m*********e
发帖数: 121 | 1 In games, when people say they solve for rational expectation equilibrium,
do they mean there are other kinds of equilibrium in the game but they
just want to focus on a particular kind of equilibrium? Are there equilibria
that are not rational expectation equilibrium? |
a**n
发帖数: 3801 | 2 Yes, rational expectation is an extra assumption.
There may exist other equilibria where RE is not
satisfied. But you have to assume some sort of
belief system and RE is usually quite natural.
equilibria
【在 m*********e 的大作中提到】
: In games, when people say they solve for rational expectation equilibrium,
: do they mean there are other kinds of equilibrium in the game but they
: just want to focus on a particular kind of equilibrium? Are there equilibria
: that are not rational expectation equilibrium?
|
m*********e
发帖数: 121 | 3 Thanks. Can you give a simple example of an equilibrium where RE is not
satisfied?
【在 a**n 的大作中提到】
: Yes, rational expectation is an extra assumption.
: There may exist other equilibria where RE is not
: satisfied. But you have to assume some sort of
: belief system and RE is usually quite natural.
:
: equilibria
|
U*****e
发帖数: 2882 | 4 My understanding is that because most literature and textbooks assume that
1) players are rational and
2) the following are common knowledge
- that players are rational (common knowledge of rationality)
- the game (common knowledge of common prior)
then Nash equilibrium and rational expectations equilibrium are equivalent. The reference below is about it. (see the abstract)
http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/raumann/pdf/86.pdf |
