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ChinaNews版 - 8964 苏联“六四”档案解密:“六四”屠杀三千人
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b*****t
发帖数: 9671
1
下午11:00(31 分钟前)8964 苏联“六四”档案解密:“六四”屠杀三千人从 童言无
忌 戈尔巴乔夫支持六四屠杀。
http://www.google.com/buzz/109245144142018091431/X2G2iCMcpux
Reshared post from Pillar Chang.8964 苏联“六四”档案解密:天安门死3000人 -
诸哥驿站·博客·网摘
作者:封从德 注意这一段对话: Lukyanov reports that the real number of
casualties on Tiananmen Square was 3,000.(Lukyanov:天安门的真实死亡数字是
3000人) Gorbachev: We must be realists. They, like us, have to defend
themselves. Three thousands . . . So what?(戈尔巴乔夫:我们必须现实。他们和
我们一样,必须维护自己。三 千。。。那又怎么样?) 这是“六四”屠杀三千人的最
新证据。此前有三个证据指向三千人这个数字: 一、六四清晨中国红十字会及某医院
发言人分别公布,医院死亡人数 2600-2700;一些西方情报机构的数字 更高; 二、北
京大学学生自治会和北高联派出28辆校车去几十家...
作者:封从德
注意这一段对话:
Lukyanov reports that the real number of casualties on Tiananmen Square
was 3,000.(Lukyanov:天安门的真实死亡数字是3000人)
Gorbachev: We must be realists. They, like us, have to defend themselves
. Three thousands . . . So what?(戈尔巴乔夫:我们必须现实。他们和我们一样,
必须维护自己。三千。。。那又怎么样?)
这是“六四”屠杀三千人的最新证据。此前有三个证据指向三千人这个数字:
一、六四清晨中国红十字会及某医院发言人分别公布,医院死亡人数 2600-2700;
一些西方情报机构的数字更高;
二、北京大学学生自治会和北高联派出28辆校车去几十家医院的调查结果,与红十
字会数字吻合;(北大筹委会副主席常劲的见 证;北高联秘书长王有才的见证)
三、美国学者Timothy Brook的书中有“六四”当天11家医院的死亡数字,总共478
人;据此他推测整个北京124家医院应有2800人死亡,与红十字会和两个学生组织的数
字吻合。
四、这些数字仅仅是六四当天在医院调查的,应该还有不少医院外死亡和失踪的情
况。如戒严部队冲进医院使很多人避到医院外, 因得不到妥善治疗而辞世的;另外,
王楠的案例(丁子霖名单第2号)证明还有大量失踪的情况,外界更难以知道。
Timothy Brook的书名是Quelling the People,这是该书第161页的影像:
http://www.city-journal.org/2010/20_2_soviet-archives.html
Claire Berlinski
A Hidden History of Evil
Why doesn’t anyone care about the unread Soviet archives?
Marc Riboud/Magnum Photos
Though Mikhail Gorbachev is lionized in the West, the untranslated
archives suggest a much darker figure.
In the world’s collective consciousness, the word “Nazi” is
synonymous with evil. It is widely understood that the Nazis’ ideology—
nationalism, anti-Semitism, the autarkic ethnic state, the Führer principle
—led directly to the furnaces of Auschwitz. It is not nearly as well
understood that Communism led just as inexorably, everywhere on the globe
where it was applied, to starvation, torture, and slave-labor camps. Nor is
it widely acknowledged that Communism was responsible for the deaths of some
150 million human beings during the twentieth century. The world remains
inexplicably indifferent and uncurious about the deadliest ideology in
history.
For evidence of this indifference, consider the unread Soviet archives.
Pavel Stroilov, a Russian exile in London, has on his computer 50,000
unpublished, untranslated, top-secret Kremlin documents, mostly dating from
the close of the Cold War. He stole them in 2003 and fled Russia. Within
living memory, they would have been worth millions to the CIA; they surely
tell a story about Communism and its collapse that the world needs to know.
Yet he can’t get anyone to house them in a reputable library, publish them,
or fund their translation. In fact, he can’t get anyone to take much
interest in them at all.
