h******t
发帖数: 872 | 1 http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-end-gamethe-dark-side-of-
1. The frustrated and aggressive central bank
If one wants to know how bad the health of China's economy has gone, look no
further than the PBOC's composure, which seems rather frustrated and
aggressive as of late. On 5th July, the central bank cut benchmark interest
rates for the 2nd time in less than a month. This happened right after the
fact that in December 2011, PBOC cut the reserve requirement ratio(RRR) by a
50 bp to 21%, it followed up with another 50 bp in February and another 50
bp in May to 20% currently.
On top of all the rate cuts, PBOC also made its biggest injection of funds
into the money market in nearly six months. The PBOC injected a net 225
billion yuan ($34.5 billion) through the reverse-repurchase operations(repo)
on last Tuesday and Friday, following a combined injection of 291 billion
yuan in the previous four weeks.
2. The systematic short-circuit of debt financing's in order
So why PBOC is in such an urge to open the floodgate of liquidity? This
economist will spare you the boredom of looking at the diagrams of China's
economic misery: HSBC PMI, etc, since you can find those eye candies
everywhere else on the web. Let me cut to the chase: However high it aims,
PBOC's action in practice merely work as the band aid to the bleeding
economy. But it won't be able to fix it. The central bank's aggressive pro-
liquidity maneuvers at best serve to sustain the over-leveraged economy and
avoid the systematic short-circuit of debt financing. Now allow me to
divulge:
The main drivers of China's debt financing,China's state-owned banks, are
starving for cash. According to Citigroup estimates, in 2011 seven of the
biggest Chinese banks raised 323.8 billion renminbi ($51.4 billion) of new
fund. Several financial firms are expected to raise another $17.7 billion in
the next few months, with China’s fifth-biggest lender, the Bank of
Communications, accounting for $9 billion. The unprecedented lending binge
encouraged by the central government,increasingly rigorous requirement of
regulatory capital and excruciating maintenance of excessive dividend
payouts have rendered the most-profitable banks in the world--Chinese banks-
-in a rather precarious position.
GaveKal's data will illustrate this is no exaggeration: In 2010, China’s
five biggest banks — the Big Four plus the Bank of Communications — paid
more than 144 billion yuan in dividends while raising more than 199 billion
yuan on the capital markets. The ballooning balance sheet caused by the loan
frenzy and strict capital requirement make China's banks' cash-craving
burning at both ends:this march, China’s big four— Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China, the Bank of China, China Construction Bank and
Agricultural Bank of China — have a combined 14 percent increase in total
assets, to 51.3 trillion yuan, which is roughly the size of the German,
French and British economies combined.
Meanwhile, under a new set of rules, the country’s biggest banks will need
to increase their capital levels to 11.5 percent of assets by the end of
2013.Their core Tier 1 capital ratio will need to be at least 9.5 percent.
These requirements are more stringent than the rules that apply to American
and European banks. Hereby, we shouldn't be surprised why the world's most
profitable banks are in the dire need of cash. It has to be PBOC who comes
to the rescue.
But we can't expect the alchemy of central banking to conjure miracles other
than administrating monetary band aids when the economy is broken.
3. The over-leveraged economy and unsustainable bubbles
According to the great Ray Dalio's principles, the credit-fueled China's
economy is so over-leveraged that a great de-leveraging is going to be the
only way out. The pyramid of debt/credit is cracking and will collapse since
the conditions of underlying economic agents are deteriorating.There's no
mount of monetary band aids that can alter that destiny.
According to Fitch’s data, the ratio of total financing/GDP in China rose
from 124% at end‐2007 to 174% at end‐2010, and rose by another 5pp to 179%
in 2011.In 2012 the growth of broad credit will slightly decelerate but
still outpace GDP. Clearly China is not suffering a liquidity crisis but the
diminishing economic return on credit. According to Fitch, in 2012, each
CNY1 in new financing will yield ￥0.39 yuan in new GDP versus ￥0.73 yuan
pre-crisis.Returns would have to rise above ￥0.5 yuan for domestic credit/
GDP to stabilize at 2011’s 179%.
The dilemma is that business entities will need more and more credit to
achieve the same economic result, therefore will be more and more leveraged,
less and less able to service the debt, more and more prone to insolvency
and bankruptcy. It will reach a turning point when the increasing number of
insolvencies and bankruptcies initiate an accelerating downward spiral for
underling assets prices and drive up the non-performing loan ratio for the
banks.
