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发帖数: 518 | 1 Dongping Han ([email protected]) is professor of history and political
science at Warren Wilson College in North Carolina. His publications
include several journal articles and The Unknown Cultural Revolution (
Garland Publishing, republished by Monthly Review, 2008). He comes from a
rural background in China. Most of the research for this article was carried
out by means of interviews in the rural areas discussed.
https://monthlyreview.org/2009/12/01/farmers-mao-and-discontent-in-china/
There are widespread misconceptions about numerous aspects of the Chinese
revolution. These include a misreading of the Great Leap Forward, the
Cultural Revolution, and the “reforms” of the post-Mao era, and the
reaction of the overwhelming mass of the peasantry to these movements.
Although the revolutionary programs/movements resulted in significant
hardships — on the rural population (the Great Leap Forward, 1958-61) or
the intellectuals (the Cultural Revolution, 1966-76) — they both produced
concrete achievements in the countryside that led to impressive gains in
agricultural production and in people’s lives. In contrast, the post-Mao
era “reforms” have resulted so far in a huge growth of inequality in China
, with the rural population suffering greatly by the dismantling of public
support for health and education. In addition, local and regional officials
have sold farmland for development purposes, usually lining their own
pockets, with inadequate compensation for the farmers. This has resulted in
the current massive unrest in rural areas, involving literally hundreds of
thousands of incidents with protesting farmers.1
The Great Leap Forward
The Great Leap Forward, the second five-year plan of the Chinese revolution,
was an attempt to develop rapidly both industry and agriculture. This was
the period during which the communes were formed and some 600,000 “backyard
,” small-scale steel furnaces were built to supply local needs all over the
country. This was also the era of massive irrigation projects — local,
regional, and national in scope — that were to result in impressive gains
in crop yields in subsequent years. However, the extra work burden that
necessitated increased food consumption by the rural population was not
accompanied by sufficient enhanced calorie intake.
The current widespread rural, as well as urban, discontent in China is in
sharp contrast to the relative absence of unrest during the Great Leap
Forward, when grain shortages led to severe hunger in some parts of rural
China as a result of harsh weather conditions and mismanagement by various
governmental levels. There is considerable disagreement as to whether or not
mass starvation occurred and, if it did, how many people died. Nevertheless
, it is clear that significant hardships were created by grain shortages
induced, at least partially, by the policies of the Great Leap Forward.
However, during my research in rural China over the past twenty-five years
— including extensive interviews with farmers in Jimo County in Shandong
Province — I have not come across a single farmer who believed that Mao
lost popularity because of the Great Leap Forward. Nor have I encountered
any farmer who contemplated rising up against the government during the
Great Leap Forward, or any literature mentioning that there were serious
peasant protests during this period. (However, a significant number of
farmers, particularly younger ones, express their willingness to join a
rebellion now if there was one against the government.) And, as difficult as
conditions may have been during the Great Leap Forward, farmers were
apparently not too emaciated or too weak to build a large number of national
, provincial, regional, and local irrigation projects.
The Communist Party and the People
The Party compared its relationship with the Chinese people to that of fish
and water. The Communists argued that water (people) can live without fish (
Communist Party members). But fish cannot live without water, thus stressing
the importance of popular support for the success of the revolution. This
special relationship between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people
was built through a long process of trial and error, not always without
failures. And there were many failures during the Great Leap Forward,
leading to attempts at rectification through the Socialist Education
Campaign in 1964 and the Cultural Revolution in 1966.
The argument that people might not have other recourse except to engage in
individual and everyday types of resistance (or coping) in the social
context of the Great Leap Forward seems convincing. Chinese farmers, like
all other people, would not lightly rise to the serious undertaking of
trying to overthrow the government. But between the choice of starving to
death and rebellion, the choice should not be hard to make. If the death
toll of millions claimed by the critics of the Great Leap Forward were true,
then why would the Chinese farmers submit to death by slow starvation
rather than rising up and giving themselves some hope of survival?
While civil society was disarmed throughout most of China’s history, this
did not prevent Chinese farmers from rising up time and again with whatever
they had in their hands. The Chinese term jiegan erqi (rise up with bamboo
sticks) was created to describe the peasant rebellion during the Qin dynasty
in particular and other peasant rebellions in general when Chinese farmers,
under the duress of social injustice, rose up, using anything they could
lay their hands on as weapons. However, during the Great Leap Forward, the
Chinese population was more armed than ever. That was the time when Mao
called for large-scale organization of militia divisions (daban minbingshi).
Young villagers in production teams were organized into militia platoons.
In each production brigade there was a militia company. At the commune level
, there were militia battalions. The department of military affairs in the
county government was in charge of arming and training the militia. Chinese
farmers worked in the fields with their rifles stacked nearby during the
Great Leap Forward years.2 How difficult would it have been for a farmer to
pick up a rifle, shoot his or her leader and start a rebellion if that
person so desired?
Past Accomplishments and Future Goals
There are a number of factors discussed below that led to acceptance and
wide, active participation of farmers in the projects of the Great Leap
Forward. One of the principal ones was that farmers knew that the projects
were going to benefit them and their villages in the future. In addition,
many farmers had received land and other assets during the land reform and
felt a responsibility to the government. The majority of the Chinese farmers
benefited from the revolution’s land reform. For example, in Jimo County,
the landlords and rich peasants, who accounted for 4 percent of the
population, lost over 11,000 hectares (165,732 mu) of land, 33,524 houses, 2
,441 horses and other farming animals, 4,377 pieces of farming implements,
and 6,891,715 kilos of grain because of land reform. But at the same time,
poor peasant households, which accounted for 60 percent of the total
population, got land, farming animals, and houses as a result of land reform.
Food Shortages
The Great Leap Forward got its name partly because of the unprecedented
scale of its irrigation projects. These projects, which were designed to
increase grain yield, contributed, ironically, to the short-term grain
shortage of the Great Leap Forward.
Most agrarian societies work closely with the cycle of seasons. In Northern
China, the seasonal cycle involves the following: a busy mid-spring planting
season, followed by a less intense late spring and early summer season,
followed by a busy mid-summer harvesting and planting season, followed again
by a less intense late summer and early fall season, followed by a busy
late fall harvesting and planting season, and finally by an idle winter and
early spring season. In this region, fewer than three months are considered
busy seasons, and the rest of the year is considered either a “slow” or “
idle” season.
Until recently, rural households in China would budget their grain supplies
according to the cycle of their work in the fields. They would eat more and
better food when they had to work strenuously in the fields, and would eat
much less and lower quality food during the slow and idle seasons. Most
farmers in northern China would get up very late in winter and early spring,
and go to bed very early at night to save energy. They only ate two meals a
day, and the foods they ate were mostly porridge or sweet potatoes during
the idle seasons. As a result, the food consumption was kept to a minimum
during the winter and early spring seasons. During the busy seasons, when
farmers had to engage in intensive manual labor, they would eat as much
wheat or corn bread as they could possibly afford. As a result, the food
consumption during these busy seasons could be three to four times higher
than the idle and slow seasons.
The Great Leap Forward turned the idle and slow seasons of rural China into
busy seasons. During the winter and spring of 1958, 1959, and 1960, rural
people worked on building reservoirs, digging wells, dredging river bottoms,
and building irrigation channels. There were national projects, provincial
projects, regional projects, and local projects being built at the same time
. Some of the more well-known examples of these projects are: the Shisanling
Reservoir (The Ming Tombs Reservoir) in Beijing; the Hai River Project,
which connected five major rivers in Northern China; the Yellow River
Sanmenxia Project in Henan and Shanxi Province; and the Yellow River Liu
Jiaxia Project. The world famous Red Flag Irrigation Channel in Lin County,
Henan was started during the Great Leap Forward and was not finished until
ten years later.3
In Jimo County, Shandong Province, the farmers put in several million days
of labor to build four medium-size reservoirs and several other irrigation
projects: Shipeng Reservoir in the southern part of Jimo County; Wangquan
Reservoir in the central part; Songhuaquan Reservoir in the midwestern part;
Yecheng Reservoir in the west; and the Chahe Irrigation Project in the
north.
Apart from these big projects, there were also numerous minor projects
launched by communes and villages in Jimo County. Among these were the
Xiazhang Reservoir in Wangcun Commune; the Fangjia Reservoir in Woli Commune
; and the Yushitou Reservoir in Duncun Commune. In 1959, Jimo County also
dug, for the first time, thirty-three big and deep electric-powered
irrigation wells.