Then there’s Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, who once spent 12
years in the USSR’s prisons, labor camps, and psikhushkas—political
psychiatric hospitals—after being convicted of copying anti-Soviet
literature. He, too, possesses a massive collection of stolen and smuggled
papers from the archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party,
which, as he writes, “contain the beginnings and the ends of all the
tragedies of our bloodstained century.” These documents are available
online at bukovsky-archives.net, but most are not translated. They are
unorganized; there are no summaries; there is no search or index function.
“I offer them free of charge to the most influential newspapers and
journals in the world, but nobody wants to print them,” Bukovsky writes. “
Editors shrug indifferently: So what? Who cares?”
The originals of most of Stroilov’s documents remain in the Kremlin
archives, where, like most of the Soviet Union’s top-secret documents from
the post-Stalin era, they remain classified. They include, Stroilov says,
transcripts of nearly every conversation between Gorbachev and his foreign
counterparts—hundreds of them, a near-complete diplomatic record of the era
, available nowhere else. There are notes from the Politburo taken by Georgy
Shakhnazarov, an aide of Gorbachev’s, and by Politburo member Vadim
Medvedev. There is the diary of Anatoly Chernyaev—Gorbachev’s principal
aide and deputy chief of the body formerly known as the Comintern—which
dates from 1972 to the collapse of the regime. There are reports, dating
from the 1960s, by Vadim Zagladin, deputy chief of the Central Committee’s
International Department until 1987 and then Gorbachev’s advisor until 1991
. Zagladin was both envoy and spy, charged with gathering secrets, spreading
disinformation, and advancing Soviet influence.
When Gorbachev and his aides were ousted from the Kremlin, they took
unauthorized copies of these documents with them. The documents were scanned
and stored in the archives of the Gorbachev Foundation, one of the first
independent think tanks in modern Russia, where a handful of friendly and
vetted researchers were given limited access to them. Then, in 1999, the
foundation opened a small part of the archive to independent researchers,
including Stroilov. The key parts of the collection remained restricted;
documents could be copied only with the written permission of the author,
and Gorbachev refused to authorize any copies whatsoever. But there was a
flaw in the foundation’s security, Stroilov explained to me. When things
went wrong with the computers, as often they did, he was able to watch the
network administrator typing the password that gave access to the foundation
’s network. Slowly and secretly, Stroilov copied the archive and sent it to
secure locations around the world.
When I first heard about Stroilov’s documents, I wondered if they were
forgeries. But in 2006, having assessed the documents with the cooperation
of prominent Soviet dissidents and Cold War spies, British judges concluded
that Stroilov was credible and granted his asylum request. The Gorbachev
Foundation itself has since acknowledged the documents’ authenticity.
Bukovsky’s story is similar. In 1992, President Boris Yeltsin’s
government invited him to testify at the Constitutional Court of Russia in a
case concerning the constitutionality of the Communist Party. The Russian
State Archives granted Bukovsky access to its documents to prepare his
testimony. Using a handheld scanner, he copied thousands of documents and
smuggled them to the West.
The Russian state cannot sue Stroilov or Bukovsky for breach of
copyright, since the material was created by the Communist Party and the
Soviet Union, neither of which now exists. Had he remained in Russia,
however, Stroilov believes that he could have been prosecuted for disclosure
of state secrets or treason. The military historian Igor Sutyagin is now
serving 15 years in a hard-labor camp for the crime of collecting newspaper
clippings and other open-source materials and sending them to a British
consulting firm. The danger that Stroilov and Bukovsky faced was real and
grave; they both assumed, one imagines, that the world would take notice of
what they had risked so much to acquire.
Stroilov claims that his documents “tell a completely new story about
the end of the Cold War. The ‘commonly accepted’ version of history of
that period consists of myths almost entirely. These documents are capable
of ruining each of those myths.” Is this so? I couldn’t say. I don’t read
Russian. Of Stroilov’s documents, I have seen only the few that have been
translated into English. Certainly, they shouldn’t be taken at face value;
they were, after all, written by Communists. But the possibility that
Stroilov is right should surely compel keen curiosity.