And then the over-stretched banking system will implode. A full blown
economic crisis will come in full force. The chain of reaction is clearly
set in the motion now. The question is when we will reach that turning point
. What PBOC has done is only adding fuel to the fire because it is unable to
tackle the root causes of China's economic ills.
The root causes are unsustainable economic bubbles and collapsing demand.
Firstly, I will analysis China's construction industry to illustrate the
severeness of China's economic bubbles.
According to Société Générale, in 2010, China spent more than $1,000bn
on construction (including residential/non residential real estate and
infrastructure), representing around 20% of its nominal GDP,or almost twice
the world average as the chart below shows. In 2010 the scale of the Chinese
construction market outpaced that of the US and became the largest
construction market worldwide with around 15% share. That year China's
construction binge push its investment/GDP ratio to 48.5%, a record
unprecedented in the recent history of China and other major economies. It's
sufficient to say China is a construction-led economy.
In 2010, China’s cement consumption surpassed 1,800mt, which is around 55%
of global consumption and about 25 times more than US consumption. With
average consumption of 1,400kg per capita, China stands well above the world
average ex-China of 300kg. History shows that such high consumption is hard
to sustain for a number of years and ultimately leads to a construction
crisis sooner or later.
In 2010, China has built around 1.8bn square meters of new residential floor
space, which is the equivalent of Spain’s housing floor space stock. This
construction has already provided accommodation for 60 million people while
the urban population has merely increased by c. 20 million. If China were to
keep its current construction pace over the next five years, the 9bn sqm
new housing area built would provide accommodation for 300 million more
people by 2015.
Therefore the available floor space stock in China will then be able to
accommodate an urbanization rate of 65-70%.But according to IMF's forecast,
it will be not until 2030 for China's urbanization to reach that level. How
can the central government punishes those farmers migrating ever so slowly
to the cities? Obviously, China will have more and more cities like Ordos, a
modern Chinese Ghost Town photogenically praised by the Time magazine.
Still not convinced? China can look to pre-crisis Spain for signs of
construction bubbles. Spain had a very high consumption per capita for years
before it crashed with the financial crisis. Spanish annual cement
consumption topped off at nearly 1,300kg per capita in 2007, ahead of the
financial crisis. 4 years later, Spanish consumption stands barely at around
500kg per capita, down 60% from its peak. If China's cement consumption per
capita keeps its current momentum, sooner or later China's construction
bubble will reach its end game.
Economic bubbles are unsustainable. It works like a Ponzi scheme. When it
first starts, the excess liquidity unleashed by the central banks will drive
the asset prices higher and higher. There will be more and more people and
money buying into the game assuming the price will keep rising up. Back then
the leverage is not a problem. But when the great de-leveraging is beckoned
, there will be a stampede towards the exit. That's when any Ponzi scheme
collapses. Let's make no bones about the fact that China's investment-fueled
growth including the construction binge is just such a Ponzi scheme.
4. Bust the myth of China's transition towards consumption-led economy
To this stage, China can't reply on the excessive investment to propel its
growth much longer. So what about seeking the growth more and more from the
demand side of the economy: the foreign and domestic demand? Well, that path
looks rather bumpy as well.
As to the foreign demand, China's export growth clearly is decelerating
recently as the major customers--EU and the US--are both fighting on the
edge of double-dip. It is immoral to accelerate the export growth while
trade partners are drowning in their debt crisis. It is also rather
dangerous while those trade partners are fighting for their survival and won
't hesitate to start a trade war to defend their lifelines. China can
sincerely hope that EU and the US soon bounce back from the economic abyss
to become their best customers again but that won't happen for a long time.
I agree with Ray Dalio that this economic crisis is a great deleveraging,
which will take more than a decade to unwind. According to UBS Wealth
Management Research's report, the great deleveraging will likely play out
through 2020. The ratios of debt-to-incomes must go down in EU and the US.
Sorry, China, no more easy fuel for your export growth.
Now that's too bad. The Ponzi scheme of investment growth and the export
growth are both collapsing. What's left for China to seek the growth then?
Domestic demand aka private consumption? It's much promised but not very
convincing.