There were undoubtedly very severe management problems during the Great Leap
Forward. People were being asked to participate in physically demanding
projects, but were not consistently provided with sufficient extra food
rations. Without these gigantic irrigation projects, there would probably
not have been any starvation in Jimo; the grain shortage and the aftermath
would have been much less severe. It was, at the very least, overzealous to
engage in such a gigantic investment of labor in such a short time and
without sufficient food rations. Clearly, Jimo County government leaders
were guilty of miscalculation and mismanagement of human and financial
resources during the Great Leap Forward.
Looking back, the leaders might blame the fervid social environment created
by the central government or the pressure they received for more and quicker
results from their higher-ups in the provincial or central governments. The
slogan of the time was: “duo kuai hao sheng de jianshe shehuizhuyi” (
build up socialism in a faster, better, and more economic manner). But, at
the grassroots level, leaders were supposed to know their local conditions
better than the upper-level government, and they were ultimately responsible
for the lives of the local people.
While we can fault the county leaders’ management, we cannot fault their
intentions. There was a general consensus among local government leaders,
local community leaders, and ordinary farmers that enhanced irrigation was
needed in order to improve crop yields. Therefore, most farmers saw the
connections between these irrigation projects and a better life for
themselves in the near future. Even though they went through a great deal of
hardship in constructing these projects at the time, farmers said they
could not deny the fact that the purpose was to make their lives better in
the future. This contrasts sharply with farmers’ attitudes toward many
massive projects from earlier eras, such as when they were drafted to build
palaces for the elite.
Farmers’ Means of Coping
We know that many farmers engaged in individual acts of coping during the
Great Leap Forward, such as “moyanggong” (pretend to work but actually not
working), and chiqing (eating green crops before they matured). As someone
who worked on a collective farm for many years, moyanggong and chiqing
appearto me to be a necessary part of dealing with daily life during the
Great Leap Forward, rather than individual forms of resistance against
government policies or officials. What else could people do, when they were
exhausted from hard work but did not feel it was right to stop working
completely while others worked on? It was appropriate to engage in
moyanggong as a way of taking a break, and other farmers understood.
Chiqing was another accepted and widespread practice during the Great Leap
Forward, necessitated by the long working hours and short supplies of food.
Farmers ate whatever they could lay their hands on to satisfy their hunger,
not to demonstrate their anger or resistance to the government’s policies
and officials. When I was working on a collective farm after the Great Leap
Forward, it was an acceptable practice to eat a limited amount of green
wheat, green corn, tender sweet potatoes and tender peanuts, turnips, and
cabbages. We sometimes cooked green corn, soybeans, and even sweet potatoes
in the fields. Farmers in Shandong called this shao pohuo (build a small
fire in the field). Afterwards, we would start a game of chi yao mohui (
trying to darken each other’s face with our blackened hands). Boys tried
that with girls, and girls tried that with boys. Production team leaders
engaged in this game with ordinary villagers, as well. Without understanding
the social context of these practices, it is easy to see them as everyday
resistance.
Societal Support for Farmers
The social climate of the time also helped farmers make the connection
between these irrigation projects and a better future. The government gave
great attention to rural areas during the Great Leap Forward — the whole
nation and Party members were told they should help agriculture, rural areas
, and farmers. It was a common practice for local government, office and
factory workers, army units, and high school and college students to come to
help farmers during the busy seasons.
An old farmer I interviewed in Henan told me with great fondness how excited
he and his fellow farmers were to see the nationally famous artists who
came to perform for them on the irrigation sites during Great Leap Forward.
He said that their work hours were long, and the food they ate was not
particularly good. But the farmers persisted, because Chairman Mao and the
government cared about farmers. “These artists,” he said: “were sent to
us by Chairman Mao.” He heard these words from the artists at the time.
Forty years later, he used these same words as his own. Only in Mao’s China
, would nationally famous artists perform for farmers at an irrigation site.
Post-Mao publications branded these initiatives by the government to send
artists and intellectuals to work with farmers and workers as part of the
Maoist persecution of intellectuals. But these government initiatives served
to enhance national solidarity and spirit. Farmers who were at the bottom
of Chinese society acquired a sense of importance and empowerment when
government officials, professors, and college students were working side by
side with them. Mao and other national leaders worked on the Shisanling
Reservoir on May 25, 1958, giving rise to waves of government officials
participating in this kind of activity.4 On October 11, 1959, 12,000 college
and high school students and professors from Qingdao City came to Jimo to
help with fall harvesting and planting. In September 1960, 28,000 students
and teachers from Qingdao City came to Jimo to help with harvesting and
planting.
Another factor that helps explain the Chinese farmers’ behavior and
attitude during the Great Leap Forward was the personal behavior of the
leaders. From his recently published memoirs, we know that, once Communist
Party Chairman Mao Zedong realized the difficult situation of rural China
during the Great Leap Forward, he gave up eating meat. He also refused to
act upon the suggestions of people around him that he should allow his
daughters to get a little more food. Some might argue that it was not a
major sacrifice for Mao to give up his pork when hundreds of thousands of
farmers were suffering because of his questionable policies and
mismanagement. But most farmers at the time could not possibly know what Mao
did or did not do. What farmers did know at the time was the behavior of
county, commune, and village leaders.
Leadership by Local Officials
Farmers in Jimo believed that the quality of national leaders is defined by
the quality of grassroots officials (guojia lingdai ren de pingde cong
difang guanyuan de pingde zhong biaoxian chulai). During the Great Leap
Forward, Jimo County leaders, including the head leader, County Party
Secretary Xu Hua, Head of County government, Li Anshi, and other county
government leaders, were busily traveling around the county to work with
people at irrigation project sites. Each county and commune leader assumed
responsibility for at least one village. Leaders came to visit and work in
the “home” village regularly; villagers knew them and they knew the
villagers well. More importantly, they ate the same food with ordinary
villagers at their homes, and always paid the standard cost for the meals,
which was often higher than the real value of the food. Song Wenying, who
hosted the commune leaders a few times, said that Wang Shuchun, who was the
head of Chengguan Commune Government, came to his village frequently. At
lunchtime, he would eat at villagers’ houses randomly. At the time, farmers
ate mostly sweet potatoes, and Wang Shuchun would eat the same food with
them. After the meal he would leave thirty cents and a three-liang grain
coupon for his meal.
Indeed, most village leaders during the Great Leap Forward were actively
present in the daily lives of the people. They worked at the construction
sites with the villagers most of the time, and ate the same kind of food as
the ordinary villagers.
Maqiao Village Party Secretary, Wu Changxing, worked with farmers on the
irrigation sites day and night during the Great Leap Forward. He refused to
eat more than anybody else, and in the end he died of a combination of
exhaustion and malnutrition — the only person to die on the construction
site from Maqiao village. Other people driven by hunger began eating green
crops, but he felt that, as a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) member and the
village party secretary, he could not lower himself to that level. Other
people could cheat a little by taking longer bathroom breaks, but he felt
that, as a leader, he had to be a role model for others. Wu Changxing left
two children behind, and villagers in Maqiao took very good care of his
children, out of their respect for their honest and hardworking leader.
In September 1960, with students, professors, and others, 2,100 provincial
and city officials also came to work with farmers in Jimo. Most farmers I
interviewed in Jimo were pleased to see government officials working side by
side with them. “We were so happy to see officials of the people’s
government and urban intellectuals eat the same food and do the same job
with us. We felt close bonds with them at the time.” This often overlooked
aspect of Chinese society and politics is an important factor behind people
’s high morale during the Great Leap Forward.
During this period, most people were skinny, and the county and commune
leaders were as skinny as everybody else. Based on their body size, it was
almost impossible to tell these leaders apart from ordinary farmers. “
County Party Secretary Xu,” Zhang Yingfa, a farmer from South River, said,
“was as tall as I was, but he was definitely thinner than I was when he
came to work with us in the village.” This, again, was sharp contrast with
the traditional image of Chinese officials. Farmers said that it was very
hard to perceive these Communist officials as oppressors and bad people.
They simply did not arouse anger among farmers. This does not mean that
there were not many bad and corrupt local officials at the time. But in the
eyes of many rural people today, Mao’s officials were drastically different
from the “younger and more educated” crop of Chinese government officials
of the later “reform” era, who came to the village only in cars, and ate
lavish banquets at the expense of the villagers. An important factor in
preventing peasant rebellion during a period of severe hardship was the
leadership style and personal integrity of the Communist officials.
