c*******2
发帖数: 617 | 1 Wyne: Five reasons China has no friends
Originally published: July 8, 2014 11:57 AM
Updated: July 8, 2014 1:06 PM
By ALI WYNE, The Washington Post
Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi, left, shakes hands
Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi, left, shakes hands with Vietnamese
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh before their talks
behind closed-door on the tension in the South China Sea in Hanoi, Vietnam
on Wednesday June 18, 2014. (Credit: AP)
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In 2010, then Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told a gathering of
Asian countries that the United States "has a national interest in freedom
of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for
international law in the South China Sea."
To China, those were fighting words. But surprisingly, no country came to
its defense. Instead, 12 of China's neighbors issued statements in support
of Clinton's position. Incensed, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
declared "China is a big country, and other countries are small countries,
and that is just a fact."
According to the Financial Times's Geoff Dyer: "In less than half an hour,
Yang managed to tear up more than a decade of subtle, diligent and highly
effective Chinese diplomacy." It's just one example among many of a simple
fact: China has few acquaintances and fewer friends.
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The country's isolation is evident again in advance of this week's U.S.-
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. As 'The Washington Post' reported:
China's military rise, and its increasingly assertive claims to sovereignty
of these largely uninhabited lumps of rock, coral and sand, have set it on a
possible collision course with its neighbors, who also claim various of the
archipelagos, and with the United States, which has important alliances
with three of the rival claimants and would be obliged to defend them in
case of an attack.
In "Still Ours to Lead," Brookings scholar Bruce Jones notes that the United
States "has more than fifty allies - over a quarter of the world's states."
China's "strategic allies," however, "are few and far between." What
accounts for that gap?
1. History: China's Cold War experience of maneuvering between the United
States and Soviet Union shaped its current aversion to alliance formation.
It committed to pursuing an "independent and self-reliant foreign policy of
peace" in 1982 and, according to Feng Zhang, a scholar at the Australian
National University, "has consistently rejected alliance as a foreign-policy
principle, denigrating it as a relic of the Cold War unpalatable to Chinese
morals." Especially in light of the Obama administration's rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific, China has come to see America's network of alliances in the
region as an instrument for constricting its rise.
2. Ideology: While it believes its values are exceptional, China is not
interested in posing a Soviet-style challenge to democracy, capitalism and
democratic capitalism. Still, the country remains a one-party, authoritarian
country that treats political dissidents and ethnic minorities poorly. As
long as those realities remain true, it will find it difficult, if not
impossible, to forge alliances with democracies.
3. Big fish, small pond: China's millennia-old history, imposing size (in
terms of both population and territory), and challenging location (it has 14
neighbors) mean that some of its neighbors' suspicion is inbuilt. But its
behavior in recent years - enforcing a self-declared maritime border that
encompasses some 80 percent of the South China Sea, applying incremental
pressure and sometimes coercion to assert its sovereignty over disputed
territories therein and adopting an increasingly elastic conception of its
core interests - has further undermined its ability to achieve a "peaceful
rise" within the Asia-Pacific.
4. China is primarily focused on internal development: While China's
behavior toward its neighbors has been increasingly assertive, its conduct
beyond the Asia-Pacific is often transactional. The country is primarily
interested in nurturing business relationships with other big countries.
To that end, China has established economic partnerships across the world -
extending loans and building infrastructure in exchange for vital
commodities - paying little attention to the nature of the governments with
which it is interacting. There is a significant gap, however, between
business arrangements and durable alliances: The latter require at least
some semblance of shared values and alignment of strategic imperatives.
5. China has risen - fast: The German Marshall Fund's Daniel Kliman recently
compared China's rise over a 30-year period (1982 - 2012) with that of the
United States (1870 - 1900), Germany (1870 - 1900), the Soviet Union (1945-
75), and Japan (1960-90), considering shares of global economic growth,
trade and military spending. "In 30 years of ascent," he concludes, China "
has come farther, faster than any of the other rising powers in the
comparison group." Any rise of such magnitude is bound to arouse anxiety,
especially when it occurs in the putative successor to the world's
superpower.
While China has been advocating a new regional security architecture that
would diminish the salience of America's alliances in the Asia-Pacific, it
does not appear to have reconsidered substantially its basic posture on
alliance formation.
But as Yan Xuetong (author of an influential November 2011 New York Times
article "How China Can Defeat America") and Huang Yuxing argue in "Ancient
Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power," "the limitations of the principle of
nonalignment have already become apparent." China may not aspire to global
preeminence. But if it aspires to strategic parity with the United States,
it will have to become more proactive in forging alliances.
Wyne is a contributing analyst at Wikistrat and a coauthor of "Lee Kuan Yew:
The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World" (
2013). | s**********s
发帖数: 1079 | 2 中国处在富不富穷不穷的境地，没有多少国家在这个阶段，自然找不到多少共同价值。
穷光蛋时代朋友不要太多。 | c*******2
发帖数: 617 | 3 英文大意是， 1，2，3，4，5， 中国自己不要朋友。
或者说， 中国不要盟友。
结论是， 中国如果要抗衡美国， 要考虑自己的政策。 | h******1
发帖数: 16295 | 4 中国的朋友很多的.
不信你去参观联合国,外边的美国安检对中国人态度不好,对美国人笑脸相迎.
可一到里面买票,就完全反过来了. | C***J
发帖数: 7594 | 5 你确定是穷光蛋才交上很多朋友。
还是交很多损友，才变成穷光蛋。
【在 s**********s 的大作中提到】
: 中国处在富不富穷不穷的境地，没有多少国家在这个阶段，自然找不到多少共同价值。
: 穷光蛋时代朋友不要太多。
| d*****t
发帖数: 7903 | | L**W
发帖数: 2277 | 7 咸吃萝卜淡操心，
英国是美国最好的朋友吧，它是最积极建人民币中心的，这种往美国两肋插刀
的朋友还是自己留着享受吧。 | L*********2
发帖数: 10195 | 8 谁说我鳖没朋友，老朋友一堆一堆的摸，就是还活的好好的没几个。。。 | C**********e
发帖数: 23303 | | C**********e
发帖数: 23303 | 10 题目应该是 中国为何没有富朋友
【在 C**********e 的大作中提到】
: 非洲好朋友不少
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