Let's examine the structural reasons that China's domestic demand will have
its work cut out to refill the tank space of the economic growth left out by
collapsing investment and export:
1st, Contrary to what many choose to believe, China's trade surplus is not
caused by Chinese consumers' high saving rate, but has much to do with their
deteriorating disposable incomes which far lag behind GDP growth and
inflation. According to the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU),
workers' wages/GDP ratio have gone down for 22 consecutive years since 1983.
It goes without saying that the consumption/GDP ratio is shrinking all the
while.
Meanwhile, Aggregate Savings Rate has increased by 51% from 36% in 1996 to
51% in 2007. Don't jump to your conclusion yet that Chinese consumers has
been over-tightening their purse strings. The truth is far away from
conventional perceptions: according to Development Research Center of the
State Council's report, that increase is mainly driven by the government and
corporations and not by the household. For the past 11 years, Household
Saving Rate has only increased from 19% to 22%. Even India's Household
Saving Rate of 24% is higher than China's right now.
All the while, government and corporations' saving rate has increased from
17% to 22%, which accounts for nearly 80% of the increase on Aggregate
Savings Rate. For the past decade, Government's fiscal income is growing
faster than GDP or Household Income. In 2009, the fiscal income was 687.71
billion yuan, and achieved an annual growth of 11.7% while GDP growth was 8.
7%, Urban household disposable income growth was 8.8% and agriculture
household disposable income growth was 8.2%. It is obvious that the state
and corporations has taken too much out of national income and hence they
continue to weaken the consumers rather than empower them.
2nd, The state enterprises and crony capitalists have heavily dominated the
income distribution. The deteriorating income inequity makes it harder for
GDP growth to trickle down to the overall consumption. In 2010, the net
profits from two central enterprises(China Mobile and Petrol China) outstrip
the net profits from the top 500 private enterprise combined. Meanwhile,
Central enterprises only contribute 30% of GDP, and provide 20% of national
employment while the private enterprises contribute 70% of the GDP and
provide 80% of the national employment.
Adding fuel to the fire, monopoly enterprises also account for 55% of
national wage and salary. The widening income gap will skew more and more
national income towards corruption, rent seeking, capital flight, asset
investment and speculation. Thus the consumption-side of economy will be
continually weakened.
The biggest problem for China is the state, central enterprises and crony
capitalists wield too much power over national economy, have too much
monopoly power over wealth creation and income distribution, and much of the
GDP growth and vested interest groups' economic progress are made on the
expanse of average consumers stuck in deteriorating relative poverty. If
these problems aren't solved, the faster the Chinese GDP growth, the less
Chinese consumers will be able to support the over-capacity expansion, the
more export momentum China will need to sustain its growth. This is a
vicious circle of global imbalance. Even the revaluation of RMB can't break
it.
5. The end game is coming
There you have it: the unsustainable economic bubbles and collapsing demand
are the root causes plaguing China's economy. PBOC's current maneuvers won't
fix any of it. As I said previously,those alchemy recipes of central
banking at best can serve to sustain the over-leveraged economy and avoid
the systematic short-circuit of debt financing for now.
Other than that, there won't be much liquidity invested in capacity and job
intensive projects since there's no much demand to go around and the
economic return on credit will deteriorate. If these structural deficiencies
aren't properly addressed by the central government, things will get worse,
more frivolous rate cuts and RRR cuts and other central banking's gimmicks
are sure to come but to no avail, the chain reaction will be accelerated,
and China will face its end game: the dark side of a great deleveraging.
Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-end-gamethe-dark-side-of-a-great-deleveraging-2012-7#ixzz20t0OCfuD | p******u
发帖数: 14642 | 2 米帝撸文，越多越好
no
interest
a
50
【在 h******t 的大作中提到】
: http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-end-gamethe-dark-side-of-
: 1. The frustrated and aggressive central bank
: If one wants to know how bad the health of China's economy has gone, look no
: further than the PBOC's composure, which seems rather frustrated and
: aggressive as of late. On 5th July, the central bank cut benchmark interest
: rates for the 2nd time in less than a month. This happened right after the
: fact that in December 2011, PBOC cut the reserve requirement ratio(RRR) by a
: 50 bp to 21%, it followed up with another 50 bp in February and another 50
: bp in May to 20% currently.
