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发帖数: 20182 | 1 •Research Article
Reverse-engineering censorship in China: Randomized experimentation and
participant observation
Gary King1,*,
Jennifer Pan1,
Margaret E. Roberts2
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Author Affiliations
1Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University, Cambridge,
MA 02138, USA.
2Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, La
Jolla, CA 92093, USA.
↵*Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract
Structured Abstract
Introduction
Censorship has a long history in China, extending from the efforts of
Emperor Qin to burn Confucian texts in the third century BCE to the control
of traditional broadcast media under Communist Party rule. However, with the
rise of the Internet and new media platforms, more than 1.3 billion people
can now broadcast their individual views, making information far more
diffuse and considerably harder to control. In response, the government has
built a massive social media censorship organization, the result of which
constitutes the largest selective suppression of human communication in the
recorded history of any country. We show that this large system, designed to
suppress information, paradoxically leaves large footprints and so reveals
a great deal about itself and the intentions of the government.
Graphic
The Chinese censorship decision tree. The pictures shown are examples of
real (and typical) websites, along with our translations.
Rationale
Chinese censorship of individual social media posts occurs at two levels: (i
) Many tens of thousands of censors, working inside Chinese social media
firms and government at several levels, read individual social media posts,
and decide which ones to take down. (ii) They also read social media
submissions that are prevented from being posted by automated keyword
filters, and decide which ones to publish.
To study the first level, we devised an observational study to download
published Chinese social media posts before the government could censor them
, and to revisit each from a worldwide network of computers to see which was
censored. To study the second level, we conducted the first largescale
experimental study of censorship by creating accounts on numerous social
media sites throughout China, submitting texts with different randomly
assigned content to each, and detecting from a worldwide network of
computers which ones were censored.
To find out the details of how the system works, we supplemented the typical
current approach (conducting uncertain and potentially unsafe confidential
interviews with insiders) with a participant observation study, in which we
set up our own social media site in China. While also attempting not to
alter the system we were studying, we purchased a URL, rented server space,
contracted with Chinese firms to acquire the same software as used by
existing social media sites, and—with direct access to their software,
documentation, and even customer service help desk support—
reverseengineered how it all works.
Results
Criticisms of the state, its leaders, and their policies are routinely
published, whereas posts with collective action potential are much more
likely to be censored—regardless of whether they are for or against the
state (two concepts not previously distinguished in the literature). Chinese
people can write the most vitriolic blog posts about even the top Chinese
leaders without fear of censorship, but if they write in support of or
opposition to an ongoing protest—or even about a rally in favor of a
popular policy or leader—they will be censored.
We clarify the internal mechanisms of the Chinese censorship apparatus and
show how changes in censorship behavior reveal government intent by
presaging their action on the ground. That is, it appears that criticism on
the web, which was thought to be censored, is used by Chinese leaders to
determine which officials are not doing their job of mollifying the people
and need to be replaced.
Conclusion
Censorship in China is used to muzzle those outside government who attempt
to spur the creation of crowds for any reason—in opposition to, in support
of, or unrelated to the government. The government allows the Chinese people
to say whatever they like about the state, its leaders, or their policies,
because talk about any subject unconnected to collective action is not
censored. The value that Chinese leaders find in allowing and then measuring
criticism by hundreds of millions of Chinese people creates actionable
information for them and, as a result, also for academic scholars and public
policy analysts. | m*l
发帖数: 83 | 2 Science上发帖研究军版热门话题，大家怎么没有什么兴趣啊。 |
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