For instance, the documents cast Gorbachev in a far darker light than
the one in which he is generally regarded. In one document, he laughs with
the Politburo about the USSR’s downing of Korean Airlines flight 007 in
1983—a crime that was not only monstrous but brought the world very near to
nuclear Armageddon. These minutes from a Politburo meeting on October 4,
1989, are similarly disturbing:
Lukyanov reports that the real number of casualties on Tiananmen Square
was 3,000.
Gorbachev: We must be realists. They, like us, have to defend themselves
. Three thousands . . . So what?
And a transcript of Gorbachev’s conversation with Hans-Jochen Vogel,
the leader of West Germany’s Social Democratic Party, shows Gorbachev
defending Soviet troops’ April 9, 1989, massacre of peaceful protesters in
Tbilisi.
Stroilov’s documents also contain transcripts of Gorbachev’s
discussions with many Middle Eastern leaders. These suggest interesting
connections between Soviet policy and contemporary trends in Russian foreign
policy. Here is a fragment from a conversation reported to have taken place
with Syrian president Hafez al-Assad on April 28, 1990:
H. ASSAD. To put pressure on Israel, Baghdad would need to get closer to
Damascus, because Iraq has no common borders with Israel. . . .
M. S. GORBACHEV. I think so, too. . . .
H. ASSAD. Israel’s approach is different, because the Judaic religion
itself states: the land of Israel spreads from Nile to Euphrates and its
return is a divine predestination.
M. S. GORBACHEV. But this is racism, combined with Messianism!
H. ASSAD. This is the most dangerous form of racism.
One doesn’t need to be a fantasist to wonder whether these discussions
might be relevant to our understanding of contemporary Russian policy in a
region of some enduring strategic significance.
There are other ways in which the story that Stroilov’s and Bukovsky’s
papers tell isn’t over. They suggest, for example, that the architects of
the European integration project, as well as many of today’s senior leaders
in the European Union, were far too close to the USSR for comfort. This
raises important questions about the nature of contemporary Europe—
questions that might be asked when Americans consider Europe as a model for
social policy, or when they seek European diplomatic cooperation on key
issues of national security.
According to Zagladin’s reports, for example, Kenneth Coates, who from
1989 to 1998 was a British member of the European Parliament, approached
Zagladin on January 9, 1990, to discuss what amounted to a gradual merger of
the European Parliament and the Supreme Soviet. Coates, says Zagladin,
explained that “creating an infrastructure of cooperation between the two
parliament[s] would help . . . to isolate the rightists in the European
Parliament (and in Europe), those who are interested in the USSR’s collapse
.” Coates served as chair of the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on
Human Rights from 1992 to 1994. How did it come to pass that Europe was
taking advice about human rights from a man who had apparently wished to “
isolate” those interested in the USSR’s collapse and sought to extend
Soviet influence in Europe?
Or consider a report on Francisco Fernández Ordó?ez, who led Spain’s
integration into the European Community as its foreign minister. On March 3,
1989, according to these documents, he explained to Gorbachev that “the
success of perestroika means only one thing—the success of the socialist
revolution in contemporary conditions. And that is exactly what the
reactionaries don’t accept.” Eighteen months later, Ordó?ez told
Gorbachev: “I feel intellectual disgust when I have to read, for example,
passages in the documents of ‘G7’ where the problems of democracy, freedom
of human personality and ideology of market economy are set on the same
level. As a socialist, I cannot accept such an equation.” Perhaps most
shockingly, the Eastern European press has reported that Stroilov’s
documents suggest that Fran?ois Mitterrand was maneuvering with Gorbachev to
ensure that Germany would unite as a neutral, socialist entity under a
Franco-Soviet condominium.