There were very few differences in wealth or background between local
leaders and the people being led. The village leaders of the 1950s
understood the poor villagers much better than their preceding and
succeeding counterparts in Chinese history. This understanding was a
strength for the Communist Party, and it played a significant role in
preventing government decay during the aftermath of Great Leap Forward.
Farmers are likely to follow village leaders that come from the same socio-
economic background as the overwhelming majority of villagers, and
demonstrate concern for their needs. Mao became the great leader of Chinese
people exactly because he was able to see the revolutionary potential of
peasant leaders. It was these peasants and peasant leaders who accomplished
the fundamental goals of the Chinese revolution and rejuvenated Chinese
society.
During the Socialist Education Campaign of 1964, following the Great Leap
Forward, many local village leaders were charged with petty corruption and
misdemeanors, such as eating more than their fair share of food, stealing
small amounts of money from the collective purse, and dividing a small
amount of grain among themselves during the Great Leap Forward. In the eyes
of the Communist Party, which demanded that its members suffer hardships
first and enjoy benefits last (chi ku zai qian, xiangshou zai hou), this
kind of devious behavior could not be allowed. But judging by today’s
standards, or the standards of traditional China, the village leaders’
corruption was minor. It is natural that, amid a grain shortage, people who
were closer to the food would eat a little more in order to survive.
From the Cultural Revolution to Rural “Reforms”
In light of the widespread minor corruption among village leaders during the
Great Leap Forward, one of the important goals of the Cultural Revolution
was to empower ordinary villagers to participate in village politics.5
Village leaders’ authority was greatly curbed as a result of the
empowerment of ordinary villagers during this period, and local government
became more legitimate in the eyes of people than during the Great Leap
Forward. The central, provincial, regional, county, and commune governments
gave a great amount of attention to agriculture, rural areas, and farmers.
Many farmers were selected to participate in all levels of government.
Officials were urged to work with farmers, and the urban population was
urged to support the rural people. Seventeen million urban, educated youth
were sent to live and work in rural areas during the Cultural Revolution
years. Consequently, in the eyes of the farmers, the government cared about
them.6
Contemporary Rural Unrest
Chinese media was filled with success stories about the rural reform ever
since Deng Xiaoping’s government started the “reforms” in the early 1980s
. Chinese and western scholars basically echoed the Chinese government’s
claims about the successes of the rural reforms. According to the official
story, crop yields increased dramatically, and farmers’ income rose
significantly. (Crop yields did increase, partially because of the
irrigation projects, crop breeding, and fertilizer factories built during
the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.) People who studied
rural China postulated that the increase of grain yields was due to change
from collective to private farming. It is also true that China has not
experienced any serious natural disasters in the last twenty-five years that
have had widespread effects on agricultural production, and farmers have in
their possession more grain than ever before. In the villages I visited in
Henan and Shandong Provinces, most rural families have around 1 to 1.5
metric tons (two or three thousand jin) of grain stored in their houses,
which would usually be sufficient for two years’ consumption.
According to the standard view, the rural revolts occurring in China today
are hard to explain. In 2001, Yu Jianrong’s Politics in Yue Village was
published, documenting contemporary rural protests in Hunan Province. In
2004, Chen Guili and Chun Tao reported Chinese farmers’ anger at the
government policies and CCP official conduct in rural China. (These writings
made a big stir in China, because they caused a major lawsuit.) In fall
2004, two huge protests in Sichuan Province involving hundreds of thousands
farmers shocked the world. In one incident, over one hundred thousand
farmers surrounded local government buildings for three days; over a dozen
police cars were set on fire, and the government sent over one hundred
thousand armed police to pacify the crowd. In the other incident, the angry
crowd held the Provincial Governor hostage for a few days. Since then,
nobody has doubted that the Chinese government faces a serious crisis in the
rural areas.
There has been a major shift in farmers’ perceptions of the CCP from the
time of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. As discussed above,
farmers then viewed the CCP and local, regional, and national officials as
working in their best interests. But when I first interviewed farmers in
Jimo regarding their reaction to rural reorganization in 1982, the most
common response was that gongchandang bu guan women la (the Communist Party
does not care about us anymore). “Women jiuyao cheng moniangde haozila” (
we are going to become orphans) one farmer told me at the time. This simple
answer is pregnant with many implications. It means that some farmers
considered the government’s collective farming policy as an indicator that
the Communist Party cared about their livelihood. But, as a result of the
rural “reforms,” the government could not be seen as being on their side
— it could, at best, be regarded as neutral. This change in the farmers’
perception of CCP policies and actions, together with a change in leadership
styles of Communist officials at various levels of government, have had a
huge impact on farmers’ perception of and interactions with the state.
Privatization, Corruption, Inequality, and Crime
In the process of rural reorganization, some collectively owned means of
production ended up in the hands of former village leaders. In Jimo County,
most collectively owned village industrial enterprises were first contracted
to the managers and then sold to them. The village factory I managed before
I went to college in 1978 was sold to its subsequent manager, Liu Dunxiao.
In less than twenty years, Liu and his family acquired assets of over 200
million yuan (about US$30 million). Liu’s younger brother, with his help,
controls the public transportation system in the county, and has assets of
hundreds of millions yuan as well. The same process has transferred many
state and collectively owned enterprises to private ownership by a system
based on cronyism. The Chinese people now refer to this process as the
original sin of the Chinese capitalist class that has arisen since the mid-
1980s. This acquisition of collectively owned or state-owned assets was
unconstitutional and illegal. It also violated the sense of social justice
widely held by Chinese farmers. One capitalist told me in an interview that
most of the Chinese capitalist class had a criminal beginning, which is like
a sword hanging over their heads. Many villagers now call into question the
political legitimacy of the government that has encouraged the criminal
acquisition of collectively owned property and state-owned means of
production.
Since the rural reforms, the different levels of government no longer
organize large-scale irrigation projects in China, and the presence of the
government in farmers’ lives has become minimal. Township governments now
do only two things: collect the grain tax and enforce the family planning
policies. Farmers believe that the township government only wants money (tax
) and lives (family planning) from them (yao qian he yao ming). They do not
believe that the township government does anything positive for them.
The retreat of the national government from rural areas is considered
progressive by the liberal free market economic mindset. It appears that the
state is giving society in general, and rural people in particular, the
power to take control of their own livelihood. Farmers should have welcomed
the rural reorganization. But the reality is more complicated.
During the collective era, commune leaders lived in the rural areas where
they worked. They would come to the village on bikes. Today, the township
government leaders are more educated and do not want to live in rural areas.
They have built luxurious, western-style houses in the county government
seats. Therefore, the township government has to buy a car for each of the
top four government officials: township party secretary, deputy party
secretary, township government head, and deputy township government head.
They also need drivers to chauffeur them to work every day. Because they do
not have much to do, they are often bored. Therefore, they visit restaurants
and entertainment facilities. “Rural restaurants in the surrounding areas,
” one farmer said, “have begun to provide xiaojie services (prostitutes)
because township government leaders want them.”
As expenditures of the township government increase, the ways to extract
money from farmers multiply, now that the agricultural tax has been
eliminated. Many township governments use family planning as a way to get
money from farmers. In order to get a permit to have a child, farmers have
to bribe the village and township government officials. Some township and
village leaders sell birth permits to farmers who have money. In some places
, local officials even encourage rich farmers to have more children so that
they can get “fines” from them. In such a social context, farmers question
the political legitimacy of the central government, as well as county and
village officials. Another way of making money is the confiscation of land
by local and regional officials, who then sell the land at a profit for “
development,” without adequately compensating the farmers — thus adding
greatly to the rural ferment.
The change in farmers’ perception of government legitimacy and official
conduct has transformed farmers’ interaction with the state. Interviewees
in South River village, Jimo County, told me that farmers refused to storm
the unguarded government granaries adjacent to their village during the
grain shortage of the Great Leap Forward. But now, they have begun to engage
in all kinds illegal and illicit activities. Several villagers have been in
prison for stealing at markets and from other villagers. They fight with
the tax collectors. In one incident, two brothers beat up a tax collector,
and ended up in prison for two years.
Some daring individuals organized a gang of thieves, stealing on a large
scale. They have built a network with collaborators in the big cities, who
identify targets: mostly homes of corrupt officials and rich business owners
. They come to the big city, commit their crimes with precision, and then
return to their village to divide the spoils with their urban collaborators.