: On top of all the rate cuts, PBOC also made its biggest injection of funds
| e********3
发帖数: 18578 | 3 你看看最近几个月中该股跌了多少，就知道大事不妙了。
【在 p******u 的大作中提到】
: 米帝撸文，越多越好
:
: no
: interest
: a
: 50
| L***n
发帖数: 6727 | 4 作者 Dee Woo, Beijing Royal School, 这位是哪个王爷?
no
interest
a
50
【在 h******t 的大作中提到】
: http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-end-gamethe-dark-side-of-
: 1. The frustrated and aggressive central bank
: If one wants to know how bad the health of China's economy has gone, look no
: further than the PBOC's composure, which seems rather frustrated and
: aggressive as of late. On 5th July, the central bank cut benchmark interest
: rates for the 2nd time in less than a month. This happened right after the
: fact that in December 2011, PBOC cut the reserve requirement ratio(RRR) by a
: 50 bp to 21%, it followed up with another 50 bp in February and another 50
: bp in May to 20% currently.
: On top of all the rate cuts, PBOC also made its biggest injection of funds
| L***n
发帖数: 6727 | 5 太有趣了
Dee Woo first gained international attention by writing a personal letter to
Barack Obama in October 2010, attempting to dissuade the US from initiating
a trade war with China. As a result, he was featured in much of the
Mainland Chinese media, as well as in Hong Kong, Singapore, Macao, Malaysia,
Canada and the US, including by the Wall Street Journal. He has gone on to
publish numerous commentaries in many influential newspaper and magazines in
Mainland China, Singapore, Taiwan and the US, and is a columnist...
这位牛逼啊
no
interest
a
50
【在 h******t 的大作中提到】
: http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-end-gamethe-dark-side-of-
: 1. The frustrated and aggressive central bank
: If one wants to know how bad the health of China's economy has gone, look no
: further than the PBOC's composure, which seems rather frustrated and
: aggressive as of late. On 5th July, the central bank cut benchmark interest
: rates for the 2nd time in less than a month. This happened right after the
: fact that in December 2011, PBOC cut the reserve requirement ratio(RRR) by a
: 50 bp to 21%, it followed up with another 50 bp in February and another 50
: bp in May to 20% currently.
: On top of all the rate cuts, PBOC also made its biggest injection of funds
| p******u
发帖数: 14642 | 6 看名字可能是港仙，整个东亚也只有洪孔会出啥叉叉皇家学校的了
to
initiating
Malaysia,
to
in
【在 L***n 的大作中提到】
: 太有趣了
: Dee Woo first gained international attention by writing a personal letter to
: Barack Obama in October 2010, attempting to dissuade the US from initiating
: a trade war with China. As a result, he was featured in much of the
: Mainland Chinese media, as well as in Hong Kong, Singapore, Macao, Malaysia,
: Canada and the US, including by the Wall Street Journal. He has gone on to
: publish numerous commentaries in many influential newspaper and magazines in
: Mainland China, Singapore, Taiwan and the US, and is a columnist...
: 这位牛逼啊
:
| L***n
发帖数: 6727 | 7 google了一下，像是个开在北京的野鸡学校
【在 p******u 的大作中提到】
: 看名字可能是港仙，整个东亚也只有洪孔会出啥叉叉皇家学校的了
:
: to
: initiating
: Malaysia,
: to
: in
| P*****t
发帖数: 4978 | 8 Dee Woo is a Standing Director at Beijing New Century Research Institute for
Multinationals, a citizen economist, and a citizen diplomacy activist.
所谓citizen economist是不是就是传说中的民科呀？
to
initiating
Malaysia,
to
in
【在 L***n 的大作中提到】
: 太有趣了
: Dee Woo first gained international attention by writing a personal letter to
: Barack Obama in October 2010, attempting to dissuade the US from initiating
: a trade war with China. As a result, he was featured in much of the
: Mainland Chinese media, as well as in Hong Kong, Singapore, Macao, Malaysia,
: Canada and the US, including by the Wall Street Journal. He has gone on to
: publish numerous commentaries in many influential newspaper and magazines in
: Mainland China, Singapore, Taiwan and the US, and is a columnist...