Zagladin’s records also note that the former leader of the British
Labour Party, Neil Kinnock, approached Gorbachev—unauthorized, while
Kinnock was leader of the opposition—through a secret envoy to discuss the
possibility of halting the United Kingdom’s Trident nuclear-missile program
. The minutes of the meeting between Gorbachev and the envoy, MP Stuart
Holland, read as follows:
In [Holland’s] opinion, Soviet Union should be very interested in
liquidation of “Tridents” because, apart from other things, the West—
meaning the US, Britain and France—would have a serious advantage over the
Soviet Union after the completion of START treaty. That advantage will need
to be eliminated. . . . At the same time Holland noted that, of course, we
can seriously think about realisation of that idea only if the Labour comes
to power. He said Thatcher . . . would never agree to any reduction of
nuclear armaments.
Kinnock was vice president of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004,
and his wife, Glenys, is now Britain’s minister for Europe. Gerard Batten,
a member of the UK Independence Party, has noted the significance of the
episode. “If the report given to Mr. Gorbachev is true, it means that Lord
Kinnock approached one of Britain’s enemies in order to seek approval
regarding his party’s defense policy and, had he been elected, Britain’s
defense policy,” Batten said to the European Parliament in 2009. “If this
report is true, then Lord Kinnock would be guilty of treason.”
Similarly, Baroness Catherine Ashton, who is now the European Union’s
foreign minister, was treasurer of Britain’s Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament from 1980 to 1982. The papers offer evidence that this
organization received “unidentified income” from the Soviet Union in the
1980s. Stroilov’s papers suggest as well that the government of the current
Spanish EU commissioner for economic and monetary affairs, Joaquín Almunia
, enthusiastically supported the Soviet project of gradually unifying
Germany and Europe into a socialist “common European home” and strongly
opposed the independence of the Baltic states and then of Ukraine.
Perhaps it doesn’t surprise you to read that prominent European
politicians held these views. But why doesn’t it? It is impossible to
imagine that figures who had enjoyed such close ties to the Nazi Party—or,
for that matter, to the Ku Klux Klan or to South Africa’s apartheid regime
—would enjoy top positions in Europe today. The rules are different,
apparently, for Communist fellow travelers. “We now have the EU unelected
socialist party running Europe,” Stroilov said to me. “Bet the KGB can’t
believe it.”
And what of Zagladin’s description of his dealings with our own current
vice president in 1979?
Unofficially, [Senator Joseph] Biden and [Senator Richard] Lugar said
that, in the end of the day, they were not so much concerned with having a
problem of this or that citizen solved as with showing to the American
public that they do care for “human rights.” . . . In other words, the
collocutors directly admitted that what is happening is a kind of a show,
that they absolutely do not care for the fate of most so-called dissidents.
Remarkably, the world has shown little interest in the unread Soviet
archives. That paragraph about Biden is a good example. Stroilov and
Bukovsky coauthored a piece about it for the online magazine FrontPage on
October 10, 2008; it passed without remark. Americans considered the episode
so uninteresting that even Biden’s political opponents didn’t try to turn
it into political capital. Imagine, if you can, what it must feel like to
have spent the prime of your life in a Soviet psychiatric hospital, to know
that Joe Biden is now vice president of the United States, and to know that
no one gives a damn.
Bukovsky’s book about the story that these documents tell, Jugement à
Moscou, has been published in French, Russian, and a few other Slavic
languages, but not in English. Random House bought the manuscript and, in
Bukovsky’s words, tried “to force me to rewrite the whole book from the
liberal left political perspective.” Bukovsky replied that “due to certain
peculiarities of my biography I am allergic to political censorship.” The
contract was canceled, the book was never published in English, and no other
publisher has shown interest in it. Neither has anyone wanted to publish
EUSSR, a pamphlet by Stroilov and Bukovsky about the Soviet roots of
European integration. In 2004, a very small British publisher did print an
abbreviated version of the pamphlet; it, too, passed unnoticed.
Stroilov has a long list of complaints about journalists who have
initially shown interest in the documents, only to tell him later that their
editors have declared the story insignificant. In advance of Gorbachev’s
visit to Germany for the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the fall of
the Berlin Wall, Stroilov says, he offered the German press the documents
depicting Gorbachev unflatteringly. There were no takers. In France, news
about the documents showing Mitterrand’s and Gorbachev’s plans to turn
Germany into a dependent socialist state prompted a few murmurs of curiosity
, nothing more. Bukovsky’s vast collection about Soviet sponsorship of
terrorism, Palestinian and otherwise, remains largely unpublished.
