k****h
发帖数: 944 | 1 An economy of two-period, consisting of a large number of communities. Each
community 有两类人 , A 类人可以在两时期之间迁移到别的communities, B类永远
immobile. A 类人 make their migration decisions based on the local
government’s policies (a set of continuous numbers), 但不会全部迁移, 因为有
a congestion constraint. My question is how to set the government target
function (or voting rules) that reflects the preferences of both A and B and
that also demonstrates that the government policies are affected by the
ratio between A p | k****h
发帖数: 944 | 2 补充一些,the government set its policies (e.g. the levels of durable public
goods and public debts) at the first period, recognizing that part of
population A may relocate to other regions. Only Nash equilibria are of
particular interest here.
A, B的utility functions may be same or different. | k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 3 Hehe, what do you mean by “voting rules that reflects the preferences of
both A and B”? Is that an optimal policy that maximize the aggregate local
welfare given the composition (or ratio) of A and B in the local community?
(e.g. like in a typical spatial setting, A and B have different bliss
points) Or is there any other consideration (e.g. local election, or the
local official also have their own objective function, so they aim to
maximize a weighted combination of both their own and the loc
【在 k****h 的大作中提到】
: An economy of two-period, consisting of a large number of communities. Each
: community 有两类人 , A 类人可以在两时期之间迁移到别的communities, B类永远
: immobile. A 类人 make their migration decisions based on the local
: government’s policies (a set of continuous numbers), 但不会全部迁移, 因为有
: a congestion constraint. My question is how to set the government target
: function (or voting rules) that reflects the preferences of both A and B and
: that also demonstrates that the government policies are affected by the
: ratio between A p
| k****h
发帖数: 944 | 4 Thanks for your inputs, kzeng.
Governments are considered benevelent ones, rather than leviathians. So in
this sense, it is more of the first case you referred. But remember that the
composition of population changes in the second period. Thus I confused
about whose welfares it is to maximize.
local
community?
and
【在 k***g 的大作中提到】
: Hehe, what do you mean by “voting rules that reflects the preferences of
: both A and B”? Is that an optimal policy that maximize the aggregate local
: welfare given the composition (or ratio) of A and B in the local community?
: (e.g. like in a typical spatial setting, A and B have different bliss
: points) Or is there any other consideration (e.g. local election, or the
: local official also have their own objective function, so they aim to
: maximize a weighted combination of both their own and the loc
| k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 5 Hehe, just maximize the present discounted expected utility of both periods.
This expected utility depends on the initial distribution of A and B, and
their objective function. If both A and B have the same utility function as
you said in your second post, then no A have incentive to migrate because
policies are the same everywhere. If A and B have different bliss points
and if A can coordinate with each other, then for every region, (1- \alpha)*
N_i will leave the region for the same destinati
【在 k****h 的大作中提到】
: Thanks for your inputs, kzeng.
: Governments are considered benevelent ones, rather than leviathians. So in
: this sense, it is more of the first case you referred. But remember that the
: composition of population changes in the second period. Thus I confused
: about whose welfares it is to maximize.
:
: local
: community?
: and
| k****h
发帖数: 944 | 6 Thanks. Actually as long as all regions are ex ante identical, there would
be no migration among jurisdictions, regardless of the utility functions of
A and B. Because in equilibrium, all regions should have the same policies.
But i doubt that it is reasonable to simply add up two-period lifetime
utilities of all residents in both periods. Still for the same reason, the
population has propensity to move, and thus the composition may change. The
government has not much reason to concern the welfa
【在 k***g 的大作中提到】
: Hehe, just maximize the present discounted expected utility of both periods.
: This expected utility depends on the initial distribution of A and B, and
: their objective function. If both A and B have the same utility function as
: you said in your second post, then no A have incentive to migrate because
: policies are the same everywhere. If A and B have different bliss points
: and if A can coordinate with each other, then for every region, (1- \alpha)*
: N_i will leave the region for the same destinati
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