: 这位牛逼啊
:
| M*****8
发帖数: 17722 | 9
no
interest
a
50
后清犯贱，几十年听命于盗魔经信徒的墙街财阀，
心甘情愿被插管吸血后，终于被洋主子送进屠宰场。
http://bit.ly/O8AWzm
中国的灾难性去杠杆化已经开始
胡迪 ， 北京王府学校 | 七月 15，2012，4:29 PM | 34551 | 34
胡迪是在北京新世纪跨国公司研究所，一个公民的经济学家，常务理事和公民外交活动
家。
1。 沮丧和积极的央行
如果一个人想知道中国经济的健康已经多么糟糕，没有进一步看，比中国人民银行的镇
定，这似乎相当沮丧和后期的侵略。 7月5日，央行在不到一个月的时间内第二次削减
基准利率。 这之后发生的事实，在2011年12月，中国人民银行下调存款准备金率（RRR
）由50个基点至21％，与另外50个基点在二月和五月另外50个基点，至目前的20％。
上的所有降息，中国人民银行也取得了进入货币市场，在近半年最大的资金注入。 中
国人民银行在上周二和周五注入净225亿人民币（345亿元）通过反向回购操作（回购）
，在合并前四个星期注射后的291十亿人民币。
2。 债务融资的系统短路是为了
那么，为什么中国人民银行是在这样一种冲动，打开闸门的流动资金？ 这位经济学家
将不遗余力你无聊看中国的经济苦难图： 汇丰 PMI等，因为你可以在网上找到那些眼
睛糖果，其他任何地方。 让我切入正题：不过高，它的目的，中国人民银行在实践中
的行动仅仅是创可贴止血经济工作。 但它不会是能够解决它。 央行的积极亲流动性演
习，最好的服务，以维持经济过度杠杆化和避免债务融资系统短路。 现在，请允许我
透露：
中国，中国的国有商业银行的债务融资的主要驱动力正在挨饿现金。 据花旗集团估计
，在2011年7中国最大的银 行提出了323.8亿美元的新基金人民币（514
亿美元）。 一些金融机构预计提高美元在未来数月的17.7亿美元，与中国的第五大银
行，交通银行，占比为90亿美元。 中央政府鼓励，前所未有的贷款热潮日益严格的监
管资本要求和过多的股息难以忍受维护已呈现在世界上最盈利的银行 - 在一个相当危
险的境地 - 中国银行。
GaveKal的数据说明了这一点也不夸张：在2010年，中国的五家最大的银 &#
8203;行-四大加上交通银行-支付股息超过144亿人民币，同时提高对资本市场的超过
199亿人民币。 的气球平衡负债表造成的贷款狂潮和严格的资本要求使中国银行的现金
渴求两头烧：今年三月，中国的大4，工业和商业的中国银行，中国银行，中国建设银
行和农业银行 - 中国有一个总资产组合增长14％，至51.3万亿元，这大概是结合了德
国，法国和英国的经济规模。
与此同时，一套新的规则下，该国最大的银行将需要以增加其资本水平2013.Their核心
一级资本比率11.5％的资产将需要至少9.5％。 这些要求较严格的规则，适用于美国和
欧洲的银行。 在此，我们不应该感到惊讶，为什么世界上最赚钱的银行在急需现金。
它是中国人民银行来救援。
但是，我们不能指望中央银行炼金术想象的奇迹，比其他经济被打破时，行政货币波段
艾滋病的。
3。 过度杠杆化的经济和不可持续的泡沫
据雷Dalio伟大的原则 ，信贷推动中国的经济过度杠杆，一个伟大的去杠杆化将是唯一
的出路。 债务/信贷金字塔的打击，就会崩溃以来的基本经济主体的条件是没有货币的
带艾滋病deteriorating.There的坐骑，命运可以改变。
根据惠誉的数据 ，在中国的融资总额/国内生产总值的比例从2007年底的124％上升到
174％，在2010年年底，由另一5pp至179％2011.In 2012年广泛的信贷增长将略有上升
减速，但仍高于国内生产总值。 显然，中国是没有痛苦的流动性危机而减少对信贷的
经济回报。 据惠誉国际，在2012年，每个CNY1在新的融资将产生日元在新的国内生产
总值的0.39元相比¥0.73元前，crisis.Returns将有超越日元稳定在2011年的179
％，国内信贷/国内生产总值的0.5元。
是业务实体将需要更多的信贷来达到同样的经济效果，因此将有越来越多的杠杆，越来
越少，能够提供服务的债务，更多和更容易破产和破产的困境。 它会达到一个转折点
，当越来越多的破产和破产启动下属资产价格加速螺旋式下降，并带动了银行的不良贷
款比率。
