c**i
发帖数: 6973 | 1 中俄交往中北京开始占据上风. BBC CHinese, Oct 3, 2011
http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp
/chinese_news/2011/10/111003_china_russia.shtml
Note: Prominently displayed in the home page of Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
http://www.sipri.org/
is
Chinese-Russian Security and Energy Relations Are Crumbling. Oct 3, 2011
, which heralds the new book:
Linda Jakobson, Paul Holtom, Dean Knox and Jingchao Peng, China's Energy and
Security Relations With Russia; Hopes, frustrations and uncertainties.
SIPRI, Oct 2011 (policy paper 29)http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP29.pdf
Quote from the book:
"One of the most important and unique aspects of this study is its emphasis
on Chinese perspectives." preface
"Relations between China and Russia are regularly described as ‘at their
best in
history’ by officials from both sides. Yet Chinese foreign policy
specialists stress
that centuries of antagonism have bred a deep-rooted mistrust that continues
to
challenge the fostering of close China–Russia relations." summary
"A Chinese foreign policy specialist stated that although many Chinese
dislike Japan
or the United States , they concede they have much to learn from these two
countries.
He concluded, ‘But what do the Chinese have to learn from Russia?’[
footnote 8] Chinese
analysts often observe that China has risen to great power status as Russia
’s power has waned. China has surpassed Russia as a focus of attention
among policymakers in Washington, further complicating China–Russia
relations. In addition, China has used its economic power to gain political
clout in Central Asian countries, which Russia perceives as part of its
traditional sphere of influence." page 2
"A fundamental problem in the relationship is divergence between Chinese and
Russian world views. Chinese analysts believe that Russia views itself
predominantly in European terms, a heritage which is alien to China. Chinese
people are aware that Russians have historically seen China as inferior and
that Russians find it demeaning to be slipping into the junior role of
resource provider. Moreover, Chinese analysts tend to assume that Russia
wishes to be part of Europe and that Russia therefore ‘cannot antagonize
the West’, thereby weakening its desire or ability to strengthen the
strategic partnership with China. However, these views fail to take into
account the debate within Russia regarding its own complex relationship with
‘Europe’ and the fact that Russian officials and scholars are re-
evaluating Russia’s role in Asia. Russian officials and analysts
increasingly emphasize the need for Russia to develop an ‘Asian vector’
and pay more attention to its eastern neighbours." pages 9-10
(Pages 10-12 are important. You need to read it yourself.)
"China’s first large orders for combat aircraft, air defence systems and
naval equipment from Russia took place following a Taiwanese procurement
drive that included purchases of combat aircraft and naval equipment from
the USA and France in 1992. The reason that China turned to Russia to meet
its perceived need for advanced combat aircraft, air defence systems and
naval equipment is twofold. First, China’s own domestic arms industry was
unable to meet the demands of the air force and navy to provide equipment
comparable to that being acquired by Taiwan and other states in China’s
neighbourhood. Second, China had a limited range of potential suppliers
following the imposition of European Union (EU) and US arms embargoes in
1989." page 16
"Nevertheless, [despite progress of its own defense industry] China is
likely to remain partially dependent on imports of a number of advanced
weapon systems, components and technologies
for the coming decade, particularly long-range strike, tanker and transport
aircraft,
and high-performance ship-launched land-attack missiles. In contrast to
the energy relationship (see chapter 4), China has been unable to
substantially
diversify its arms and military technology suppliers. There are thus
opportunities
for Russia to remain China’s primary foreign arms supplier, although there
are
questions as to whether Russia is willing and able to meet China’s changing
demands for transfers of technology and components rather than finished
weapons systems. * * * Yet Chinese arms producers will continue to require
foreign
assistance for components and technologies for combat aircraft, submarines
and large surface warships. Manufacturing engines is a continuing weakness
for
China’s arms industry and represents an area where Russia or other willing
suppliers are likely to maintain a presence." pages 16-17
Russia "has fallen behind technologically and has begun to import arms and
technologies from Israel and Western Europe for its own military
modernization.85 Russia is therefore unable to meet certain Chinese
technology demands. * * * National export control agencies of EU member
states have interpreted the EU arms embargo flexibly, particularly with
regard to dual-use products and technologies. For example, EU member states
issued export licences worth more than 10 million and exported at least
8 million worth of military equipment to China in 2009." pages 17-18
"Russia competes with other former Soviet republics to supply arms to
China. Ukraine has provided China with military equipment and technical
assistance
in the form of engines, tanks, combat and trainer aircraft, helicopters and
naval platforms as well as missiles and related technologies. * * * In
particular, Ukrainian companies have provided China with Kh-55 cruise
missiles, an Su-33 carrier combat aircraft prototype (T-10K) and the
aircraft carrier Varyag * * * the Chinese J-15 carrier-borne combat aircraft
is based on the T-10K." page 18
"China is increasingly frustrated with poor Russian quality controls and is
demanding that Russia deliver products on time, in good condition and at
agreed prices. Russian arms industry officials recognize that they have
problems * * * Chinese companies are thought to be contributing to this
process in that most of Russia’s imported machine tools are made in China."
