’t released the imagery.
Let’s assume then that no Chinese fighter aircraft has ever landed on any
of the three artificial islands. Given the vast costs of reclaiming the
seven features and then building military infrastructure on them －
including fuel and ammunition depots, hangars, and radar and communications
equipment － why hasn’t the PLAAF ever flown combat jets to the artificial
islands?
There are three possible reasons.
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The first is political: China does not want to inflame tensions with the
Southeast Asian claimants by deploying combat jets to its artificial islands
. Given that over the past few months China has doubled down on its claims
and provocatively sent survey ships and CCG vessels into the EEZs of Vietnam
, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines, this seems unlikely. As China seems
unperturbed by the reputational damage its activities in the South China
Sea have caused since the beginning of this year we can probably rule out
this possibility.
The second is aircraft maintenance issues. Operating fighter aircraft at sea
poses problems due to salt in the sea spray and high humidity, both of
which can cause metal corrosion. However, U.S. aircraft carriers deal with
this issue all the time and in any case China has constructed large hangars
on its artificial islands, some of which are probably air conditioned.
Besides, a few days’ deployment to Fiery, Subi, or Mischief Reef would not
impose much wear and tear on PLAAF fighter jets, which could quickly be
washed down with fresh water.
The third possible reason, if true, poses a more serious problem for Chinese
defense planners: that the structural integrity of the facilities on the
artificial islands, including the airstrips, is suboptimal and the PLAAF is
therefore wary of using them.
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Reclamation work at Subi Reef began in early 2014, but before the dredging
was even completed construction had already started on the runways and
support facilities. The runway on Subi was completed by mid-2016. The usual
industry practice would have been to allow the reclaimed land to settle for
months or even years before beginning construction. To do otherwise leads to
the possibility of subsidence. Japan’s Kansai Airport, also constructed on
an artificial island, has suffered from this problem since it opened in
1994, despite extensive remedial engineering work.
Doubts about the structural integrity of the artificial islands are
amplified when the issue of corruption is considered. Despite President Xi
Jinping’s anti-graft campaign, corruption in China remains endemic,
including in the military-industrial complex. For instance, in July 2019 Su
Bo, who oversaw the construction of China’s first domestically produced
aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, was convicted of corruption and jailed for
12 years. And in May 2020, Hu Wenming, the head of China’s aircraft carrier
construction program, was arrested and charged with corruption and passing
secrets to foreign powers. Corruption in the building industry leads to
short cuts and shoddy construction.
If the airstrips on the three atolls are sinking or cracked it would not be
readily apparent from satellite imagery. Aircraft could use them, especially
slower turboprop aircraft such as the military transport planes and
maritime patrol aircraft that landed on Fiery Cross Reef in March and April.
But for fast combat jets the integrity of the runway surface needs to be
much higher. The image-conscious and risk-averse PLA would be keen to avoid
the public relations debacle that would accompany a mishap involving one of
its fighters as it took off or landed on one of the three reefs.
If indeed there are structural problems with the runways and associated
facilities on China’s man-made islands it calls into question their
strategic utility for the Chinese air force and any ambitions Beijing may
harbor to enforce an ADIZ over the South China Sea.
Ian Storey is Senior Fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. | s******2
发帖数: 1 | 2 这种以推沙为基底的新建岛礁
本来稳定性就不够
短时间(3-5年)作为战术用基地还行
尤其长跑道的维护 费时费力费钱
还必须多年持续加固 以避免海水渗透与地形下陷变形
每一百公尺上下差个10公分就麻烦了
再加上岛上本身没有淡水资源
光是驻守人员的日常消耗就很惊人
the-
【在 s******2 的大作中提到】
: The Diplomat文章：中共在南沙渚碧礁建立的軍用機場可能為豆腐渣工程，無法起降和
: 維護戰鬥機。
: https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/why-doesnt-china-deploy-fighter-jets-to-the-
: spratly-islands/
: Why Doesn’t China Deploy Fighter Jets to the Spratly Islands?
: Is Beijing merely trying to avoid provocation, or is there a more serious
: problem with its artificial island bases in the South China Sea?
: By Ian Storey
: August 14, 2020
: Why Doesn’t China Deploy Fighter Jets to the Spratly Islands?
| c***n
发帖数: 2232 | |
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