This way, they are able to live a “good life,” and reduce the risk of
being caught. Most people, even the local police, know how these people make
their living.
Another group of villagers have organized a secret society that engages in
smuggling and provides assassins for hire. They will kill or hurt people for
the right price. Some of these farmers, who were timid and obedient during
the Great Leap Forward, hard working but aggressively demanding during the
Cultural Revolution, have become bandits, thieves, and thugs during the
reform period.
Chinese society during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution was
relatively poor. People barely had enough to eat and wear. But many farmers
remember that time with fondness. There was a general equality of condition,
very little corruption, very few crimes, no drugs and no prostitution
Today, most people in rural China have become more affluent. In Jimo County,
the primary area of my research, some people have a lot of money. A number
of households claim to own millions. But, at the same time, people’s lives
are filled with crime, corruption, prostitution, drug abuse — and there is
a huge gap between the rich and poor.
Government Response to Rural Conditions and Unrest
The Chinese government has begun to admit, for the first time since the
rural reform of the 1980s, that it faces a serious, three-fold crisis
regarding agriculture, rural areas, and farmers (san nong wenti). Scholars
and government officials have started to discuss the crisis openly. Yu
Jianrong’s Yucun Politics (Yuecun Zhengzhi) describes an incident in Hunan,
in which over ten thousand farmers stormed the township government building
. A sixty-two-year-old farmer broke six government signs, quoting Mao Zedong
’s words: “rebellion is justified.” Cheng Guili and Chun Tao, in their
Zhongguo Nongmin Diaocha (Investigating Chinese Farmers), record numerous
cases of official oppression against farmers.
The number one Central Government directive in 2004 was aimed at increasing
the rural population’s income. To this end, the Chinese government, by the
summer of 2006, had completely eliminated agricultural taxes for the rural
population.
However, the crisis that the Chinese government faces in rural China is not
simply an issue of increasing farmers’ income. It is a very complex issue,
involving government legitimacy, official conduct, and many other issues.
While many people applaud the Chinese government’s elimination of
agricultural taxes, this action is more sensational than effective, and may
even be dangerous. The elimination of the agriculture taxes further weakens
government presence in rural areas. But rural China today needs a stronger,
not weaker, government presence. The rural areas need the government to
provide free education and medical care. Farmers need the government to
protect them from greedy developers — backed by local officials — who grab
farmers’ land. Rural China needs progressive taxing — taxing the rich to
protect the weak and poor. Simply eliminating all taxes leads to more
corruption, as local officials devise other ways to gain income.
The Chinese central government has blamed local officials for the problems
in rural China. Similarly, the Chinese media has made the township
government officials the scapegoats for the rising problems in rural China.
Chinese scholars in the West also tend to blame the local officials for the
rising tension between government and farmers in China. One of the township
government officials I interviewed told me he felt that it was both easy and
dangerous to use township government officials as scapegoats: they are the
symptom, not the cause of the problem, which is systemic, and much deeper
than the central government realizes. Scapegoating township government
officials will only conceal the real problem and lead to more social
disturbances. And, once the rural people rise up, they will not think
carefully about whom to rise up against. That is the nature of popular riots.
Looking Back at Mao
After the Third Plenary Meeting of the CCP Eleventh Central Committee (
December 1978) passed the resolution to criticize Mao’s mistakes during the
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese media,
controlled by anti-Mao elites, have not hesitated to publish books and
articles denouncing the Great Leap Forward as well as the Cultural
Revolution. For the last thirty years, anti-Mao, anti-Great Leap Forward,
and anti-Cultural Revolution sentiments have dominated Chinese intellectual
discourse. However, many people have written their own memoirs under the
auspices of the Chinese Political Consultation Committee, in an effort to
gather cultural and historical memoirs of the Great Leap Forward. In essence
, these authors — whose essays directly contradict the official
denunciations — have protested the “rewriting of the history” by Mao’s
opponents.
In December 2006, Deng Pufang responded to a Reuters reporter, saying that
the Cultural Revolution brought disaster not only to himself and his family
but also to the Chinese nation. However, this almost routine
characterization of the era triggered an avalanche of comments from the
Chinese people, eliciting, in little more than a month, over 35,000 Internet
objections. The overwhelming majority of these comments praised Mao’s
contribution to the Chinese people and criticized the serious consequences
caused by the reform measures Deng Xiaoping introduced. Some people
commented that the new elite should “stop lying about Chairman Mao. People
are waking up, and it is no longer possible to deceive people with lies
about Chairman Mao.” Many said that “history is written by the people, not
by the elites.” For many Chinese, “Chairman Mao worked for Chinese people
all his life, and he continues to live in the people’s heart.” It seems
that the efforts of government and elite to discredit Mao’s legacies have
backfired, with significant implications for Chinese politics in the future.
How is it possible to explain the high esteem in which Mao — long after his
death — is held among many Chinese people, despite the official and semi-
official onslaught on his legacy and image?7 Chinese elites and Mao’s
enemies have produced numerous publications to discredit Mao. But if the
sufferings and brutalities allegedly imposed on the Chinese farmers by Mao’
s government were true, the farmers would have known them, first hand. Why
do so many farmers still hang Mao’s picture in their houses, and hold his
memories dear, and, in some places, build temples to worship him?
These farmers remind me of my U.S. colleagues and students, who came to
China with me for my college’s worldwide experience courses. The long lines
outside Mao’s Mausoleum on Tiananmen Square always surprised them. The
workers and farmers who lost the benefits they received under Mao’s
socialist policies came to show respect to their leader, often with tears in
their eyes. This is another indicator of Mao’s continuing popularity among
the Chinese working class.
Conclusion
How does one explain the change in state and society interaction from the
Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution to the reform era? Mencius once
said: Yi shi dao shi min, sui ku er bu yuan, yi sheng dao sha ren, sui si er
bu yuan (the people will not complain if the ruler employs the people with
good intention, and people will not complain if the ruler causes the people
to die with the intention to ensure their survival). That means that, when a
government is considered legitimate, and official conduct resonates with
that legitimacy, people will follow government policies and endure hardship.
Thus, the government will survive tough challenges and difficulties.
However, when government legitimacy is in question, or official conduct is
repugnant, people will be less likely to follow government policies, and,
when crises arise, will be more likely to rebel. The large amount of peasant
unrest in China today is the result of a loss of government legitimacy. To
reverse this trend, the government needs to do more than simply increase
farmers’ income.
The Chinese Government can curb official corruption in the rural areas in
two ways. It can resurrect the Communist Party’s self-criticism and
disciplinary mechanism of the old days, in which party leaders and ordinary
party members hold regular meetings to examine their own behavior, according
to Party policies and regulations. At the same time, the government can
empower ordinary farmers by encouraging them to criticize government
officials and policies by different means, including big character posters,
which were widely used during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution
, and have proven effective in curbing official corruption. More importantly
, the government needs to select more farmers to government positions, and
encourage local officials to live and work with farmers whenever possible.
The gap between rich and poor has become a huge problem in China,
particularly in the rural areas, and has caused many serious social problems
, such as the increase of crime. Too big a gap between the rich and poor
will tear the society apart and threaten China’s stability. More
egalitarian practices will enhance China’s internal coherence and enable
the country to deal more effectively with its challenges.
Notes
↩ The extent of rural protests in China is rarely reported in a
coherent fashion in the Western media. But, according to the Chinese news
agency Xinhua story published in People’s Daily (“China grapples with
thorny issue of rural land rights,” there were “87,000 protests, riots and
other ‘mass incidents’” related to land loss in 2005, up 6 percent from
2004, and 50 percent from 2003. Thus, in these three years alone, there were
well over 100,000 such actions! The article points out, “Once the backbone
of the Communist Party of China, which won widespread support in the
countryside six decades ago on protecting the rights of farmers who joined
its fight to overthrow the landlord class, many Chinese farmers now feel
alienated from their own land, formerly the fruits of the revolution.” In
the seven years before the January 2006 story was written, some 6.7 million
hectares of farmland (5 percent of all of China’s farmland) had been
converted into other uses — roads, factories, etc. People are also
protesting industrial pollution of air, water, and soil. In 2007, the last
year that the Chinese government released data on “mass incidents,”
protests involving over one hundred people, there were 80,000 such incidents.