Stroilov says that he and Bukovsky approached Jonathan Brent of Yale
University Press, which is leading a publishing project on the history of
the Cold War. He claims that initially Brent was enthusiastic and asked him
to write a book, based on the documents, about the first Gulf War. Stroilov
says that he wrote the first six chapters, sent them off, and never heard
from Brent again, despite sending him e-mail after e-mail. “I can only
speculate what so much frightened him in that book,” Stroilov wrote to me.
I’ve also asked Brent and received no reply. This doesn’t mean
anything; people are busy. I am less inclined to believe in complex attempts
to suppress the truth than I am in indifference and preoccupation with
other things. Stroilov sees in these events “a kind of a taboo, the vague
common understanding in the Establishment that it is better to let sleeping
dogs lie, not to throw stones in a house of glass, and not to mention a rope
in the house of a hanged man.” I suspect it is something even more
disturbing: no one much cares.
“I know the time will come,” Stroilov says, “when the world has to
look at those documents very carefully. We just cannot escape this. We have
no way forward until we face the truth about what happened to us in the
twentieth century. Even now, no matter how hard we try to ignore history,
all these questions come back to us time and again.”
The questions come back time and again, it is true, but few remember
that they have been asked before, and few remember what the answer looked
like. No one talks much about the victims of Communism. No one erects
memorials to the throngs of people murdered by the Soviet state. (In his
widely ignored book, A Century of Violence in Soviet Russia, Alexander
Yakovlev, the architect of perestroika under Gorbachev, puts the number at
30 to 35 million.)
Indeed, many still subscribe to the essential tenets of Communist
ideology. Politicians, academics, students, even the occasional autodidact
taxi driver still stand opposed to private property. Many remain enthralled
by schemes for central economic planning. Stalin, according to polls, is one
of Russia’s most popular historical figures. No small number of young
people in Istanbul, where I live, proudly describe themselves as Communists;
I have met such people around the world, from Seattle to Calcutta.
We rightly insisted upon total denazification; we rightly excoriate
those who now attempt to revive the Nazis’ ideology. But the world exhibits
a perilous failure to acknowledge the monstrous history of Communism. These
documents should be translated. They should be housed in a reputable
library, properly cataloged, and carefully assessed by scholars. Above all,
they should be well-known to a public that seems to have forgotten what the
Soviet Union was really about. If they contain what Stroilov and Bukovsky
say—and all the evidence I’ve seen suggests that they do—this is the
obligation of anyone who gives a damn about history, foreign policy, and the
scores of millions dead.
Claire Berlinski, a contributing editor of City Journal, is an American
journalist who lives in Istanbul. She is the author of There Is No
Alternative: Why Margaret Thatcher Matters.
来源:http://www.aboluowang.com/news/data/2010/0605/article_101362.html
b*****t
发帖数: 9671
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发文不显示,难道是在审查?

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【在 b*****t 的大作中提到】
: 下午11:00(31 分钟前)8964 苏联“六四”档案解密:“六四”屠杀三千人从 童言无
: 忌 戈尔巴乔夫支持六四屠杀。
: http://www.google.com/buzz/109245144142018091431/X2G2iCMcpux
: Reshared post from Pillar Chang.8964 苏联“六四”档案解密:天安门死3000人 -
: 诸哥驿站·博客·网摘
: 作者:封从德 注意这一段对话: Lukyanov reports that the real number of
: casualties on Tiananmen Square was 3,000.(Lukyanov:天安门的真实死亡数字是
: 3000人) Gorbachev: We must be realists. They, like us, have to defend
: themselves. Three thousands . . . So what?(戈尔巴乔夫:我们必须现实。他们和
: 我们一样,必须维护自己。三 千。。。那又怎么样?) 这是“六四”屠杀三千人的最

p*****e
发帖数: 7299
3
要等待中喧部通稿辟谣以确认准确性。
1 (共1页)
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