然后过度紧张的银行体系将崩溃。 一个全面的经济危机将全面生效。 链反应，明确规
定在现在的议案。 问题是什么时候，我们会达到这个转折点。 中国人民银行做了只添
加燃料的火，因为它是无法对付中国的经济弊病的根源。
根源是不可持续的经济泡沫和崩溃的需求。
首先，我会分析中国建筑业说明中国的经济泡沫的严重程度。
据兴业银行 ，在2010年，中国花费超过1万亿美元，建设（包括住宅/非住宅房地产和
基础设施），较其名义国内生产总值的20％左右，几乎两倍于世界平均水平为下面的图
表显示。 2010年中国建筑市场的规模超过美国，成为全世界大约有15％的市场份额最
大的建筑市场。 这一年中国的建设热潮，推动其投资/ GDP的比率48.5％，创下了在中
国和其他主要经济体最近的历史上前所未有的。 这足以说明中国是一个建设为主导的
经济。
在2010年，中国的水泥消费量超过1800万吨，其中约55％的全球消费量的约25倍，比美
国的消费更是。 随着人均1400公斤的平均消费中，中国主张，远高于世界平均水平的
前中国300公斤。 历史表明，这样的高消费是很难维持数年，并最终导致施工危机迟早。
在2010年，中国已建成约18亿平方米，新建住宅建筑面积，相当于西班牙的住房建筑面
积股票。 这建设已经为60万人提供住所，而城市人口仅仅增加由c。 20亿美元。 如果
中国在未来五年保持其目前的建设步伐，建立新的住房面积90亿平方米，将提供3亿多
的人，到2015年的住宿。
因此可用的楼面空间股票在中国将成为能容纳65-70％的城市化率，但根据国际货币基
金组织的预测，这将是中国的城市化，直到2030年达到这一水平。 中央政府如何惩罚
那些农民迁移过如此缓慢的城市吗？ 显然，中国将有越来越多的城市像鄂尔多斯，中
国现代鬼城photogenically的称赞“时代”杂志 。
仍然不相信吗？ 中国可以寻找到危机前的西班牙建筑泡沫的迹象。 西班牙有一个年人
均消费非常高，金融危机前坠毁。 西班牙每年近1300公斤，人均水泥消费量突破2007
年，未来的金融危机。 4年后，代表西班牙的消费几乎在各地人均500公斤，其峰值下
降了60％。 如果中国的人均水泥消费量保持目前的势头，迟早建设中国的泡沫将达到
其最终游戏。
经济泡沫是不可持续的。 它的工作原理就像一个庞氏骗局。 第一次启动时，由央行释
放的流动性过剩将推动资产价格走高。 会有越来越多的人进入游戏和金钱购买假设价
格会不断上升。 当时的杠杆是没有问题的。 但是，当伟大的去杠杆化是招了招手，对
出口会有踩踏。 这时候，任何庞氏骗局崩溃。 让我们把有关的事实，中国的投资为燃
料的增长，包括建设热潮就是这样一个庞氏骗局没有骨头。
4。 中国转型的神话破灭对消费主导的经济
到了这个阶段，中国可以不答辩的过度投资，以推动其增长更长。 因此寻求从需求方
的经济增长越来越多的国外和国内需求呢？ 那么，这条道路看起来也颇为坎坷。
由于外国的需求，中国的出口增长明显减速的主要客户 - 欧盟和美国最近 - 都双底的
边缘上的战斗。 这是不道德的行为，加快出口增长，而贸易伙伴都淹没在他们的债务
危机。 这也是相当危险的，而这些贸易伙伴正在争取他们的生存和会毫不犹豫地开始
一场贸易战，以捍卫自己的生命线。 中国衷心希望，欧盟和美国很快反弹回来从经济
深渊再次成为他们最好的客户，但很长一段时间不会发生。
我同意雷Dalio经济危机，这是一个伟大的去杠杆化，这将需要超过十年放松。 据瑞银
财富管理研究报告，伟大的去杠杆化很可能会发挥出到2020年。 债务收入的比例必须
在欧盟和美国。 对不起，中国，没有燃料更容易为您的出口增长。
现在，这太糟糕了。 庞氏骗局的投资增长和出口增长都倒塌。 为中国寻求增长，那么
剩下什么？ 内需又名私人消费？ 它更承诺，但不是非常有说服力的。
让我们来看看，中国的国内需求将有其工作切出笔芯离开倒塌的投资和出口对经济增长
的坦克空间的结构性原因：
1，相反，许多人选择相信，中国的贸易顺差不引起中国消费者的高储蓄率，但有很多
事要做，他们恶化的可支配收入远远落后于国内生产总值增长率和通货膨胀。 根据工
会的所有中国联合会（中华全国总工会），工人的工资/ GDP的比率已连续22年了，自
1983年以来。 不用说，消费/ GDP的比率正在萎缩，而。
同时，总储蓄率从1996年的36％，由51％上升到51％，在2007年。 不跳你的结论，但