↩ New China News Agency: “National Militia Work Conference was
held in Beijing on February 8, to Discuss and Study the Experiences and
Accomplishments of Large Scale Organization of Militia Divisions since 1958.
” Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dashiji, The Chronology of People’s Republic
of China, (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 1982), 282.
↩ The Chronology of People’s Republic of China, 209, vol. one (
Beijing: Xinhua Press, 1982), 210-14.
↩ The Chronology of People’s Republic of China, 209, vol. one,
208.
↩ For a detailed discussion of change and progress in rural areas
during the Cultural Revolution, see Dongping Han, The Unknown Cultural
Revolution: Life and Change in a Chinese Village (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 2008).
↩ See Dongping Han, “Hukou System and China’s Rural Development,
” Journal of Developing Areas, Spring 1999, and “Impact of the Cultural
Revolution on Rural Education and Economic Development,” Modern China 27,
no. 1, January 2001.
↩ Jacob Heibrunn, “Mao More than Ever,” New Republic, April 21,
1997, 20; and Orville Schell, “Once Again, Long Live Chairman Mao,”
Atlantic, December 1992, 32. | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 2 人们对中国革命的许多方面存在误解。这些包括对大跃进，文化大革命和后毛泽东时代
的“改革”的误读，以及绝大多数农民对这些运动的反应。尽管革命性的计划/运动给
农村人口（大跃进，1958-61年）或知识分子（文化大革命，1966-76年）带来了巨大的
困难，但它们都在农村取得了具体成就，给人们留下了深刻的印象。农业生产和人民生
活的增长。相比之下，后毛时代的“改革”迄今在中国造成了巨大的不平等，农村人口
由于取消了对健康和教育的公共支持而遭受了巨大苦难。此外，地方和地区官员出于发
展目的出售农田，通常是自己掏腰包，对农民的补偿不足。这导致了当前农村地区的大
规模动乱，涉及抗议农民的数十万起事件 | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 3 大跃进
“大跃进”是中国革命的第二个五年计划，是试图迅速发展工农业的尝试。在此期间，
成立了公社，并建造了约60万个“后院”小型钢铁炉，以满足全国各地
的当地需求。这也是大规模灌溉项目（地方，区域和国家级）的时代，这将在随后的几
年中使农作物的产量显着提高。但是，额外的工作负担使农村人口不得不增加食物的消
费，却没有带来足够的热量摄入。
当前中国在农村和城市普遍存在的不满情绪与大跃进时期相对缺乏动乱形成鲜明对比，
当时由于天气条件恶劣，粮食短缺导致中国部分农村地区严重饥饿，政府各级管理不善
。关于是否发生大规模饥饿以及有多少人死亡，存在着很大的分歧。尽管如此，很明显
，大跃进造成的巨大困难至少部分是由大跃进政策引起的。但是，在过去的二十五年中
，我在中国农村进行的研究（包括对山东省即墨县农民的广泛采访）中，我没有遇到一
个农民，他相信毛泽东因为大跃进而失去了声望。我也没有遇到任何打算在“大跃进”
期间反抗政府的农民，也没有遇到任何提及在此期间发生过严重农民抗议活动的文献。
（但是，很多农民，特别是年轻的农民，如果有反对政府的话，现在表示愿意加入叛
乱。）而且，尽管在“大跃进”期间情况可能很困难，但是农民显然还不太愿意瘦弱或
太弱而无法建立大量的国家，省，地区和地方灌溉项目。 | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 4 共产党和人民
党把同中国人民的关系比作鱼和水。共产党人争辩说，水（人民）可以没有鱼（共产党
员）生活。但是鱼不能没有水而生存，因此强调了民众支持革命成功的重要性。中国共
产党人与中国人民之间的特殊关系是经过漫长的反复试验而建立的，并非总是没有失败
。在大跃进期间有很多失败，导致通过1964年的社会主义教育运动和1966年的文化大革
命进行整顿的尝试。
人们认为，除了在大跃进的社会环境中进行个人抵抗和日常抵抗（或应对）之外，人们
可能没有其他资源可言。与其他所有人一样，中国农民不会轻易地承担起推翻政府的认
真工作。但是，在选择饿死还是叛乱之间，应该不难做出选择。如果大跃进的批评家们
声称造成的数百万人的死亡人数是真实的，那么为什么中国农民会因饥饿缓慢而死于死
亡，而不是站起来为自己提供生存的希望？ | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 5 尽管民间社会在中国大部分历史上都解除了武装，但这并不能阻止中国农民一次又一次
地腾出手来。创建中文术语jiegan erqi（用竹棍抬起）是为了描述尤其是秦朝的农民
起义，以及一般情况下的其他农民起义，当时中国农民在社会不公正的胁迫下，抬起头
来，用自己能摆的任何东西他们动手做武器。但是，在大跃进期间，中国人民比以往任
何时候都拥有更多的武装。那是毛泽东呼吁大规模组织民兵分裂的时候。生产小组中的
年轻村民被组织成民兵排。每个生产大队都有一个民兵连。在公社一级，有民兵营。县
政府军事部门负责武装和训练民兵。在“大跃进”期间，中国农民带着步枪在田地里工
作。2如果一个农民愿意，一个农民要捡起步枪，开枪射击他或她的领袖并发动叛乱有
多么困难？ | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 6 过去的成就和未来的目标
下面讨论的许多因素导致农民接受并积极参与大跃进的项目。主要的原因之一是，农民
知道这些项目将在未来使他们和他们的村庄受益。此外，土地改革期间，许多农民获得
了土地和其他资产，并对政府负有责任。革命的土地改革使大多数中国农民受益。例如
，在即墨县，占总人口4％的地主和富农失去了11,000公顷（165,732亩）土地，33,524
栋房屋，2,441匹马和其他农用动物，4,377件农具，以及土地改革使谷物增加了6,891,
715公斤。但与此同时，占总人口60％的贫困农民家庭由于土地改革而获得了土地，牲
畜和房屋。 | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 7 食物短缺
大跃进之所以得名，部分原因是其灌溉项目规模空前。具有讽刺意味的是，这些旨在提
高粮食单产的项目为大跃进的短期粮食短缺做出了贡献。
大多数农业社会与季节周期紧密合作。在中国北方，季节性周期涉及以下几个方面：春
季中旬繁忙的播种季节，随后是春季和夏季初强度较低的夏季，接着是夏季中旬的繁忙
收获和播种季节，之后又是强度较弱的后期夏季和秋季初，随后是繁忙的秋季收获和播
种季节，最后是一个闲置的冬季和春季初。在该地区，少于三个月被认为是繁忙季节，
而其余年份则被认为是“淡季”或“空转”季节。
直到最近，中国的农村家庭仍会根据他们在田间工作的周期来预算谷物