page 19
"Russia and India have a long-standing friendly relationship and high levels
of
mutual trust. Moreover, closer ties with India are seen as a means of
balancing a
rising China. In addition, while Russian officials enjoy a senior role in
the
partnership with India, they are increasingly aware of and displeased with
their
junior role vis-à-vis China. * * * However, it is also worth bearing in
mind that competition from Israeli, European and even US suppliers has led
Russia to offer more advanced products to maintain a significant share in
the growing Indian market. In contrast, competition for the shrinking
Chinese market is limited. Nevertheless, if China made concessions on price
and intellectual property rights, Russian analysts believe
that China could receive more advanced weapons and technology." page 20
"Russia secured an order in late 2009 from Myanmar for 20 MiG-29 in direct
competition with China’s JF-17 and J-10. Even so, this has not assuaged
Russian fears of competition in its traditional markets." page 22
"In Peace Mission 2010, China demonstrated it could move large numbers of
troops and equipment over considerable distances. The non-stop, mid-
airrefuelled
flight from Urumqi, in western China, to Kazakhstan and back of China’s [
two] J-10 combat aircraft and H-6H bomber aircraft represented the longest
continuous distance that Chinese military aircraft have flown. * * * Just as
Russia once enjoyed the upper hand in military-technical cooperation at the
beginning of the partnership, it enjoys the upper hand in military training
cooperation because of its greater operational experience in fields such as
counterinsurgency." page 25
"China–Russia energy cooperation has experienced ‘many twists and turns'.
It is revealing that some Chinese analysts describe the mere existence of
continued negotiations as a feat in itself." page 26
(Please read pages 27-32, regarding East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil
pipeline.)
(Figure 4.6. China’s current and planned natural gas infrastructure. page
36)
"China is acquiring significant technology in the ongoing construction of
Westinghouse
AP-1000 reactors in Zhejiang and Shandong provinces. The first units are due
to be operational in 2013. The AP-1000 has been designated as the basis for
China’s third-generation nuclear power technology, undoubtedly making
older Russian technology less attractive
"the changing balance of power in the international system over the past
decade has also strained the relationship. China’s extraordinary rise has
changed its status vis-á-vis its neighbour, from a junior partner during
the Soviet era to one of economic dominance today. This is reflected by the
fact that, while Russia is only China’s 10th-largest trading partner, China
became Russia’s largest partner in 2010. China is now in a position to
have greater expectations of and place demands on Russia, while Russia is
struggling to come to terms with this new power dynamic. In both countries,
strategic planners warn that the present competition could escalate to a
more pointed rivalry, entirely undermining the notion of a strategic
partnership." conclusion
"At present, China and Russia have a greater interest to develop productive
relations with the US Government than with one another. For example, while
China and Russia once stood together in opposition to US missile defence
plans and their impact on strategic arsenals, today Russia is cutting a deal
with the USA to jointly deploy and possibly develop missile defences and is
increasingly calling on China to enter into multilateral
nuclear disarmament discussions.
Note:
(a) "Kalashnikov rifles" mentions in page 21 is AK-47.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AK-47
(b) Tianwan Nuclear Power Station 田湾核电站 page 39
(c) Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant 秦山核电站 page 40
(d) The AP in AP-1000 stands for "Advanced Passive." | h***i
发帖数: 89031 | 2 你这个是谣言
and
【在 c**i 的大作中提到】
: 中俄交往中北京开始占据上风. BBC CHinese, Oct 3, 2011
: http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp
: /chinese_news/2011/10/111003_china_russia.shtml
: Note: Prominently displayed in the home page of Stockholm International
: Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
: http://www.sipri.org/
: is
: Chinese-Russian Security and Energy Relations Are Crumbling. Oct 3, 2011
: , which heralds the new book:
:
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