中国消费者已经过度紧缩他们的钱袋。 事实是，远离传统的看法：根据发展研究中心
，国务院的报告的增加主要是由政府和企业，而不是由家庭带动。 在过去11年，家庭
储蓄率已经从19％提高到22％。 甚至印度的家庭储蓄率24％，高于中国的现在。
在这期间，政府和企业的储蓄率已经从17％提高到22％，占近80％的总储蓄率的增加。
在过去的十年中，政府的财政收入增长速度高于GDP或家庭收入。 在2009年，财政收
入687.71十亿人民币，年均增长达到11.7％，而国内生产总值增长率为8.7％，城市家
庭可支配收入增长8.8％，农业家庭可支配收入增长8.2％。 很明显，太多的国家和企
业已经采取了国家收入，因此，他们继续削弱消费者，而不是赋予他们。
第二，国有企业和权贵资本家重为主的收入分配。 日益恶化的收入不平等，使GDP增长
难以涓滴的整体消费。 在2010年，从中央企业（中国移动和中国石油）的净利润超过
500强民营联合企业的净利润。 与此同时，中央企业不仅有助于国内生产总值的30％，
并提供全国就业的20％，而民营企业贡献的国内生产总值的70％，并提供80％的国家就
业。
火添加燃料，垄断企业也占全国工资，薪金的55％。 收入差距扩大会歪斜收入越来越
多的国家对腐败，寻租，资本外逃，资产投资和投机。 因此，经济的消费端将不断削
弱。
为中国最大的问题是国家，中央企业和权贵资本家执掌的权力太大了国民经济，多创造
财富和收入分配有太多的垄断权力，GDP的增长和既得利益集团的经济进步作出袤的平
均消费者停留在相对贫穷恶化。 如果这些问题不解决，中国的GDP增长速度越快，那么
中国的消费者将能够支持超过扩容，更多的出口势头，中国将需要维持其增长。 这是
一个全球经济失衡的恶性循环。 即使人民币升值不能打破它。
5。 游戏结束
有你有它不可持续的经济泡沫和崩溃需求是困扰中国经济的根源。 中国人民银行的电
流演习不会修复它。 正如我以前说过，中央银行的炼金术配方充其量可以起到维持经
济过度杠杆化和避免债务融资系统短路。
以外，不会因为没有多少需求去走一走，对信贷的经济回报将恶化的流动性，投资能力
和就业密集型项目。 如果这些结构性缺陷由中央财政解决，不正确的事情会变得更糟
，更轻薄的降息和存款准备金率削减和其他中央银行的噱头，是一定要来，但无济于事
，连锁反应将会加快，中国将面对比赛结束：一个伟大的去杠杆化的阴暗面。
http://bit.ly/O8AWzm
http://www.mitbbs.com/article_t/Military/38060605.html
【在 h******t 的大作中提到】
: http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-end-gamethe-dark-side-of-
: 1. The frustrated and aggressive central bank
: If one wants to know how bad the health of China's economy has gone, look no
: further than the PBOC's composure, which seems rather frustrated and
: aggressive as of late. On 5th July, the central bank cut benchmark interest
: rates for the 2nd time in less than a month. This happened right after the
: fact that in December 2011, PBOC cut the reserve requirement ratio(RRR) by a
: 50 bp to 21%, it followed up with another 50 bp in February and another 50
: bp in May to 20% currently.
: On top of all the rate cuts, PBOC also made its biggest injection of funds
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