供应。当他们不得不在田间辛苦工作时，他们会吃更多更好的食物，而在缓慢和空闲的
季节里他们会吃更少而质量较低的食物。中国北方的大多数农民会在冬季和早春起床很
晚，晚上很早就睡觉以节省能源。他们每天只吃两顿饭，在闲暇时节，他们吃的食物大
多是稀饭或红薯。结果，在冬季和初春季节，食物消耗保持在最低水平。在繁忙的季节
中，当农民不得不从事密集的体力劳动时，他们将吃掉尽可能多的小麦或玉米面包。结
果，在这些繁忙季节中的食物消耗可能是空闲和缓慢季节中食物消耗的三到四倍。
大跃进把中国农村的闲散和缓慢的季节变成了繁忙的季节。在1958年的冬季和春季，
1959年和1960年的春季，农村人民致力于修建水库，挖井，疏river河底和修建灌溉渠
。同时正在建设国家项目，省项目，区域项目和地方项目。这些项目中一些比较著名的
例子是：北京的十三陵水库（明十三陵水库）；海河工程，连接中国北方的五条主要河
流；河南和山西省的黄河三门峡工程；和黄河刘家峡项目。世界著名的河南省林县红旗
灌溉渠始于大跃进，直到十年后才完工。 | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 8 在山东省即墨县，农民花费了数百万天的劳动力来建设四个中型水库和其他几个灌溉项
目：即墨县南部的石棚水库；望泉水库位于中部；中西部的松花泉水库；西部的叶城水
库；北部的查河灌溉项目。
除了这些大型项目，即墨县的公社和乡村还开展了许多小型项目。其中有王村公社下漳
水库。沃里公社的方家水库；和敦村公社的Yushitou水库。 1959年，即墨县还首次开
凿了33座大型深层电动灌溉井。
大跃进期间无疑存在非常严重的管理问题。人们被要求参加对身体有要求的项目，但并
不能始终如一地获得足够的额外口粮。没有这些巨大的灌溉项目，即墨市就可能不会有
饥饿。粮食短缺和后果本来不会那么严重。至少在如此短的时间内，在没有足够的食物
配给的情况下，进行如此庞大的劳动力投资，实在是太过热心了。显然，即墨县政府领
导在大跃进期间犯有错误估计和对人力和财力管理不当的罪行。
回顾过去，领导人可能会归咎于中央政府创造的凶猛的社会环境，或者归咎于他们在省
级或中央政府中的上级领导获得更多更快的成果的压力。当时的口号是：“以更快，更
好，更经济的方式建立社会主义”。但是，在基层，领导者应该比上级政府更了解他们
的当地情况，并且他们最终对当地人民的生活负责。
虽然我们可以责怪县领导的管理，但是我们不能责怪他们的意图。地方政府领导人，地
方社区领导人和普通农民之间普遍达成共识，即需要增加灌溉以提高农作物产量。因此
，大多数农民看到了这些灌溉工程与他们在不久的将来拥有更好生活之间的联系。尽管
当时农民在建设这些项目时遇到了很多困难，但农民们表示，他们不能否认这样一个事
实，即目的是为了改善他们的生活。这与农民对早期许多大型项目的态度形成鲜明对比
，例如，当他们被草拟为精英建造宫殿时。 | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 9 农民的应对方式
我们知道，许多农民在大跃进时期都进行了个人应对活动，例如“ moyanggong”（假
装工作，但实际上不工作）和chiqing（成熟前吃了绿色农作物）。作为在集体农场工
作了多年的人，在我看来，魔羊宫和池青是大跃进期间应对日常生活的必要组成部分，
而不是个人抵抗政府政策或官员的形式。当人们精疲力尽，但又觉得在别人工作的时候
完全停止工作是不正确的，那么人们还能做些什么呢？休息一下是一种适当的活动，其
他农民都知道。
在大跃进期间，由于工作时间长和粮食供应短缺，赤庆是另一种被广泛接受的做法。农
民尽其所能来满足饥饿，而不是为了表达对政府政策和官员的愤怒或抵制。大跃进之后
我在一个集体农场工作时，吃少量的绿色小麦，绿色玉米，嫩红薯和嫩花生，萝卜和白
菜是一种可以接受的做法。有时我们在田间煮玉米，大豆，甚至是地瓜。山东的农民称
此为邵少火（在田间生小火）。之后，我们将开始一场“ chi yao mohui”游戏（尝试
用涂黑的手使彼此的脸变黑）。男孩和女孩一起尝试，女孩和男孩一起尝试。生产团队
负责人也与普通村民一起参加了这场比赛。如果不了解这些做法的社会背景，就很容易
将它们视为日常阻力。 | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 10 农民社会支持
当时的社会气候还帮助农民在这些灌溉项目和更美好的未来之间建立了联系。大跃进期
间，政府高度重视农村地区-全国人民和党员都被告知他们应该帮助农业，农村地区和
农民。在繁忙的季节里，地方政府，办公室和工厂工人，部队以及高中和大学生来帮助
农民是一种普遍的做法。
我在河南采访的一位老农夫很高兴地告诉我，他和他的同胞们多么高兴看到大跃进期间
在灌溉现场为他们表演的全国著名艺术家。他说，他们的工作时间很长，吃的食物也不
是特别好。但是农民坚持不懈，因为毛主席和政府关心农民。他说：“这些艺术家是由
毛主席寄给我们的。”他当时听到了这些艺术家的话。四十年后，他使用了与自己相同
的词语。只有在毛泽东时代，全国知名的艺术家才能在灌溉现场为农民表演。
毛泽东时代后的出版物对政府的这些举措进行了烙印，作为毛派迫害知识分子的一部分
，派遣艺术家和知识分子与农民和工人一起工作。但是，这些政府举措有助于增强民族
团结和精神。当政府官员，教授和大学生并肩工作时，处于中国社会底层的农民获得了
重要性和赋予的权力。 1958年5月25日，毛泽东和其他国家领导人在十三陵水库工作，
引起了政府官员参与这种活动的热潮。41959年10月11日，来自青岛市的12,000名大中
学生和教授来到这里。即墨帮助秋天的收成和播种。 1960年9月，来自青岛市的28,000
名学生和老师来到即墨市帮助收割和种植。
有助于解释大跃进期间中国农民的行为和态度的另一个因素是领导人的个人行为。从他
最近发表的回忆录中，我们知道，一旦共产党主席毛泽东意识到大跃进期间中国农村的
困境，他就放弃了吃肉。他还拒绝按照周围人的建议采取行动，他应该允许他的女儿多
吃一点食物。有人可能会争辩说，当数十万农民因其可疑的政策和管理不善而遭受痛苦
时，放弃毛泽东的猪肉并不是主要的牺牲。但是当时的大多数农民可能不知道毛泽东做
了什么或没有做过什么。当时农民所知道的是县，公社和村领导的行为。 | | | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 11 地方官员的领导
即墨市的农民认为，国家领导人的素质是由基层官员的素质来定义的。在大跃进期间，
即墨县领导人，包括组长，县委书记徐华，县政府首脑，李安石和其他县政府领导，正
忙着在该县各地旅行，与灌溉工程现场的人们一起工作。每个县和公社的领导人至少对
一个村庄负责。领导人定期来“家”村参观并工作；村民们认识他们，他们也很了解村
民。更重要的是，他们在家中与普通村民一起吃相同的食物，并且总是支付标准的饭菜
费用，这通常高于食物的实际价值。几次接待公社领导人的宋文英说，城关公社负责人
王树春经常来他的村庄。午餐时间，他会在村民的房子里随机吃饭。当时，农民主要吃
红薯，而王树春也会吃同样的食物。饭后，他会留下三十美分和一张三粮券。
的确，大跃进时期的大多数村领导积极参与了人民的日常生活。他们大部分时间都与村
民一起在建筑工地工作，吃的食物与普通村民相同。
大跃进期间，马桥村党委书记吴长兴日夜与农民合作灌溉。他拒绝吃得比其他任何人都
要多，最终他死于筋疲力尽和营养不良，这是唯一一个在马桥村死于建筑工地的人。其
他由于饥饿而生的人开始吃绿色农作物，但他感到，作为中共党员兼村党委书记，他无
法降低自己的水平。其他人可以花更长的时间在卫生间里作弊，但他觉得作为领导者，
他必须成为他人的榜样。吴长兴留下了两个孩子，马桥村的村民出于对他们诚实而勤奋
的领导者的尊重，对他的孩子们给予了很好的照顾。 | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 12 1960年9月，在学生，教授等人的陪同下，2,100名省市官员也来到即墨市与农民合作。
我在即墨采访的大多数农民都很高兴看到政府官员与他们并肩工作。 “我们很高兴看
到人民政府和城市知识分子的官员吃相同的食物，并且与我们做同样的工作。当时我们
与他们之间有着紧密的联系。”在大跃进期间，中国社会和政治的这一常被忽视的方面
是人们士气高涨的重要因素。
在此期间，大多数人都是骨瘦如柴的，县和公社的领导人和其他所有人一样骨瘦如柴。
根据他们的体型，除了普通农民外，几乎不可能告诉这些领导人。一位来自南河的农民
张英发说：“县委书记徐志高和我一样高，但他绝对比我来村里和我们一起工作时要瘦
。”这再次与中国官员的传统形象形成鲜明对比。农民们说，很难将这些共产党官员视
为压迫者和坏人。他们只是没有引起农民的愤怒。这并不意味着当时没有多少坏的和腐
败的地方官员。但是，在当今许多农村人民的眼中，毛泽东的官员与后来的“改革”时
代的“年轻且受过高等教育”的中国政府官员大不相同，后者仅乘汽车来到村子，并在
牺牲村民。在严峻的时期，防止农民叛乱的一个重要因素是共产党官员的领导风格和个
人品格。
地方领导人与被领导人民之间的财富或背景差异很小。 1950年代的村领导对贫困村民
的了解比中国历史上的前任和后任村民要好得多。这种理解是共产党的力量，在防止大
跃进之后，它在防止政府衰落中发挥了重要作用。农民可能会跟随与绝大多数村民具有
相同社会经济背景的村领导，并对他们的需求表示关注。毛泽东成为中国人民的伟大领
袖，正是因为他能够看到农民领袖的革命潜力。正是这些农民和农民领导人实现了中国
革命的根本目标，使中国社会复兴。
在1964年的社会主义教育运动中，大跃进运动之后，许多当地的村领导被指控犯有小腐
败和轻罪，例如，进食多于应得的食物，从集体钱包中窃取少量金钱，大跃进期间彼此
之间有少量谷物。在共产党的眼中，要求党员先吃苦，后享利益（池苦前干，相守再厚
），这种de回行为是不允许的。但是，以今天的标准或传统中国的标准来看，村领导的
腐败程度很小。很自然，在粮食短缺的情况下，距离食物较近的人们会为了生存而多吃
一点。 | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 13 从文革到农村的“改革”
鉴于“大跃进”期间村领导普遍存在轻微腐败，“文化大革命”的重要目标之一是赋予
普通村民以参与乡村政治的权力。5赋予权力后，村领导的权威被大大抑制了。在此期
间，普通村民的数量比以往任何时候都要多，而且在人民眼中，地方政府变得比大跃进
时期更加合法。中央，省，地区，县和公社政府对农业，农村地区和农民给予了极大的
关注。选择了许多农民参加各级政府。敦促官员与农民合作，并敦促城市人口支持农村
人民。在文化大革命时期，有1,700万受过教育的城市青年被送往农村地区生活和工作
。因此，在农民眼中，政府关心他们。6 | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 14 当代农村动荡
自邓小平政府于1980年代初开始“改革”以来，中国媒体充斥着有关农村改革的成功故
事。中西方学者基本上都赞同中国政府关于农村改革成功的主张。根据官方报道，农作
物的单产大幅增加，农民的收入大幅度增加。 （作物单产的确增加了，部分原因是在
大跃进和文化大革命期间修建了灌溉项目，作物育种和建了化肥厂。）研究中国农村的
人推测，粮食单产的增加是由于集体向集体的转变。私人耕作。的确，在过去的二十五
年中，中国没有发生过对农业生产产生广泛影响的严重自然灾害，农民拥有的谷物比以
往任何时候都多。在我访问过的河南和山东省的村庄中，大多数农村家庭的房屋中储存
的谷物约为1至1.5公吨（两三千斤），通常足以满足两年的消费需求。
按照标准的观点，今天在中国发生的农村起义很难解释。 2001年，俞建荣的《岳村政
治》出版，记载了湖南省当代农村抗议活动。 2004年，陈桂丽和春涛报道了中国农民
对中国农村的政府政策和中共官方行为的愤怒。 （这些著作在中国引起了极大的轰动
，因为它们引起了一场大诉讼。）2004年秋天，四川省发生了两次涉及数十万农民的大
规模抗议活动，震惊世界。在一次事件中，超过十万农民包围了当地政府建筑物三天；
十几辆警车着火了，政府派出了十万多名武装警察安抚人群。在另一起事件中，愤怒的
人群将省长的人质扣留了几天。从那以后，没有人怀疑中国政府在农村地区面临着严重
的危机。
自大跃进和文化大革命以来，农民对中共的看法发生了重大变化。如上所述，农民随后
将中共以及地方，地区和国家官员视为自己的最大利益。但是，当我在1982年首次访问
即墨市的农民时，他们对农村改组的反应是，最常见的回答是工党党不关妇女（共产党
不再关心我们）。一位农民当时对我说：“我们要成为孤儿。”这个简单的答案蕴含着
许多含义。这意味着一些农民将政府的集体农业政策视为共产党关心其生计的指标。但
是，由于农村的“改革”，政府不能被视为站在一边—充其量也可以被视为中立的。农
民对中共政策和行动的看法的这种变化，以及各级政府官员的领导风格的变化，对农民
对国家的看法和与政府的互动产生了巨大影响 | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 15 私有化，腐败，不平等和犯罪
在农村重组过程中，一些集体所有的生产资料最终落入了前村领导的手中。在即墨县，
大多数集体所有的乡村工业企业首先与管理者签约，然后出售给他们。我在1978年上大
学之前管理的乡村工厂被卖给了后来的经理刘敦孝。在不到二十年的时间里，刘及其家
人获得了超过2亿元人民币（约合3000万美元）的资产。刘的弟弟在他的帮助下控制着
县城的公共交通系统，并拥有数亿人民币的资产。相同的过程通过基于裙带关系的系统
将许多国有企业和集体企业转变为私有企业。中国人民现在将这一过程称为自1980年代
中期以来中国资本主义阶级的原始罪恶。收购集体或国有资产是违宪的和非法的。这也
违反了中国农民普遍持有的社会正义感。一位资本家在一次采访中告诉我，大多数中国
资本家阶级都是犯罪开始的，就像头上悬挂着一把剑。现在，许多村民对政府的政治合
法性提出了质疑，该政府鼓励人们犯罪地收购集体所有的财产和国有生产资料。
自从农村改革以来，各级政府不再在中国组织大规模的灌溉项目，而且政府在农民生活
中的影响已降至最低。乡镇政府现在只做两件事：征收谷物税和执行计划生育政策。农
民认为乡镇政府只向他们要钱（税收）和生活（计划生育）（姚谦和姚明）。他们不相
信乡镇政府为他们做任何积极的事情。
自由的自由市场经济思想认为国民政府从农村撤退是渐进的。看来，国家正在赋予整个
社会，特别是农村人民控制自己的生计的权力。农民应该欢迎农村的改组。但是现实更
加复杂。 | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 16 在集体时代，公社领导人住在他们工作的农村地区。他们会骑自行车来到村庄。如今，
乡镇政府领导人的教育程度更高，而且不想住在农村地区。他们在县政府所在地建造了
豪华的西式房屋。因此，乡镇政府必须为前四名政府官员购买汽车：乡镇党委书记，党
委副书记，乡镇政府负责人和乡镇政府副负责人。他们还需要司机专职司机每天上班。
因为他们无事可做，所以他们常常很无聊。因此，他们参观餐馆和娱乐设施。一位农民
说：“周边地区的乡村餐馆已经开始提供小街服务（妓女），因为乡镇政府领导人希望
他们这样做。”
由于取消了农业税，随着乡镇政府支出的增加，从农民那里赚钱的方式也越来越多。许
多乡镇政府将计划生育作为从农民那里赚钱的方式。为了获得生育的许可证，农民必须
贿赂村镇政府官员。一些乡镇领导人向有钱的农民出售出生许可证。在某些地方，地方
官员甚至鼓励富裕的农民生育更多的孩子，以便他们从中获得“罚款”。在这样的社会
背景下，农民质疑中央政府以及县和村官员的政治合法性。另一种赚钱的方式是地方和
地区官员没收土地，然后他们以赚取利润出售土地以进行“发展”，却没有对农民进行
充分补偿，从而大大增加了农村的发酵。 | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 17 农民对政府合法性和官方行为的看法的改变改变了农民与国家的互动。即墨县南河村的
受访者告诉我，在“大跃进”粮食短缺期间，农民拒绝冲入村庄附近无人看守的政府粮
仓。但是现在，他们已经开始从事各种非法和非法活动。几名村民因在市场上和从其他
村民那里偷窃而入狱。他们与收税人打架。在一次事件中，两个兄弟殴打了一名收税员
，最终入狱两年。
一些大胆的人组织了一帮小偷，大规模偷窃。他们与大城市的合作者建立了网络，他们
确定了目标：主要是腐败官员和富有企业主的家。他们来到大城市，精确地犯罪，然后
回到自己的村庄，与城市合作者分道扬sp。这样，他们就可以过上“美好的生活”，并
减少被抓住的风险。大多数人，甚至是当地警察，都知道这些人如何谋生。
另一组村民组织了一个秘密社团，从事偷渡活动，并提供刺客租用。他们会以适当的价
格杀死或伤害人们。这些农民中的一些人在大跃进期间胆怯且听话，在文化大革命期间
辛勤工作，但要求很高，在改革时期变成了土匪，小偷和暴徒。
大跃进和文化大革命期间的中国社会相对贫困。人们几乎没有足够的饮食。但是许多农
民怀念那段时间。普遍条件平等，很少腐败，很少犯罪，没有毒品，没有卖淫
今天，中国农村地区的大多数人已经变得更加富裕。在我研究的主要区域即墨县，有些
人有很多钱。许多家庭声称拥有数百万。但是，与此同时，人们的生活充满了犯罪，腐
败，卖淫，滥用毒品，贫富之间存在巨大差距。 | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 18 政府对农村状况和动荡的反应
自1980年代农村改革以来，中国政府已开始首次承认，它面临着严重的三重危机，涉及
农业，农村地区和农民（圣农戈）。学者和政府官员已经开始公开讨论这场危机。于建
荣的《于村政治》（Yucun Politics）描述了湖南的一起事件，一万多名农民闯入乡镇
政府大楼。一位62岁的农民打破了六个政府标志，引用了毛泽东的话：“叛乱是正当的
。”程桂丽和春涛在《中国农民调查》中记录了许多官方压迫农民的案件。
2004年中央政府的第一号指令旨在增加农村人口的收入。为此，到2006年夏，中国政府
已经完全取消了农村人口的农业税。
然而，中国政府在中国农村地区面临的危机不仅仅是增加农民收入的问题。这是一个非
常复杂的问题，涉及政府的合法性，官方行为和许多其他问题。尽管许多人为中国政府
取消农业税而鼓掌，但此举比有效的措施更具轰动性，甚至可能是危险的。取消农业税
进一步削弱了政府在农村地区的存在。但是今天的中国农村需要更强大而不是更弱小的
政府机构。农村地区需要政府提供免费的教育和医疗服务。农民需要政府保护他们免受
贪婪的开发商的侵害，这些开发商在当地官员的支持下抢夺农民的土地。中国农村需要
逐步征税-向富人征税以保护弱者和穷人。由于地方官员想出其他方法来获得收入，仅
取消所有税收将导致更多的腐败。
中国中央政府已将当地农村的问题归咎于地方官员。同样，中国媒体也使乡镇政府官员
成为了中国农村地区日益严重的问题的替罪羊。西方的中国学者也倾向于将中国政府与
农民之间日益紧张的状况归咎于当地官员。我采访的一位乡镇政府官员告诉我，他觉得
用乡镇政府官员作为替罪羊既容易又危险：它们是问题的征兆，而不是问题的原因，是
系统的，而且比中央政府要深得多意识到。随随便便的乡镇政府官员只会掩盖真正的问
题，并导致更多的社会动荡。而且，一旦农村人民起来，他们就不会仔细考虑该与谁抗
衡。那是暴动的本质。 | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 19 回望毛
中共十一届三中全会（1978年12月）通过批评毛泽东大跃进和文化大革命中的错误的决
议后，在反毛派精英的控制下，中国媒体毫不犹豫地出版书籍，谴责大跃进和文化大革
命的文章。在过去的三十年中，反毛，反大跃进和反文化革命的情绪主导了中国的知识
分子话语。但是，许多人在中国政治协商委员会的主持下写了自己的回忆录，以收集《
大跃进》的文化和历史回忆录。从本质上讲，这些作者的论文直接与官方的指责相抵触
，他们抗议毛派反对者“重写历史”。
2006年12月，邓普芳在接受路透社记者采访时说，“文化大革命”不仅给他本人和家人
带来了灾难，也给中华民族带来了灾难。然而，这个时代几乎是例行的刻画引起了中国
人民的大量评论，在不到一个月的时间里，就引起了超过35,000个互联网反对。这些评
论绝大多数都赞扬了毛对中国人民的贡献，并批评了邓小平提出的改革措施所造成的严
重后果。有人评论说，新的精英应该“停止对毛主席说谎。”人们正在醒来，再也无法
用关于毛主席的谎言欺骗人们。”许多人说“历史是人民写的，而不是精英写的”。对
于许多中国人来说，“毛主席一生为中国人民服务，他继续生活在人民心中。”看来政
府和精英们抹黑毛泽东传统的努力适得其反，对未来的中国政治产生了重大影响。
尽管官方和半官方对他的遗产和形象进行了猛烈抨击，但毛泽东逝世很久后却受到许多
中国人的崇高敬意呢？7抹黑毛。但是，如果所谓的毛泽东政府对中国农民施加的苦难
和残酷是真实的，那么农民将是第一手知道他们的。为什么这么多农民仍然把毛的照片
挂在自己的房子里，并珍惜他的记忆，并在某些地方建庙拜他？
这些农民让我想起了我的美国同事和学生，他们是和我一起来中国参加我学院的全球经
验课程的。天安门广场上毛泽东陵墓外面的长长的队伍总是让他们感到惊讶。失去了在
毛泽东的社会主义政策下获得的利益的工人和农民，常常对他们的眼泪表示敬意。这是
毛泽东在中国工人阶级中继续受欢迎的另一个标志。 | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 20 结论
如何解释从大跃进和文化大革命到改革时代国家与社会互动的变化？孟子曾经说过：易
道到民，随酷而远，易道到沙仁，随而多远（如果统治者善意地雇用人民，人们不会抱
怨，如果统治者善意地雇用人们，人们不会抱怨。统治者使人们为了确保自己的生存而
死亡）。这意味着，当政府被认为是合法的，并且官方行为与此合法性产生共鸣时，人
们将遵循政府的政策并忍受艰辛。因此，政府将度过艰难的挑战和困难。但是，如果政
府的合法性受到质疑，或者官方行为令人反感，人们将不太可能遵循政府的政策，而当
出现危机时，人们更有可能反叛。今天，中国大量的农民动乱是政府合法性丧失的结果
。为了扭转这种趋势，政府需要做的不仅仅是增加农民的收入。
中国政府可以通过两种方式遏制农村地区的官方腐败。它可以恢复共产党过去的自我批
评和纪律机制，在这种机制中，党的领导人和普通党员定期举行会议，以根据党的政策
和法规来检查自己的行为。同时，政府可以鼓励普通农民通过不同的方式批评政府官员
和政策，包括大人物海报，这些海报在大跃进和文化大革命中被广泛使用，并已被证明
有效地抑制了官方腐败，从而赋予他们权力。 。更重要的是，政府需要选择更多的农
民担任政府职务，并鼓励地方官员尽可能与农民生活和合作。
贫富差距已经成为中国特别是农村地区的一个巨大问题，并引起了许多严重的社会问题
，例如犯罪增加。贫富差距过大将使社会崩溃，并威胁到中国的稳定。更加平等的做法
将增强中国的内部一致性，并使中国能够更有效地应对挑战。 | s******n
发帖数: 518 | 21 笔记
西方媒体很少以连贯的方式报道中国农村抗议活动的程度。但是，据《人民日报》报道
的中国新华社报道（“中国苦于农村土地权的棘手问题”，2005年发生了与土地流失有
关的“ 8.7万起抗议，骚乱和其他'群体性事件'，上升了6因此，仅在这三年中，就有
超过100,000例这样的行动发生在2004年，这是2003年的50％。文章指出：“一旦获得
中国共产党的骨干，它在农村得到了广泛的支持6几十年前，为了保护参加推翻地主阶
级斗争的农民的权利，许多中国农民现在感到与自己的土地疏远了，以前是革命的成果
。”在撰写2006年1月的故事之前的七年中，有些人670万公顷的耕地（占中国耕地的5
％）已被改作其他用途，例如道路，工厂等。人们还抗议空气，水和土壤的工业污染。
2007年，去年，中国政府发布了有关“大规模事件”的数据，涉及一百多人的抗议活动
，有80,000起此类事件。
↩新华社：“全国民兵工作会议于2月8日在北京举行，讨论和研究1958年以
来大规模民兵组织的经验和成就。”中华人民共事报》，（北京：新华出版社，1982）
，第282页。
of《中国年表》第209卷。一（北京：新华出版社，1982），210-14。
of《中国年表》第209卷。一，208。
↩有关“文化大革命”期间农村地区变化与进步的详细讨论，请参见韩东平
的《未知的文化大革命：中国乡村的生活与变化》（纽约：每月评论出版社，2008年）。
↩见韩东平，《户籍制度与中国农村发展》，《发展区杂志》，1999年春季
，和《文化大革命对农村教育和经济发展的影响》，《近代中国》 27号。 2001年1月1
日。
↩雅各布·海布伦（Jacob Heibrunn），“毛比以往任何时候都多”，新共
和国，1997年4月21日，第20页；和奥维尔·谢尔（Orville Schell），“再次，毛主&
#8203;席万岁”，大西洋，1992年12月，第32页。 |
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